external/trailofbits-security/trailmark/skills/trailmark-finding-triage/SKILL.md
Performs graph-assisted triage of a single security finding, SARIF result, weAudit annotation, suspicious function, or report excerpt using Trailmark reachability, entrypoint paths, taint, privilege-boundary, blast-radius, caller/callee, and neighborhood evidence. Use when deciding whether one candidate issue is reachable, prioritizing a finding before PoC work, preparing evidence for exploit validation, or checking whether a static-analysis result is actionable.
npx skillsauth add seikaikyo/dash-skills trailmark-finding-triageInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
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Build a concise graph evidence packet for one candidate finding. This skill answers whether the affected code is reachable, what graph evidence supports or weakens the claim, and what manual review is still required before calling the issue exploitable.
graph-evolution plus a differential
review workflow.| Rationalization | Why It Is Wrong | Required Action | |---|---|---| | "The scanner says high severity, so reachability is obvious" | Static findings need graph and code context before promotion | Bind the finding to a graph node and check entrypoint paths | | "No entrypoint path means impossible" | It may mean parser, proxy, or dynamic dispatch limitations | Report the limitation separately from reachability | | "An auth check appears on the path, so the issue is safe" | The check may enforce the wrong predicate or be bypassed by another path | Treat validation/auth as review targets, not proof | | "One reachable path is enough for a PoC claim" | The path still needs attacker-controlled inputs and compatible preconditions | Separate graph reachability from exploitability | | "This is probably a chain" | Single-finding triage stops at one candidate | Hand off related findings to a composition workflow |
Finding Triage Progress:
- [ ] Step 1: Normalize the candidate
- [ ] Step 2: Build or reuse the Trailmark graph
- [ ] Step 3: Bind the candidate to graph node(s)
- [ ] Step 4: Analyze reachability, taint, boundaries, and blast radius
- [ ] Step 5: Decide and emit the evidence packet
Accept file/line, function name, SARIF result, weAudit annotation, Markdown finding excerpt, or a manual claim. Normalize it to:
If there is no concrete code anchor, stop and ask for one.
For input handling details, see references/input-normalization.md.
Use the public trailmark skill workflow. Prefer an existing fresh exported
graph or .trailmark/ artifact when present. Otherwise build a graph with
language="auto" or the target's explicit language list, then run
engine.preanalysis().
Record the Trailmark version or feature probes used. Feature-gate Trailmark
0.4-only APIs with hasattr() or CLI help checks.
Bind by file and line overlap first, then function name plus file. If several nodes match, list every candidate and select the narrowest enclosing node as primary. If no node matches, report a binding limitation instead of guessing.
SARIF and weAudit users should reuse the audit-augmentation workflow for
matching and then inspect the annotated node.
Run the query recipe in references/query-recipes.md:
tainted, privilege_boundary, and high_blast_radius
subgraphsDo not treat graph reachability as proof of exploitability.
Produce one verdict:
| Verdict | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Promote | Graph evidence supports reachability and plausible impact |
| Needs manual review | Evidence is suggestive but not decisive |
| Deprioritize | No reachable path or only trusted/internal paths found |
| Blocked | Binding or Trailmark analysis failed |
Write the evidence packet using references/output-format.md.
Hand off promoted PoC-worthy issues to the user's PoC workflow. Hand off
related findings to a composition workflow. Hand off repeatable root causes to
trailmark-variant-neighborhood, variant-analysis, or a custom Semgrep/CodeQL
rule workflow.
src/Vault.sol:148; I think withdraw can
bypass the balance update."semgrep:error unchecked-transfer in contracts/Bridge.sol line 91."parse_packet is attacker reachable. Build the
Trailmark evidence packet and tell me what is still missing."tools
Conduct comprehensive GDPR compliance assessments by evaluating data processing activities against EU Regulation 2016/679, including Article 30 records of processing, lawful basis validation, data subject rights implementation, Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs) under Article 35, breach notification procedures, international transfer safeguards (SCCs, adequacy decisions), and technical/organizational measures under Article 32. Use when processing personal data of EU residents, preparing for supervisory authority audits, implementing privacy-by-design for new systems, scoping compliance gaps for M&A due diligence, assessing third-party processors, or responding to data subject access requests at scale. Incorporates 2026 guidance from ICO, EDPB, and post-Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 UK-GDPR considerations. Do not use for implementing specific Article 32 controls — use implementing-gdpr-data-protection-controls; or for DSAR automation — use implementing-gdpr-data-subject-access-request.
tools
Parse Windows forensic artifacts—$MFT/$J (MFTECmd), Prefetch (PECmd), registry hives (RECmd), shellbags, and Amcache—into normalized CSV/JSON with Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools, then load results into Timeline Explorer for analysis. Use during DFIR/incident-response investigations, after triage collection (e.g. with KAPE), to establish program execution, file/folder access, and persistence evidence from acquired forensic images.
development
Build automated multi-turn adversarial attacks against conversational LLM targets using Microsoft PyRIT's RedTeamingOrchestrator, CrescendoOrchestrator (gradual escalation), and TreeOfAttacksWithPruningOrchestrator (adaptive branching), with scorer feedback loops and persisted conversation memory. Use when single-shot LLM scanning is insufficient and you need multi-turn, scorer-driven AI red-team campaigns against a chatbot or agent.
testing
Stand up MISP, enable and cache curated threat feeds (CIRCL, abuse.ch, Feodo Tracker), apply warninglists to suppress false positives, query indicators with PyMISP, and export attributes as auto-generated Suricata/Sigma/Wazuh detection rules. Use when maturing a MISP instance to actively drive detection, curating threat feeds with quality controls, or automating IOC-to-detection pipelines for the SIEM/IDS.