external/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/skills/analyzing-windows-shellbag-artifacts/SKILL.md
Analyze Windows Shellbag registry artifacts to reconstruct folder browsing activity, detect access to removable media and network shares, and establish user interaction with directories even after deletion using SBECmd and ShellBags Explorer.
npx skillsauth add seikaikyo/dash-skills analyzing-windows-shellbag-artifactsInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
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Shellbags are Windows registry artifacts that track how users interact with folders through Windows Explorer, storing view settings such as icon size, window position, sort order, and view mode. From a forensic perspective, Shellbags provide definitive evidence of folder access -- even folders that no longer exist on the system. When a user browses to a folder via Windows Explorer, the Open/Save dialog, or the Control Panel, a Shellbag entry is created or updated in the user's registry hive. These entries persist after folder deletion, drive disconnection, and even across user profile resets, making them invaluable for proving that a user navigated to specific directories on local drives, USB devices, network shares, or zip archives.
| Hive | Key Path | Stores | |------|---------|--------| | NTUSER.DAT | Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU | Folder hierarchy tree | | NTUSER.DAT | Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags | View settings per folder | | UsrClass.dat | Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU | Desktop/Explorer shell | | UsrClass.dat | Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags | Additional view settings |
The BagMRU key contains a hierarchical tree of numbered subkeys representing the directory structure. Each subkey value contains a Shell Item (SHITEMID) binary blob encoding the folder identity:
Each Shell Item contains:
# Parse shellbags from a directory of registry hives
SBECmd.exe -d "C:\Evidence\Registry" --csv C:\Output --csvf shellbags.csv
# Parse from a live system (requires admin)
SBECmd.exe --live --csv C:\Output --csvf live_shellbags.csv
# Key output columns:
# AbsolutePath - Full reconstructed path
# CreatedOn - When the folder was first browsed
# ModifiedOn - When view settings were last changed
# AccessedOn - Last access timestamp
# ShellType - Type of shell item (Directory, Drive, Network, etc.)
# Value - Raw shell item data
# Launch GUI tool for interactive analysis
ShellBagsExplorer.exe
# Load registry hives: File > Load Hive
# Navigate the tree structure to see folder hierarchy
# Right-click entries for detailed shell item properties
Shellbag Path: My Computer\E:\Confidential\Project_Files
ShellType: Directory (on removable volume)
CreatedOn: 2025-03-15 09:30:00 UTC
This proves the user navigated to E:\Confidential\Project_Files
via Windows Explorer, even if the USB drive is no longer connected.
The volume letter E: and directory timestamps can be correlated
with USBSTOR and MountPoints2 registry entries.
Shellbag Path: \\FileServer01\Finance\Q4_Reports
ShellType: Network Location
AccessedOn: 2025-02-20 14:15:00 UTC
This proves the user browsed to a network share, even if
the share has been decommissioned or access revoked.
Shellbag Path: C:\Users\suspect\Documents\Exfiltration_Staging
ShellType: Directory
CreatedOn: 2025-01-10 08:00:00 UTC
Even though C:\Users\suspect\Documents\Exfiltration_Staging
no longer exists, the Shellbag entry proves the user
created and navigated to this folder.
$ SBECmd.exe -d "C:\Evidence\Users\jsmith" --csv /analysis/shellbag_output
SBECmd v2.1.0 - ShellBags Explorer (Command Line)
====================================================
Processing hives for user: jsmith
NTUSER.DAT: C:\Evidence\Users\jsmith\NTUSER.DAT
UsrClass.dat: C:\Evidence\Users\jsmith\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
[+] NTUSER.DAT shellbag entries: 456
[+] UsrClass.dat shellbag entries: 1,234
[+] Total shellbag entries: 1,690
--- Folder Access Timeline (Incident Window) ---
Last Accessed (UTC) | Folder Path | Type | Access Count
------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------
2024-01-15 14:34:05 | C:\Users\jsmith\Downloads | File System | 45
2024-01-15 14:36:25 | C:\ProgramData\Updates | File System | 3
2024-01-15 15:05:00 | \\FILESERV01\Finance | Network | 2
2024-01-15 15:12:30 | \\FILESERV01\Finance\Q4_Reports | Network | 1
2024-01-15 15:30:00 | E:\ | Removable | 4
2024-01-15 15:30:45 | E:\Backup | Removable | 3
2024-01-15 15:31:20 | E:\Backup\Corporate_Data | Removable | 2
2024-01-15 16:12:45 | \\FILESERV01\HR\Employees | Network | 1
2024-01-15 16:15:00 | \\FILESERV01\HR\Employees\Records_2024 | Network | 1
2024-01-16 02:35:00 | C:\Windows\Temp | File System | 5
2024-01-17 02:44:00 | C:\ProgramData\svc | File System | 2
2024-01-18 01:10:00 | C:\Users\jsmith\AppData\Local\Temp | File System | 8
--- Network Share Access ---
\\FILESERV01\Finance First: 2023-09-10 Last: 2024-01-15
\\FILESERV01\Finance\Q4_Reports First: 2024-01-15 Last: 2024-01-15 (NEW)
\\FILESERV01\HR\Employees First: 2024-01-15 Last: 2024-01-15 (NEW)
\\DC01\SYSVOL First: 2023-03-15 Last: 2024-01-16 (anomalous access time)
--- Removable Device Access ---
E:\ (USB Drive)
Volume Name: BACKUP_DRIVE
First Accessed: 2024-01-15 15:30:00 UTC
Last Accessed: 2024-01-15 15:45:22 UTC
Folders Browsed: 3 (E:\, E:\Backup, E:\Backup\Corporate_Data)
--- Deleted/No Longer Existing Paths ---
C:\ProgramData\Updates\ (folder deleted, shellbag persists)
C:\ProgramData\svc\ (folder deleted, shellbag persists)
C:\Windows\Temp\tools\ (folder deleted, shellbag persists)
Summary:
Total unique folders accessed: 1,690
Network shares accessed: 4 (2 newly accessed during incident)
Removable media: 1 USB device (data staging suspected)
Deleted folder evidence: 3 paths (anti-forensics indicator)
CSV exported to: /analysis/shellbag_output/
development
拋棄式 HTML mockup 比稿:產出 2 到 3 個設計立場不同的變體(密度 / 版式 / 強調軸,不是換色),各附取捨說明,最後給有立場的對比結論。適用:「畫個草圖」「比較 A 版 B 版」「先看方向再做」「給我看幾種做法」。要 production 元件或設計已定案時不適用。
tools
需求不明時的意圖萃取訪談:一次一題、每題附上自己的猜測、聽出「真正想要 vs 覺得應該要」,直到能預測使用者反應(約 95% 信心)才動工。適用:需求缺少對象 / 動機 / 成功標準 / 約束,或使用者點名「訪談我」「先確認一下」「我們確定嗎」。明確自足的指示、純資訊查詢、機械性操作不適用。
development
對非平凡決策啟動新鮮 context 對抗審查(找碴不背書),在修正還便宜的時候抓出錯誤方向。適用:高風險改動(production、資安敏感邏輯、不可逆操作)、不熟的程式碼、要宣稱「這樣是安全的 / 可行的」之前。機械性操作與一行修改不適用。
testing
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