external/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/skills/detecting-wmi-persistence/SKILL.md
Detect WMI event subscription persistence (MITRE T1546.003) by analyzing Sysmon Event IDs 19, 20, and 21 for malicious EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding creation, cross-referenced against root\subscription namespace contents and Sysinternals Autoruns. Use when hunting WMI-based persistence, triaging a Sysmon alert on these event IDs, or during incident response and purple-team validation of WMI defenses.
npx skillsauth add seikaikyo/dash-skills detecting-wmi-persistenceInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
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| Concept | Description | |---------|-------------| | Sysmon Event 19 | WmiEventFilter creation detected | | Sysmon Event 20 | WmiEventConsumer creation detected | | Sysmon Event 21 | WmiEventConsumerToFilter binding detected | | T1546.003 | Event Triggered Execution: WMI Event Subscription | | CommandLineEventConsumer | Executes system commands when filter triggers | | ActiveScriptEventConsumer | Runs VBScript/JScript when filter triggers |
| Tool | Purpose | |------|---------| | Sysmon | Windows event monitoring for WMI activity | | WMI Explorer | GUI tool for browsing WMI namespaces | | Autoruns | Sysinternals tool listing persistence mechanisms | | PowerShell Get-WMIObject | Enumerate WMI event subscriptions | | Splunk | SIEM analysis of Sysmon WMI events | | Velociraptor | Endpoint WMI artifact collection |
Hunt ID: TH-WMI-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Technique: T1546.003
Host: [Hostname]
Event Type: [EventFilter|EventConsumer|Binding]
Consumer Type: [CommandLine|ActiveScript]
WQL Query: [Filter query text]
Command: [Executed command or script]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
Recommended Action: [Remove subscription, investigate lateral movement]
tools
Conduct comprehensive GDPR compliance assessments by evaluating data processing activities against EU Regulation 2016/679, including Article 30 records of processing, lawful basis validation, data subject rights implementation, Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs) under Article 35, breach notification procedures, international transfer safeguards (SCCs, adequacy decisions), and technical/organizational measures under Article 32. Use when processing personal data of EU residents, preparing for supervisory authority audits, implementing privacy-by-design for new systems, scoping compliance gaps for M&A due diligence, assessing third-party processors, or responding to data subject access requests at scale. Incorporates 2026 guidance from ICO, EDPB, and post-Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 UK-GDPR considerations. Do not use for implementing specific Article 32 controls — use implementing-gdpr-data-protection-controls; or for DSAR automation — use implementing-gdpr-data-subject-access-request.
tools
Parse Windows forensic artifacts—$MFT/$J (MFTECmd), Prefetch (PECmd), registry hives (RECmd), shellbags, and Amcache—into normalized CSV/JSON with Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools, then load results into Timeline Explorer for analysis. Use during DFIR/incident-response investigations, after triage collection (e.g. with KAPE), to establish program execution, file/folder access, and persistence evidence from acquired forensic images.
development
Build automated multi-turn adversarial attacks against conversational LLM targets using Microsoft PyRIT's RedTeamingOrchestrator, CrescendoOrchestrator (gradual escalation), and TreeOfAttacksWithPruningOrchestrator (adaptive branching), with scorer feedback loops and persisted conversation memory. Use when single-shot LLM scanning is insufficient and you need multi-turn, scorer-driven AI red-team campaigns against a chatbot or agent.
testing
Stand up MISP, enable and cache curated threat feeds (CIRCL, abuse.ch, Feodo Tracker), apply warninglists to suppress false positives, query indicators with PyMISP, and export attributes as auto-generated Suricata/Sigma/Wazuh detection rules. Use when maturing a MISP instance to actively drive detection, curating threat feeds with quality controls, or automating IOC-to-detection pipelines for the SIEM/IDS.