skills/detecting-exfiltration-over-dns-with-zeek/SKILL.md
Detect DNS-based data exfiltration by analyzing Zeek dns.log for high-entropy subdomains, oversized TXT/NULL records, and anomalous query volume or patterns. Use when investigating suspected DNS tunneling, covert C2 over DNS, or data exfiltration hidden in DNS queries against network traffic captured by Zeek.
npx skillsauth add mukul975/cyber-skills detecting-exfiltration-over-dns-with-zeekInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
3 of 9 scanners reported clean
Some scanners were skipped, did not run, or reported a non-clean status. Review each row below.
DNS tunneling and exfiltration is a technique used by attackers to bypass firewalls and DLP controls by encoding stolen data into DNS query subdomains. Legitimate DNS queries have predictable entropy and length patterns, while exfiltration queries contain encoded data with high Shannon entropy, unusually long subdomain labels, and high volumes of unique subdomains per parent domain.
This skill analyzes Zeek dns.log files (TSV format) to detect exfiltration indicators. The agent computes Shannon entropy for each subdomain component, identifies queries exceeding the 63-character DNS label limit, counts unique subdomains per parent domain, and flags domains that exceed configurable thresholds. These techniques detect tools like dnscat2, iodine, dns2tcp, and custom DNS tunneling implementations.
Parse Zeek dns.log headers: Read the TSV file, extract the #fields header line to identify column positions for ts, id.orig_h, query, qtype_name, rcode_name, and answers.
Extract and decompose queries: For each DNS query, split the FQDN into subdomain labels and parent domain. Skip queries to known safe domains and internal zones.
Compute Shannon entropy: Calculate the information entropy of each subdomain label. Legitimate subdomains typically have entropy below 3.5, while encoded/encrypted data produces entropy above 4.0.
Detect long labels: Flag DNS labels exceeding 52 characters (approaching the 63-character maximum). Long labels are a strong indicator of data tunneling.
Count unique subdomains per domain: Track how many distinct subdomains each parent domain receives. Domains with more than 50 unique subdomains within the log window are suspicious.
Identify query volume anomalies: Calculate queries-per-minute per source IP per domain. Exfiltration tools generate sustained high-volume query streams that differ from normal browsing.
Score and rank domains: Combine entropy, label length, uniqueness count, and query volume into a composite risk score. Rank domains by score and output the top suspicious domains.
Generate detection report: Produce a JSON report with flagged domains, their evidence indicators, originating source IPs, and recommended response actions.
{
"analysis_summary": {
"total_queries_analyzed": 145832,
"unique_domains": 3421,
"flagged_domains": 3,
"entropy_threshold": 3.5
},
"flagged_domains": [
{
"domain": "data.evil-c2.com",
"unique_subdomains": 892,
"avg_entropy": 4.72,
"max_label_length": 61,
"source_ips": ["10.0.1.45"],
"risk_score": 9.4,
"indicators": ["high_entropy", "long_labels", "high_subdomain_count"]
}
]
}
development
Detect Pass-the-Hash (T1550.002) attacks by analyzing NTLM authentication patterns, flagging Type 3 logons using NTLM where Kerberos would be expected, and correlating with credential-dumping indicators. Use when threat hunting for lateral movement via stolen NTLM hashes, triaging EDR/SIEM alerts on suspicious NTLM logons, scoping compromise during incident response, or validating detection coverage in a purple team exercise.
testing
Detect and respond to OAuth token theft and replay in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), covering access token theft, refresh token replay, Primary Refresh Token (PRT) abuse, pass-the-cookie attacks, and Token Protection conditional access policies. Use for impossible-travel or anomalous token-usage alerts, suspected session hijacking, sign-in log analysis, or configuring token-binding defenses in Azure/M365.
development
Detect NTLM relay attacks (T1557.001) by correlating Windows Event 4624 LogonType 3 for IP-to-hostname mismatches, identifying Responder/LLMNR poisoning artifacts, auditing SMB/LDAP signing, and flagging NTLMv2-to-NTLMv1 downgrades. Use for hunting credential relay in NTLM-enabled AD, investigating auth-source anomalies, building SIEM correlation rules, or responding to PetitPotam/DFSCoerce/PrinterBug alerts.
data-ai
Detect network reconnaissance and port scanning using Suricata and Snort IDS signatures, threshold-based detection rules, and traffic anomaly analysis to identify Nmap, Masscan, and custom scanning activity.