skills/analyzing-cyber-kill-chain/SKILL.md
Analyzes intrusion activity against the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain framework to identify which phases an adversary has completed, where defenses succeeded or failed, and what controls would have interrupted the attack at earlier phases. Use when conducting post-incident analysis, building prevention-focused security controls, or mapping detection gaps to kill chain phases. Activates for requests involving kill chain analysis, intrusion kill chain, attack phase mapping, or Lockheed Martin kill chain framework.
npx skillsauth add mukul975/cyber-skills analyzing-cyber-kill-chainInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
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Use this skill when:
Do not use this skill as a standalone framework — combine with MITRE ATT&CK for technique-level granularity beyond what the 7-phase kill chain provides.
The Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain consists of seven phases. Map all observed adversary actions:
Phase 1 - Reconnaissance: Adversary gathers target information before attack.
Phase 2 - Weaponization: Adversary creates attack tool (malware + exploit).
Phase 3 - Delivery: Adversary transmits weapon to target.
Phase 4 - Exploitation: Adversary exploits vulnerability to execute code.
Phase 5 - Installation: Adversary establishes persistence on target.
Phase 6 - Command & Control (C2): Adversary communicates with compromised system.
Phase 7 - Actions on Objectives: Adversary achieves goals.
Create a phase matrix for the incident:
Phase 1: Recon → Completed (undetected)
Phase 2: Weaponize → Completed (undetected — pre-attack)
Phase 3: Delivery → Completed; phishing email bypassed SEG
Phase 4: Exploit → Completed; CVE-2023-23397 exploited
Phase 5: Install → DETECTED: EDR flagged scheduled task creation (attack stalled here)
Phase 6: C2 → Not achieved (installation blocked)
Phase 7: Objectives → Not achieved
For each phase completed without detection, document the defensive control gap.
Each kill chain phase maps to multiple ATT&CK tactics:
Within each phase, enumerate specific ATT&CK techniques observed and map to existing detections.
For each phase, document applicable defensive courses of action (COAs):
Structure findings as:
| Term | Definition | |------|-----------| | Kill Chain | Sequential model of adversary intrusion phases; breaking any link theoretically stops the attack | | Courses of Action (COA) | Defensive responses mapped to each kill chain phase: detect, deny, disrupt, degrade, deceive, destroy | | Beaconing | Regular, periodic C2 check-in pattern from compromised host to adversary server; detectable by frequency analysis | | Phase Completion | Adversary successfully finishes a kill chain phase and progresses to the next; defense-in-depth aims to prevent this | | Intelligence Gain/Loss | Analysis of whether detecting at Phase 5 (vs. Phase 3) reduced intelligence about adversary capabilities or intent |
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