external/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/skills/detecting-container-escape-with-falco-rules/SKILL.md
Writes and tunes Falco rule syntax for container escape detection - conditions, macros, lists, priorities, and output fields - covering host filesystem mounts, sensitive host path access, kernel module loading, and privileged capability abuse, including how to drive down false positives. Use when authoring or tuning a specific Falco rule for breakout behaviour, or triaging a noisy escape-related Falco alert. Keywords: Falco rule, macro, list, condition, priority, falco_rules.local.yaml, tuning, false positive. Do not use for deploying and operating Falco itself - use detecting-container-runtime-threats-with-falco; for tool-agnostic escape signals use detecting-container-escape-attempts.
npx skillsauth add seikaikyo/dash-skills detecting-container-escape-with-falco-rulesInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
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Falco is a CNCF-graduated runtime security tool that monitors Linux syscalls to detect anomalous container behavior. It uses a rules engine to identify container escape techniques such as mounting host filesystems, accessing sensitive host paths, loading kernel modules, and exploiting privileged container capabilities.
# Add Falco Helm chart
helm repo add falcosecurity https://falcosecurity.github.io/charts
helm repo update
# Install Falco with eBPF driver
helm install falco falcosecurity/falco \
--namespace falco --create-namespace \
--set falcosidekick.enabled=true \
--set falcosidekick.webui.enabled=true \
--set driver.kind=ebpf \
--set collectors.containerd.enabled=true \
--set collectors.containerd.socket=/run/containerd/containerd.sock
# Verify
kubectl get pods -n falco
kubectl logs -n falco -l app.kubernetes.io/name=falco --tail=20
# Add Falco GPG key and repo
curl -fsSL https://falco.org/repo/falcosecurity-packages.asc | \
sudo gpg --dearmor -o /usr/share/keyrings/falco-archive-keyring.gpg
echo "deb [signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/falco-archive-keyring.gpg] https://download.falco.org/packages/deb stable main" | \
sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/falcosecurity.list
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y falco
# Start Falco
sudo systemctl enable falco
sudo systemctl start falco
- rule: Container Mounting Host Filesystem
desc: Detect a container attempting to mount the host filesystem
condition: >
spawned_process and container and
proc.name = mount and
(proc.args contains "/host" or proc.args contains "nsenter")
output: >
Container mounting host filesystem
(user=%user.name container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name
image=%container.image.repository command=%proc.cmdline %evt.args)
priority: CRITICAL
tags: [container, escape, T1611]
- rule: Nsenter Execution in Container
desc: Detect nsenter being used to escape container namespaces
condition: >
spawned_process and container and proc.name = nsenter
output: >
nsenter executed in container - potential escape attempt
(user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository
command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname)
priority: CRITICAL
tags: [container, escape, namespace, T1611]
- rule: Launch Privileged Container
desc: Detect a privileged container being launched
condition: >
container_started and container and container.privileged=true
output: >
Privileged container started
(user=%user.name container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name
image=%container.image.repository)
priority: WARNING
tags: [container, privileged, T1610]
- rule: Write to Sysrq Trigger
desc: Detect writes to /proc/sysrq-trigger which can crash or control the host
condition: >
open_write and container and fd.name = /proc/sysrq-trigger
output: >
Write to /proc/sysrq-trigger from container
(user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository
command=%proc.cmdline)
priority: CRITICAL
tags: [container, escape, host-manipulation]
- rule: Container Loading Kernel Module
desc: Detect a container attempting to load a kernel module
condition: >
spawned_process and container and
(proc.name in (insmod, modprobe) or
(proc.name = init_module))
output: >
Kernel module loading from container
(user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository
command=%proc.cmdline)
priority: CRITICAL
tags: [container, escape, kernel, T1611]
- rule: Write to Cgroup Release Agent
desc: Detect writes to cgroup release_agent which is a known container escape vector
condition: >
open_write and container and
fd.name endswith release_agent
output: >
Container writing to cgroup release_agent - escape attempt
(user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository
file=%fd.name command=%proc.cmdline)
priority: CRITICAL
tags: [container, escape, cgroup, CVE-2022-0492]
- rule: Container Reading Host Shadow File
desc: Detect a container reading /etc/shadow on the host via mounted volume
condition: >
open_read and container and
(fd.name = /etc/shadow or fd.name startswith /host/etc/shadow)
output: >
Container reading host shadow file
(user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository
file=%fd.name command=%proc.cmdline)
priority: CRITICAL
tags: [container, credential-access, T1003]
- rule: Container Accessing Docker Socket
desc: Detect a container accessing the Docker socket which allows host control
condition: >
(open_read or open_write) and container and
fd.name = /var/run/docker.sock
output: >
Container accessing Docker socket
(user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository
command=%proc.cmdline)
priority: CRITICAL
tags: [container, escape, docker-socket, T1610]
# /etc/falco/rules.d/container-escape.yaml
- list: escape_binaries
items: [nsenter, chroot, unshare, mount, umount, pivot_root]
- macro: container_escape_attempt
condition: >
spawned_process and container and
proc.name in (escape_binaries)
- rule: Container Escape Binary Execution
desc: Detect execution of binaries commonly used for container escape
condition: container_escape_attempt
output: >
Escape-related binary executed in container
(user=%user.name container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository
command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname pid=%proc.pid)
priority: CRITICAL
tags: [container, escape, mitre_T1611]
- rule: Sensitive File Access from Container
desc: Detect container access to sensitive host files
condition: >
(open_read or open_write) and container and
(fd.name startswith /proc/1/ or
fd.name = /etc/shadow or
fd.name = /etc/kubernetes/admin.conf or
fd.name startswith /var/lib/kubelet/)
output: >
Sensitive file accessed from container
(container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository
file=%fd.name command=%proc.cmdline user=%user.name)
priority: CRITICAL
tags: [container, sensitive-file, mitre_T1005]
# /etc/falco/falco.yaml (key settings)
rules_files:
- /etc/falco/falco_rules.yaml
- /etc/falco/rules.d/container-escape.yaml
json_output: true
json_include_output_property: true
json_include_tags_property: true
log_stderr: true
log_syslog: true
log_level: info
priority: WARNING
stdout_output:
enabled: true
syslog_output:
enabled: true
http_output:
enabled: true
url: http://falcosidekick:2801
insecure: true
grpc:
enabled: true
bind_address: "unix:///run/falco/falco.sock"
threadiness: 8
grpc_output:
enabled: true
# Falcosidekick values.yaml
config:
slack:
webhookurl: "https://hooks.slack.com/services/XXXXX"
minimumpriority: "warning"
messageformat: |
*{{.Priority}}* - {{.Rule}}
Container: {{.OutputFields.container_name}}
Image: {{.OutputFields.container_image_repository}}
Command: {{.OutputFields.proc_cmdline}}
# Simulate container escape attempt (in a test container)
kubectl run test-escape --image=alpine --restart=Never -- sh -c "cat /etc/shadow"
# Simulate nsenter
kubectl run test-nsenter --image=alpine --restart=Never --overrides='{"spec":{"hostPID":true}}' -- nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -- cat /etc/hostname
# Check Falco alerts
kubectl logs -n falco -l app.kubernetes.io/name=falco --tail=50 | grep -i escape
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