external/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/skills/triaging-security-alerts-in-splunk/SKILL.md
Triages security alerts in Splunk Enterprise Security by classifying severity, investigating notable events, correlating related telemetry, and making escalation or closure decisions using SPL queries and the Incident Review dashboard. Use when SOC analysts face queued alerts from correlation searches, need to prioritize investigation order, or must document triage decisions for handoff to Tier 2/3 analysts.
npx skillsauth add seikaikyo/dash-skills triaging-security-alerts-in-splunkInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
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Use this skill when:
Do not use for deep forensic investigation — escalate to Tier 2/3 after initial triage confirms malicious activity.
ess_analyst capability for notable event status updatesOpen the Incident Review dashboard in Splunk ES. Sort notable events by urgency (calculated from severity x priority). Apply filters to focus on unassigned events:
| `notable`
| search status="new" OR status="unassigned"
| sort - urgency
| table _time, rule_name, src, dest, user, urgency, status
| head 50
Focus on Critical and High urgency events first. Group related alerts by src or dest to identify attack chains rather than treating each alert independently.
For each notable event, pivot to raw events. Example for a brute force alert:
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4625
src_ip="192.168.1.105"
earliest=-1h latest=now
| stats count by src_ip, dest, user, status
| where count > 10
| sort - count
Check if the source IP is internal (lateral movement) or external (perimeter attack). Cross-reference with asset and identity lookups:
| `notable`
| search rule_name="Brute Force Access Behavior Detected"
| lookup asset_lookup_by_cidr ip AS src OUTPUT category, owner, priority
| lookup identity_lookup_expanded identity AS user OUTPUT department, managedBy
| table _time, src, dest, user, category, owner, department
Check if the same source appears in other telemetry:
index=proxy OR index=firewall src="192.168.1.105" earliest=-24h
| stats count by index, sourcetype, action, dest_port
| sort - count
Look for corroborating evidence: Did the same IP also trigger DNS anomalies, proxy blocks, or endpoint detection alerts?
index=main sourcetype="cisco:asa" src="192.168.1.105" action=blocked earliest=-24h
| timechart span=1h count by dest_port
Query the threat intelligence framework for known IOCs:
| `notable`
| search search_name="Threat - Threat Intelligence Match - Rule"
| lookup threat_intel_by_ip ip AS src OUTPUT threat_collection, threat_description, threat_key
| table _time, src, dest, threat_collection, threat_description, weight
| where weight >= 3
For domains, check against threat lists:
| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.url="*evil-domain.com*" by Web.src, Web.url, Web.status
| rename Web.* AS *
Update the notable event status in Incident Review:
| Disposition | Criteria | Action | |-------------|----------|--------| | True Positive | Corroborating evidence confirms malicious activity | Escalate to Tier 2, create incident ticket | | Benign True Positive | Alert fired correctly but activity is authorized (e.g., pen test) | Close with comment, add suppression if recurring | | False Positive | Alert logic matched benign behavior | Close, tune correlation search, document pattern | | Undetermined | Insufficient data to classify | Assign to Tier 2 with investigation notes |
Update via Splunk ES UI or REST API:
| sendalert update_notable_event param.status="2" param.urgency="critical"
param.comment="Confirmed brute force from compromised workstation. Escalated to IR-2024-0431."
param.owner="analyst_jdoe"
Record in the notable event comment field:
| `notable`
| search rule_name="Brute Force*" status="closed"
| stats count by status_label, disposition
| addtotal
Monitor triage performance over time:
| `notable`
| where status_end > 0
| eval triage_time = status_end - _time
| stats avg(triage_time) AS avg_triage_sec, median(triage_time) AS med_triage_sec,
count by rule_name, status_label
| eval avg_triage_min = round(avg_triage_sec/60, 1)
| sort - count
| table rule_name, status_label, count, avg_triage_min
| Term | Definition | |------|-----------| | Notable Event | Splunk ES alert generated by a correlation search that meets defined risk or threshold criteria | | Urgency | Calculated field combining event severity with asset/identity priority (Critical/High/Medium/Low/Informational) | | Correlation Search | Scheduled SPL query that detects threat patterns and generates notable events when conditions match | | CIM | Common Information Model — Splunk's normalized field naming convention enabling cross-source queries | | Disposition | Final classification of an alert: true positive, false positive, benign true positive, or undetermined | | MTTD/MTTR | Mean Time to Detect / Mean Time to Respond — key SOC metrics measuring detection and resolution speed |
TRIAGE REPORT — Notable Event #NE-2024-08921
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Alert: Brute Force Access Behavior Detected
Time: 2024-03-15 14:23:07 UTC
Source: 192.168.1.105 (WORKSTATION-042, Finance Dept)
Destination: 10.0.5.20 (DC-PRIMARY, Domain Controller)
User: jsmith (Finance Analyst)
Investigation:
- 847 failed logons (4625) in 12 minutes from src
- Successful logon (4624) at 14:35:02 after brute force
- No proxy/DNS anomalies from src in prior 24h
- Source not on threat intel lists
Disposition: TRUE POSITIVE — Compromised credential
Action: Escalated to Tier 2, ticket IR-2024-0431 created
Account jsmith disabled pending password reset
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