seikaikyo/hunting-for-ntlm-relay-attacks
external/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/skills/hunting-for-ntlm-relay-attacks/SKILL.md
Detects NTLM relay attacks (MITRE T1557.001) by analyzing Windows Event ID 4624 logon type 3 with NTLMSSP authentication, flagging IP-to-hostname mismatches, Responder/LLMNR poisoning signatures, SMB signing status, and anomalous cross-domain authentication patterns. Use when investigating credential-relay activity in Active Directory or building detections for NTLM relay and coercion-based attacks.
$ install --global
skillsauthnpx skillsauth add seikaikyo/dash-skills hunting-for-ntlm-relay-attacksInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
Security Scan Results
3 of 9 scanners reported clean
Some scanners were skipped, did not run, or reported a non-clean status. Review each row below.
3
Scanners Passed
9
Scanners in report
Clean
TrivyContainer and dependency vulnerability scanner
95%
Clean
SemgrepStatic code analysis for vulnerabilities
95%
Clean
mcp-scan (Snyk)Model Context Protocol security validation
95%
Skipped
Snyk (dep)Open source security scanning
50%
Skipped
Socket.devSupply chain security analysis
50%
Skipped
VirusTotalMulti-engine malware detection
50%
Skipped
CrowdStrikeAdvanced threat intelligence
50%
Skipped
OSV-ScannerOpen Source Vulnerability database check
50%
Skipped
OWASP Dep-Check
50%
Last scanned: Aug 14, 2026, 3:55 AM109.3s3 files scanned
SKILL.md
- name:
- hunting-for-ntlm-relay-attacks
- description:
- Detects NTLM relay attacks (MITRE T1557.001) by analyzing Windows Event
- domain:
- cybersecurity
- subdomain:
- threat-hunting
- version:
- 1.0
- author:
- mahipal
- license:
- Apache-2.0
Hunting for NTLM Relay Attacks
Overview
NTLM relay attacks intercept and forward NTLM authentication messages to gain unauthorized access to network resources. Attackers use tools like Responder for LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning and ntlmrelayx for credential relay. This skill detects relay activity by querying Windows Security Event 4624 (successful logon) for type 3 network logons with NTLMSSP authentication, identifying mismatches between WorkstationName and source IpAddress, detecting rapid multi-host authentication from single accounts, and auditing SMB signing configuration across domain hosts.
When to Use
- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for ntlm relay attacks
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Prerequisites
- Python 3.9+ with Windows Event Log access or exported logs
- Windows Security audit logging enabled (Event ID 4624, 4625, 5145)
- Network access for SMB signing status checks
Key Detection Areas
- IP-hostname mismatch — WorkstationName in Event 4624 does not resolve to the source IpAddress
- NTLMSSP authentication — logon events using NTLM instead of Kerberos from domain-joined hosts
- Machine account relay — computer accounts (ending in $) authenticating from unexpected IPs
- Rapid authentication — single account authenticating to multiple hosts within seconds
- Named pipe access — Event 5145 showing access to Spoolss, lsarpc, netlogon, samr pipes
- SMB signing disabled — hosts not enforcing SMB signing, enabling relay attacks
Output
JSON report with suspected relay events, IP-hostname correlation anomalies, SMB signing audit results, and MITRE ATT&CK mapping to T1557.001.
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