external/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/skills/performing-log-source-onboarding-in-siem/SKILL.md
Perform structured log source onboarding into SIEM platforms by configuring collectors, parsers, normalization, and validation for complete security visibility.
npx skillsauth add seikaikyo/dash-skills performing-log-source-onboarding-in-siemInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
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Log source onboarding is the systematic process of integrating new data sources into a SIEM platform to enable security monitoring and detection. Proper onboarding requires planning data sources, configuring collection agents, building parsers, normalizing fields to a common schema, and validating data quality. According to the UK NCSC, onboarding should prioritize log sources that provide the highest security value relative to their ingestion cost.
| Source | Log Type | Security Value | |---|---|---| | Active Directory | Security Event Logs | Authentication, privilege escalation | | Firewalls | Traffic logs | Network access, C2 detection | | EDR/AV | Endpoint alerts | Malware, process execution | | VPN/Remote Access | Connection logs | Unauthorized access | | DNS Servers | Query logs | C2 beaconing, data exfiltration | | Email Gateway | Email security logs | Phishing, BEC |
| Source | Log Type | Security Value | |---|---|---| | Web Proxy | HTTP/HTTPS logs | Web-based attacks, data exfiltration | | Cloud platforms (AWS/Azure/GCP) | Audit logs | Cloud security posture | | Database servers | Audit/query logs | Data access, SQL injection | | DHCP/IPAM | Address allocation | Asset tracking | | File servers | Access logs | Data access monitoring |
| Source | Log Type | Security Value | |---|---|---| | Application servers | App logs | Application-level attacks | | Print servers | Print logs | Data loss prevention | | Badge/physical access | Access logs | Physical security correlation | | Network devices (switches/routers) | Syslog | Network anomalies |
1. Identify the log source:
- System type and version
- Log format (syslog, CEF, JSON, Windows Events, etc.)
- Log volume estimate (EPS - events per second)
- Network location and firewall requirements
2. Assess security value:
- What threats can this source help detect?
- Which MITRE ATT&CK techniques does it cover?
- Is there an existing SIEM parser?
3. Estimate ingestion cost:
- Daily volume in GB
- License impact (per-GB or per-EPS pricing)
- Storage retention requirements
# rsyslog configuration for receiving syslog
# /etc/rsyslog.d/10-siem-collection.conf
# UDP reception
module(load="imudp")
input(type="imudp" port="514" ruleset="siem_forwarding")
# TCP reception
module(load="imtcp")
input(type="imtcp" port="514" ruleset="siem_forwarding")
# TLS reception
module(load="imtcp" StreamDriver.AuthMode="x509/name"
StreamDriver.Mode="1" StreamDriver.Name="gtls")
input(type="imtcp" port="6514" ruleset="siem_forwarding")
ruleset(name="siem_forwarding") {
# Forward to SIEM
action(type="omfwd" target="siem.company.com" port="9514"
protocol="tcp" queue.type="LinkedList"
queue.filename="siem_fwd" queue.maxdiskspace="1g"
queue.saveonshutdown="on" action.resumeRetryCount="-1")
}
# inputs.conf on Splunk Universal Forwarder
[WinEventLog://Security]
disabled = 0
index = wineventlog
sourcetype = WinEventLog:Security
evt_resolve_ad_obj = 1
checkpointInterval = 5
[WinEventLog://System]
disabled = 0
index = wineventlog
sourcetype = WinEventLog:System
[WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational]
disabled = 0
index = wineventlog
sourcetype = XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
renderXml = true
[WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational]
disabled = 0
index = wineventlog
sourcetype = XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
{
"AWSTemplateFormatVersion": "2010-09-09",
"Resources": {
"CloudTrailToSIEM": {
"Type": "AWS::CloudTrail::Trail",
"Properties": {
"TrailName": "siem-cloudtrail",
"S3BucketName": "company-cloudtrail-logs",
"IsLogging": true,
"IsMultiRegionTrail": true,
"IncludeGlobalServiceEvents": true,
"EnableLogFileValidation": true,
"EventSelectors": [
{
"ReadWriteType": "All",
"IncludeManagementEvents": true,
"DataResources": [
{
"Type": "AWS::S3::Object",
"Values": ["arn:aws:s3"]
}
]
}
]
}
}
}
}
# props.conf
[custom:firewall:logs]
SHOULD_LINEMERGE = false
LINE_BREAKER = ([\r\n]+)
TIME_PREFIX = ^
TIME_FORMAT = %Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S%z
MAX_TIMESTAMP_LOOKAHEAD = 30
TRANSFORMS-firewall = firewall_extract_fields
FIELDALIAS-src = src_addr AS src_ip
FIELDALIAS-dst = dst_addr AS dest_ip
EVAL-action = case(fw_action=="allow", "allowed", fw_action=="deny", "blocked", true(), "unknown")
EVAL-vendor_product = "Custom Firewall"
LOOKUP-geo = geo_ip_lookup ip AS dest_ip OUTPUT country, city, latitude, longitude
# transforms.conf
[firewall_extract_fields]
REGEX = ^(\S+)\s+(\S+)\s+action=(\w+)\s+src=(\S+):(\d+)\s+dst=(\S+):(\d+)\s+proto=(\w+)\s+bytes=(\d+)
FORMAT = timestamp::$1 hostname::$2 fw_action::$3 src_addr::$4 src_port::$5 dst_addr::$6 dst_port::$7 protocol::$8 bytes::$9
| Raw Field | CIM Field | Data Model | |---|---|---| | src_addr | src_ip | Network_Traffic | | dst_addr | dest_ip | Network_Traffic | | dst_port | dest_port | Network_Traffic | | fw_action | action | Network_Traffic | | bytes_sent + bytes_recv | bytes | Network_Traffic | | user_name | user | Authentication | | login_result | action | Authentication | | process_path | process | Endpoint |
# Verify events are arriving
index=new_source earliest=-1h
| stats count by sourcetype, host, source
# Check field extraction quality
index=new_source earliest=-1h
| stats count(src_ip) as has_src count(dest_ip) as has_dest count(action) as has_action count by sourcetype
| eval src_coverage=round(has_src/count*100,1)
| eval dest_coverage=round(has_dest/count*100,1)
| eval action_coverage=round(has_action/count*100,1)
# Verify CIM compliance
| datamodel Network_Traffic search
| search sourcetype=new_sourcetype
| stats count by source, sourcetype
# Check for timestamp parsing issues
index=new_source earliest=-1h
| eval time_diff=abs(_time - _indextime)
| stats avg(time_diff) as avg_lag max(time_diff) as max_lag by host
| where avg_lag > 300
# Verify existing correlation searches work with new source
index=new_source sourcetype=new_sourcetype
| tstats count from datamodel=Authentication by _time span=1h
| timechart span=1h count
# Create source-specific detection rule
[New Source - Authentication Anomaly]
search = index=new_source sourcetype=new_sourcetype action=failure \
| stats count by src_ip, user \
| where count > 10
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