skills/building-incident-response-playbook/SKILL.md
Designs and documents structured incident response playbooks with step-by-step procedures per incident type, decision trees, escalation criteria, RACI matrices, and SOAR platform integration, aligned to NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL. Use when creating or maturing an IR program, documenting response runbooks for a new incident type, or designing SOAR playbooks.
npx skillsauth add mukul975/cyber-skills building-incident-response-playbookInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
3 of 9 scanners reported clean
Some scanners were skipped, did not run, or reported a non-clean status. Review each row below.
Do not use for one-time ad hoc investigations; playbooks are reusable procedure documents, not case-specific reports.
Define the specific scenario the playbook will address:
Common playbook types:
Priority Playbooks (build first):
1. Ransomware incident response
2. Phishing/credential compromise
3. Business email compromise
4. Malware infection
5. Data breach/exfiltration
6. DDoS attack
7. Insider threat
8. Account takeover
9. Web application compromise
10. Cloud infrastructure compromise
Every playbook should follow a consistent structure:
PLAYBOOK TEMPLATE
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
1. Playbook Metadata
- Name, version, owner, last review date
- Trigger conditions
- Severity criteria
2. RACI Matrix
- Who is Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed for each step
3. Detection & Triage
- How the incident is detected
- Initial triage checklist
- Severity classification criteria
4. Containment
- Short-term containment actions
- Long-term containment actions
- Evidence preservation requirements
5. Eradication
- Root cause identification
- Malware/threat removal steps
- Verification procedures
6. Recovery
- System restoration steps
- Validation criteria
- Monitoring requirements post-recovery
7. Post-Incident
- Lessons learned meeting trigger
- Report template
- Detection improvement actions
8. Communication
- Internal notification matrix
- External notification requirements (regulators, customers, law enforcement)
- Status update cadence
9. Appendices
- Tool-specific procedures
- Contact lists
- Evidence collection checklists
Define clear decision points with binary outcomes:
Detection Alert Received
├── Is the alert a true positive?
│ ├── YES → Classify severity
│ │ ├── P1 (Critical) → Page incident commander, begin containment immediately
│ │ ├── P2 (High) → Notify IR lead, begin investigation within 30 min
│ │ ├── P3 (Medium) → Queue for investigation within 4 hours
│ │ └── P4 (Low) → Document and investigate within 24 hours
│ └── NO → Document as false positive, tune detection rule
└── Cannot determine → Escalate to Tier 2 for deeper analysis
Escalation triggers:
Write tool-specific instructions for each step (not generic guidance):
CONTAINMENT - Endpoint Isolation via CrowdStrike:
1. Open Falcon Console > Hosts > Search for affected hostname
2. Click on the host > Host Details
3. Click "Contain Host" button in upper right
4. Confirm isolation (host will only communicate with CrowdStrike cloud)
5. Document containment action in incident ticket with timestamp
6. Verify containment: Host should show "Contained" status badge
CONTAINMENT - Block C2 Domain at DNS:
1. SSH to DNS server: ssh [email protected]
2. Add to block zone: echo "zone evil.com { type master; file /etc/bind/db.sinkhole; };" >> /etc/bind/named.conf.local
3. Reload DNS: rndc reload
4. Verify: dig @dns-primary evil.com (should resolve to sinkhole IP 10.0.0.99)
5. Document blocked domain in incident ticket
Convert manual playbook steps into automated workflows:
Validate the playbook through exercises and maintain currency:
| Term | Definition | |------|------------| | Playbook | Documented, repeatable set of procedures for responding to a specific incident type | | Runbook | More granular than a playbook; step-by-step technical instructions for a specific task within a playbook | | RACI Matrix | Responsibility assignment chart defining who is Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, and Informed for each activity | | Decision Tree | Flowchart-based logic defining the response path based on binary conditions at each decision point | | Escalation Criteria | Predefined conditions that trigger notification of higher-level personnel or external parties | | SOAR Playbook | Automated workflow in a Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response platform executing playbook steps |
Context: An organization with a 5-person SOC has no documented phishing response procedure. Analysts handle phishing reports inconsistently.
Approach:
Pitfalls:
INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAYBOOK
============================
Playbook Name: Phishing Incident Response
Version: 2.1
Owner: SOC Manager
Last Reviewed: 2025-11-01
Next Review: 2026-02-01
Trigger: Phishing email reported via [email protected] or phish button
RACI MATRIX
Activity | SOC L1 | SOC L2 | IR Lead | Legal | Comms
Initial Triage | R | C | I | |
Email Analysis | R | A | I | |
Containment | | R | A | I |
Credential Reset | | R | A | |
User Notification | | C | A | | R
Regulatory Notification | | | C | R | A
Lessons Learned | C | C | R | I | I
PROCEDURE STEPS
[Detailed steps with tool-specific instructions]
DECISION TREE
[Flowchart logic]
ESCALATION MATRIX
[Conditions and contacts]
METRICS
Target MTTA: 15 minutes
Target MTTC: 1 hour
Target MTTR: 4 hours
development
Detect Pass-the-Hash (T1550.002) attacks by analyzing NTLM authentication patterns, flagging Type 3 logons using NTLM where Kerberos would be expected, and correlating with credential-dumping indicators. Use when threat hunting for lateral movement via stolen NTLM hashes, triaging EDR/SIEM alerts on suspicious NTLM logons, scoping compromise during incident response, or validating detection coverage in a purple team exercise.
testing
Detect and respond to OAuth token theft and replay in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), covering access token theft, refresh token replay, Primary Refresh Token (PRT) abuse, pass-the-cookie attacks, and Token Protection conditional access policies. Use for impossible-travel or anomalous token-usage alerts, suspected session hijacking, sign-in log analysis, or configuring token-binding defenses in Azure/M365.
development
Detect NTLM relay attacks (T1557.001) by correlating Windows Event 4624 LogonType 3 for IP-to-hostname mismatches, identifying Responder/LLMNR poisoning artifacts, auditing SMB/LDAP signing, and flagging NTLMv2-to-NTLMv1 downgrades. Use for hunting credential relay in NTLM-enabled AD, investigating auth-source anomalies, building SIEM correlation rules, or responding to PetitPotam/DFSCoerce/PrinterBug alerts.
data-ai
Detect network reconnaissance and port scanning using Suricata and Snort IDS signatures, threshold-based detection rules, and traffic anomaly analysis to identify Nmap, Masscan, and custom scanning activity.