external/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/skills/implementing-mitre-attack-coverage-mapping/SKILL.md
Implement MITRE ATT&CK coverage mapping to identify detection gaps, prioritize rule development, and measure SOC detection maturity against adversary techniques.
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MITRE ATT&CK coverage mapping gives SOC teams a structured, adversary-centric lens to evaluate detection capabilities. Enterprise SIEMs on average have detection coverage for only 21% of ATT&CK techniques (2025 CardinalOps report), with 13% of existing rules being non-functional due to misconfigured data sources. Systematic coverage mapping identifies gaps, prioritizes rule development, and tracks detection maturity over time. ATT&CK v18.1 (December 2025) is the latest version.
# Splunk ES - Export all active correlation searches with MITRE mappings
| rest /services/saved/searches
| search disabled=0 action.correlationsearch.enabled=1
| table title, search, action.notable.param.security_domain,
action.notable.param.severity, action.correlationsearch.annotations
| eval mitre_techniques=mvfilter(match('action.correlationsearch.annotations', "mitre_attack"))
// Microsoft Sentinel - Export analytics rules with MITRE mapping
SecurityAlert
| summarize count() by AlertName, ProductName
| join kind=inner (
resources
| where type == "microsoft.securityinsights/alertrules"
| extend tactics = properties.tactics
) on $left.AlertName == $right.name
{
"name": "SOC Detection Coverage - 2025",
"versions": {
"attack": "16",
"navigator": "5.1",
"layer": "4.5"
},
"domain": "enterprise-attack",
"description": "Current detection coverage mapping",
"techniques": [
{
"techniqueID": "T1110",
"tactic": "credential-access",
"color": "#00ff00",
"comment": "2 active rules - Brute Force detection via EventCode 4625",
"score": 75,
"metadata": [
{"name": "rule_count", "value": "2"},
{"name": "data_sources", "value": "Windows Security Log, Linux Auth"},
{"name": "last_validated", "value": "2025-01-15"}
]
},
{
"techniqueID": "T1059.001",
"tactic": "execution",
"color": "#00ff00",
"comment": "3 rules - PowerShell Script Block Logging",
"score": 85
},
{
"techniqueID": "T1055",
"tactic": "defense-evasion",
"color": "#ff0000",
"comment": "NO DETECTION - Requires Sysmon EventCode 8/10",
"score": 0
}
],
"gradient": {
"colors": ["#ff0000", "#ffff00", "#00ff00"],
"minValue": 0,
"maxValue": 100
}
}
| Score | Color | Meaning | Criteria | |---|---|---|---| | 0 | Red | No Detection | No rules, missing data sources | | 25 | Orange | Minimal | Rule exists but not validated/tested | | 50 | Yellow | Partial | Rule works but limited coverage | | 75 | Light Green | Good | Validated rule with good data sources | | 100 | Green | Excellent | Multiple validated rules, tested with emulation |
Score = Data_Source_Score (0-25) + Rule_Quality_Score (0-25) +
Validation_Score (0-25) + Enrichment_Score (0-25)
Data_Source_Score:
25: All required data sources ingested and parsed
15: Primary data source available
5: Partial data source coverage
0: Required data sources not available
Rule_Quality_Score:
25: Rule uses CIM-compliant queries with proper thresholds
15: Rule works but may generate false positives
5: Basic rule with no tuning
0: No detection rule
Validation_Score:
25: Validated with adversary emulation (Atomic Red Team)
15: Tested with synthetic data
5: Logic reviewed but not tested
0: Not validated
Enrichment_Score:
25: Context-rich with asset, identity, and TI enrichment
15: Basic enrichment (asset lookup)
5: No enrichment
0: N/A (no rule)
Priority = Technique_Prevalence x Impact x Feasibility
Technique_Prevalence (0-10):
- Based on MITRE Top Techniques report
- Frequency in your industry's threat landscape
- Observed in recent incidents/breaches
Impact (0-10):
- Damage potential if technique succeeds
- Difficulty of recovery
- Data sensitivity at risk
Feasibility (0-10):
- Data source availability
- Rule complexity
- Engineering effort required
| Technique | ID | Prevalence | Typical Gap Reason | |---|---|---|---| | Command and Scripting Interpreter | T1059 | Very High | Requires script block logging | | Phishing | T1566 | Very High | Email gateway integration | | Valid Accounts | T1078 | High | Baseline behavior needed | | Process Injection | T1055 | High | Requires Sysmon or EDR | | Lateral Movement (RDP/SMB) | T1021 | High | Network segmentation visibility | | Scheduled Task/Job | T1053 | High | Event log collection | | Data Encrypted for Impact | T1486 | High | File system monitoring | | Ingress Tool Transfer | T1105 | Medium | Network traffic analysis |
Quarter 1: Close Critical Gaps (Score 0, High Prevalence)
Week 1-2: Enable missing data sources
Week 3-4: Build and test rules for top 5 gap techniques
Week 5-8: Validate with adversary emulation
Week 9-12: Tune and operationalize
Quarter 2: Improve Partial Coverage (Score 25-50)
- Upgrade existing rules with enrichment
- Add secondary detection methods
- Validate with purple team exercises
Quarter 3: Mature Good Coverage (Score 50-75)
- Add behavioral analytics
- Implement detection-as-code pipeline
- Cross-technique correlation rules
Quarter 4: Excellence (Score 75-100)
- Continuous testing with BAS tools
- Automated coverage regression testing
- Red team validation
# Map available data sources to detectable techniques
DATA_SOURCE_TECHNIQUE_MAP = {
"Windows Security Event Log": [
"T1110", "T1078", "T1053.005", "T1098", "T1136",
"T1070.001", "T1021.001", "T1543.003"
],
"Sysmon": [
"T1055", "T1059", "T1003", "T1547.001", "T1036",
"T1218", "T1105", "T1071"
],
"Network Traffic (Firewall/IDS)": [
"T1071", "T1048", "T1105", "T1572", "T1090",
"T1571", "T1573"
],
"DNS Logs": [
"T1071.004", "T1568", "T1583.001", "T1048.003"
],
"Email Gateway": [
"T1566.001", "T1566.002", "T1534"
],
"Cloud Audit Logs": [
"T1078.004", "T1537", "T1530", "T1580",
"T1087.004", "T1098.001"
],
}
| inputlookup mitre_coverage_lookup
| stats avg(score) as avg_score count(eval(score=0)) as no_coverage
count(eval(score>0 AND score<50)) as partial
count(eval(score>=50 AND score<75)) as good
count(eval(score>=75)) as excellent
count as total
by tactic
| eval coverage_pct=round((total - no_coverage) / total * 100, 1)
| sort -coverage_pct
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