external/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/skills/implementing-infrastructure-as-code-security-scanning/SKILL.md
Implements automated security scanning for Infrastructure as Code using Checkov, tfsec, and KICS to detect misconfigurations in Terraform, CloudFormation, Kubernetes manifests, and Helm charts, plus policy-based governance and CI/CD integration. Use when validating cloud infrastructure before deployment or blocking insecure changes (public S3 buckets, open security groups) in pull requests.
npx skillsauth add seikaikyo/dash-skills implementing-infrastructure-as-code-security-scanningInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
3 of 9 scanners reported clean
Some scanners were skipped, did not run, or reported a non-clean status. Review each row below.
Do not use for scanning application source code (use SAST), for monitoring already-deployed infrastructure drift (use cloud security posture management tools), or for container image vulnerability scanning (use Trivy).
pip install checkov) or tfsec installed# Scan all Terraform files in a directory
checkov -d ./terraform/ --framework terraform --output cli --output json --output-file-path ./results
# Scan specific file
checkov -f main.tf --output json
# Scan Terraform plan (more accurate for dynamic values)
terraform init && terraform plan -out=tfplan
terraform show -json tfplan > tfplan.json
checkov -f tfplan.json --framework terraform_plan
# Scan with specific checks only
checkov -d ./terraform/ --check CKV_AWS_18,CKV_AWS_19,CKV_AWS_20
# Skip specific checks
checkov -d ./terraform/ --skip-check CKV_AWS_145,CKV2_AWS_6
# .github/workflows/iac-security.yml
name: IaC Security Scan
on:
pull_request:
paths:
- 'terraform/**'
- 'cloudformation/**'
- 'k8s/**'
jobs:
checkov:
name: Checkov IaC Scan
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Run Checkov
uses: bridgecrewio/checkov-action@v12
with:
directory: terraform/
framework: terraform
output_format: cli,sarif
output_file_path: console,checkov.sarif
soft_fail: false
skip_check: CKV_AWS_145
- name: Upload SARIF
if: always()
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
with:
sarif_file: checkov.sarif
category: checkov-iac
tfsec:
name: tfsec Scan
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Run tfsec
uses: aquasecurity/[email protected]
with:
working_directory: terraform/
sarif_file: tfsec.sarif
soft_fail: false
- name: Upload SARIF
if: always()
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
with:
sarif_file: tfsec.sarif
category: tfsec
# custom_checks/s3_versioning.py
from checkov.terraform.checks.resource.base_resource_check import BaseResourceCheck
from checkov.common.models.enums import CheckResult, CheckCategories
class S3BucketVersioning(BaseResourceCheck):
def __init__(self):
name = "Ensure S3 bucket has versioning enabled"
id = "CKV_CUSTOM_1"
supported_resources = ["aws_s3_bucket"]
categories = [CheckCategories.GENERAL_SECURITY]
super().__init__(name=name, id=id, categories=categories,
supported_resources=supported_resources)
def scan_resource_conf(self, conf):
versioning = conf.get("versioning", [{}])
if isinstance(versioning, list) and len(versioning) > 0:
if versioning[0].get("enabled", [False])[0]:
return CheckResult.PASSED
return CheckResult.FAILED
check = S3BucketVersioning()
# .checkov.yaml
branch: main
compact: true
directory:
- terraform/
- cloudformation/
framework:
- terraform
- cloudformation
- kubernetes
output:
- cli
- sarif
skip-check:
- CKV_AWS_145 # S3 default encryption with CMK (using SSE-S3 is acceptable)
- CKV2_AWS_6 # S3 bucket request logging (handled at CloudTrail level)
soft-fail: false
# Scan Kubernetes manifests
checkov -d ./k8s/ --framework kubernetes
# Scan Helm charts (renders templates first)
checkov -d ./charts/myapp/ --framework helm
# Scan with KICS (Keeping Infrastructure as Code Secure)
docker run -v $(pwd)/k8s:/path checkmarx/kics:latest scan \
--path /path \
--output-path /path/results \
--type Kubernetes \
--report-formats json,sarif
| Term | Definition | |------|------------| | IaC Scanning | Automated analysis of infrastructure code templates to detect security misconfigurations before deployment | | Policy as Code | Security policies defined as executable code that can be version-controlled, tested, and enforced automatically | | CKV Check ID | Checkov's unique identifier for each security check (e.g., CKV_AWS_18 for S3 public access) | | Terraform Plan Scanning | Scanning the resolved Terraform plan JSON which includes computed values and module expansions | | Graph-based Scanning | Checkov's ability to analyze relationships between resources, not just individual resource configs | | Drift Detection | Identifying differences between IaC definitions and actual deployed infrastructure state | | Custom Policy | Organization-specific security checks authored in Python or YAML to enforce internal standards |
Context: A development team repeatedly creates S3 buckets without proper access controls. A recent incident exposed customer data through a public bucket.
Approach:
aws_s3_bucket_public_access_block resource for every S3 bucketsoft_fail: false to block PR merges when S3 security checks failPitfalls: Scanning only .tf files misses dynamically computed values. Use Terraform plan scanning for higher accuracy. Checkov's resource-relationship checks (CKV2 prefix) require graph analysis mode.
IaC Security Scan Report
==========================
Framework: Terraform
Directory: terraform/
Scan Date: 2026-02-23
Checkov Results:
Passed: 187
Failed: 12
Skipped: 3
Unknown: 0
FAILED CHECKS:
CKV_AWS_18 [HIGH] S3 Bucket has public read ACL
Resource: aws_s3_bucket.data_lake
File: terraform/storage.tf:15-28
CKV_AWS_24 [HIGH] CloudWatch log group not encrypted
Resource: aws_cloudwatch_log_group.app
File: terraform/monitoring.tf:3-8
CKV_AWS_79 [MEDIUM] Instance metadata service v1 enabled
Resource: aws_instance.web
File: terraform/compute.tf:12-30
QUALITY GATE: FAILED (2 HIGH severity findings)
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