external/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/skills/implementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore/SKILL.md
Implements microsegmentation with Akamai Guardicore Segmentation to map application dependencies, visualize east-west traffic flows, and create granular, least-privilege network policies across VMs, containers, bare metal, and cloud. Use when blocking lateral movement in a data center or when PCI DSS/HIPAA compliance requires validated network segmentation.
npx skillsauth add seikaikyo/dash-skills implementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicoreInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
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Do not use for perimeter-only security (use traditional firewalls), for environments with fewer than 50 workloads where VLANs/security groups suffice, or when network team lacks capacity for ongoing policy management.
Install agents to collect process-level network communication data.
# Linux agent installation
curl -sSL https://management.guardicore.com/api/v3.0/agents/download/linux \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GC_API_TOKEN}" \
-o gc-agent-installer.sh
chmod +x gc-agent-installer.sh
sudo ./gc-agent-installer.sh \
--management-url=https://management.guardicore.com \
--site-id=datacenter-east \
--label="web-tier"
# Windows agent installation (PowerShell)
# Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://management.guardicore.com/api/v3.0/agents/download/windows" `
# -Headers @{"Authorization"="Bearer $GC_API_TOKEN"} `
# -OutFile gc-agent-installer.exe
# Start-Process -FilePath .\gc-agent-installer.exe `
# -ArgumentList "--management-url=https://management.guardicore.com","--site-id=datacenter-east" `
# -Wait
# Kubernetes DaemonSet deployment
cat > gc-daemonset.yaml << 'EOF'
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: DaemonSet
metadata:
name: guardicore-agent
namespace: guardicore
spec:
selector:
matchLabels:
app: gc-agent
template:
metadata:
labels:
app: gc-agent
spec:
hostNetwork: true
hostPID: true
containers:
- name: gc-agent
image: guardicore/agent:latest
securityContext:
privileged: true
env:
- name: GC_MANAGEMENT_URL
value: "https://management.guardicore.com"
- name: GC_API_KEY
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: gc-credentials
key: api-key
volumeMounts:
- mountPath: /host
name: host-root
volumes:
- name: host-root
hostPath:
path: /
EOF
kubectl apply -f gc-daemonset.yaml
# Verify agent enrollment
curl -s "https://management.guardicore.com/api/v3.0/agents?status=active" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GC_API_TOKEN}" | python3 -m json.tool
Use Guardicore Reveal to discover and visualize application communication patterns.
# Query discovered application flows via API
curl -s "https://management.guardicore.com/api/v3.0/connections" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GC_API_TOKEN}" \
-d '{
"time_range": {"from": "2026-02-17T00:00:00Z", "to": "2026-02-24T00:00:00Z"},
"filter": {
"source_label": "web-tier",
"destination_label": "app-tier"
},
"aggregation": "process",
"limit": 1000
}' | python3 -m json.tool
# Export application dependency map
curl -s "https://management.guardicore.com/api/v3.0/maps/export" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GC_API_TOKEN}" \
-d '{
"format": "json",
"labels": ["web-tier", "app-tier", "db-tier"],
"time_range": "7d"
}' -o app-dependency-map.json
# Typical discovery findings:
# web-tier -> app-tier: TCP 8080, 8443 (expected)
# app-tier -> db-tier: TCP 5432, 3306 (expected)
# web-tier -> db-tier: TCP 5432 (UNEXPECTED - should be blocked)
# app-tier -> internet: TCP 443 (verify if needed)
Define labels and create ring-fence policies around applications.
# Create labels for application tiers
curl -X POST "https://management.guardicore.com/api/v3.0/labels" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GC_API_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"name": "PCI-CDE",
"description": "Cardholder Data Environment workloads",
"criteria": {"ip_ranges": ["10.10.0.0/16"]},
"color": "#FF0000"
}'
# Create segmentation policy: Allow web-to-app communication
curl -X POST "https://management.guardicore.com/api/v3.0/policies" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GC_API_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"name": "Web-to-App Allowed",
"action": "ALLOW",
"priority": 100,
"source": {"labels": ["web-tier"]},
"destination": {"labels": ["app-tier"]},
"services": [
{"protocol": "TCP", "port": 8080},
{"protocol": "TCP", "port": 8443}
],
"log": true,
"enabled": true,
"section": "application-segmentation"
}'
# Create deny policy: Block web-to-database direct access
curl -X POST "https://management.guardicore.com/api/v3.0/policies" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GC_API_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"name": "Block Web-to-DB Direct",
"action": "DENY",
"priority": 200,
"source": {"labels": ["web-tier"]},
"destination": {"labels": ["db-tier"]},
"services": [{"protocol": "TCP", "port_range": "1-65535"}],
"log": true,
"alert": true,
"enabled": true
}'
# Create ring-fence policy for PCI CDE
curl -X POST "https://management.guardicore.com/api/v3.0/policies" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GC_API_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"name": "PCI CDE Ring Fence",
"action": "DENY",
"priority": 50,
"source": {"labels": ["!PCI-CDE"]},
"destination": {"labels": ["PCI-CDE"]},
"services": [{"protocol": "TCP", "port_range": "1-65535"}],
"log": true,
"alert": true,
"enabled": true
}'
Simulate policy enforcement without blocking traffic.
# Enable reveal mode (log-only) for new policies
curl -X PATCH "https://management.guardicore.com/api/v3.0/policies/POLICY_ID" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GC_API_TOKEN}" \
-d '{"enforcement_mode": "REVEAL"}'
# Check what would be blocked in reveal mode
curl -s "https://management.guardicore.com/api/v3.0/violations" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GC_API_TOKEN}" \
-d '{
"time_range": "24h",
"policy_id": "POLICY_ID",
"limit": 100
}' | python3 -c "
import json, sys
data = json.load(sys.stdin)
for v in data.get('violations', []):
print(f\"{v['source_ip']}:{v['source_process']} -> {v['dest_ip']}:{v['dest_port']} [{v['action']}]\")
"
# After validation, switch to enforcement
curl -X PATCH "https://management.guardicore.com/api/v3.0/policies/POLICY_ID" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GC_API_TOKEN}" \
-d '{"enforcement_mode": "ENFORCE"}'
Set up alerting and continuous monitoring for segmentation violations.
# Configure SIEM integration for policy violations
curl -X POST "https://management.guardicore.com/api/v3.0/integrations/syslog" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GC_API_TOKEN}" \
-d '{
"name": "Splunk SIEM",
"host": "splunk-syslog.company.com",
"port": 514,
"protocol": "TCP",
"format": "CEF",
"events": ["policy_violation", "agent_status", "deception_alert"]
}'
# Splunk query for microsegmentation violations
# index=guardicore sourcetype=guardicore:policy
# | where action="DENY" AND enforcement_mode="ENFORCE"
# | stats count by src_ip, dst_ip, dst_port, policy_name
# | sort -count
| Term | Definition | |------|------------| | Microsegmentation | Network security technique creating granular security zones around individual workloads or applications to control east-west traffic | | Reveal Mode | Guardicore's simulation mode that logs policy decisions without enforcing them, allowing validation before blocking | | Ring-Fence Policy | Isolation policy that restricts all traffic into or out of a defined group of assets (e.g., PCI CDE) | | Application Dependency Map | Visual representation of discovered network communication patterns between workloads showing processes, ports, and protocols | | East-West Traffic | Network traffic flowing laterally between workloads within a data center, as opposed to north-south traffic crossing the perimeter | | Process-Level Visibility | Guardicore's ability to identify which process on a workload initiated or received a network connection |
Context: An e-commerce company must isolate its Cardholder Data Environment (CDE) from the rest of the corporate network for PCI DSS compliance. The CDE spans 200 servers across on-prem and AWS.
Approach:
Pitfalls: Agent deployment on legacy systems (Windows Server 2012) may require manual installation. Ring-fence policies must account for management traffic (monitoring, patching, backup). Start with broad allow rules and progressively tighten. Application owners must validate dependency maps before enforcement.
Microsegmentation Deployment Report
==================================================
Organization: E-Commerce Corp
Report Date: 2026-02-23
AGENT DEPLOYMENT:
Total workloads: 500
Agents installed: 487 (97.4%)
Agents active: 482 (98.9%)
Agentless (flow logs): 13
POLICY COVERAGE:
Total policies: 45
Allow rules: 38
Deny rules: 7
Reveal mode: 3
Enforced: 42
TRAFFIC ANALYSIS (7 days):
Total flows observed: 2,456,789
Flows matching allow: 2,441,234 (99.4%)
Flows matching deny: 15,555 (0.6%)
Unclassified flows: 0
PCI CDE ISOLATION:
CDE workloads: 200
Ring-fence violations: 0 (last 30 days)
Authorized CDE entry points: 4
Lateral movement paths blocked: 95%
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