seikaikyo/hunting-for-command-and-control-beaconing

Hunting for Command and Control Beaconing

When to Use

• When proactively hunting for compromised systems in the network
• After threat intel indicates C2 frameworks targeting your industry
• When investigating periodic outbound connections to suspicious domains
• During incident response to identify active C2 channels
• When DNS query logs show unusual patterns to specific domains

Prerequisites

• Network proxy/firewall logs with full URL and timing data
• DNS query logs (passive DNS, DNS server logs, or Sysmon Event ID 22)
• Zeek/Bro network connection logs or NetFlow data
• SIEM with statistical analysis capabilities (Splunk, Elastic)
• Threat intelligence feeds for domain/IP reputation

Workflow

1. Identify Beaconing Characteristics: Define what constitutes beaconing (regular intervals, small payload sizes, consistent destinations, jitter patterns).
2. Collect Network Telemetry: Aggregate proxy logs, DNS queries, and connection metadata for analysis.
3. Apply Frequency Analysis: Identify connections with regular intervals using statistical methods (standard deviation, coefficient of variation).
4. Filter Known-Good Traffic: Exclude legitimate periodic traffic (Windows Update, AV updates, heartbeat services, NTP).
5. Analyze Domain/IP Reputation: Check identified beaconing destinations against threat intel, WHOIS data, and certificate transparency logs.
6. Investigate Endpoint Context: Correlate beaconing activity with process creation, user context, and file system changes on source endpoints.
7. Confirm and Respond: Validate C2 activity, block communication, and initiate incident response.

Key Concepts

| Concept | Description | |---------|-------------| | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol (HTTP/HTTPS/DNS C2) | | T1071.001 | Web Protocols (HTTP/S beaconing) | | T1071.004 | DNS (DNS tunneling C2) | | T1573 | Encrypted Channel | | T1572 | Protocol Tunneling | | T1568 | Dynamic Resolution (DGA, fast-flux) | | T1132 | Data Encoding in C2 | | T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol | | Beacon Interval | Time between C2 check-ins | | Jitter | Random variation in beacon interval | | DGA | Domain Generation Algorithm | | Fast-Flux | Rapidly changing DNS resolution |

Tools & Systems

| Tool | Purpose | |------|---------| | RITA (Real Intelligence Threat Analytics) | Automated beacon detection in Zeek logs | | Splunk | Statistical beacon analysis with SPL | | Elastic Security | ML-based anomaly detection for beaconing | | Zeek/Bro | Network connection metadata collection | | Suricata | Network IDS with JA3/JA4 fingerprinting | | VirusTotal | Domain and IP reputation checking | | PassiveDNS | Historical DNS resolution data | | Flare | C2 profile detection |

Common Scenarios

1. Cobalt Strike Beacon: HTTP/HTTPS beaconing with configurable sleep time and jitter to malleable C2 profiles.
2. DNS Tunneling C2: Data exfiltration and command receipt via encoded DNS TXT/CNAME queries to attacker-controlled domains.
3. Sliver C2 over HTTPS: Modern C2 framework using HTTPS with configurable beacon intervals and domain fronting.
4. DGA-based C2: Malware generating random domains daily, with adversary registering upcoming domains for C2.
5. Legitimate Service Abuse: C2 over legitimate cloud services (Azure, AWS, Slack, Discord, Telegram).

Output Format

Hunt ID: TH-C2-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Source IP: [Internal IP]
Source Host: [Hostname]
Destination: [Domain/IP]
Protocol: [HTTP/HTTPS/DNS/Custom]
Beacon Interval: [Average seconds]
Jitter: [Percentage]
Connection Count: [Total connections]
Data Volume: [Bytes sent/received]
First Seen: [Timestamp]
Last Seen: [Timestamp]
Domain Age: [Days]
TI Match: [Yes/No - source]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]