external/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/skills/analyzing-linux-kernel-rootkits/SKILL.md
Detect kernel-level rootkits in Linux memory dumps using Volatility3 linux plugins (check_syscall, lsmod, hidden_modules), rkhunter system scanning, and /proc vs /sys discrepancy analysis to identify hooked syscalls, hidden kernel modules, and tampered system structures.
npx skillsauth add seikaikyo/dash-skills analyzing-linux-kernel-rootkitsInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
3 of 9 scanners reported clean
Some scanners were skipped, did not run, or reported a non-clean status. Review each row below.
Linux kernel rootkits operate at ring 0, modifying kernel data structures to hide processes, files, network connections, and kernel modules from userspace tools. Detection requires either memory forensics (analyzing physical memory dumps with Volatility3) or cross-view analysis (comparing /proc, /sys, and kernel data structures for inconsistencies). This skill covers using Volatility3 Linux plugins to detect syscall table hooks, hidden kernel modules, and modified function pointers, supplemented by live system scanning with rkhunter and chkrootkit.
Capture Linux physical memory using LiME kernel module or AVML for cloud instances.
Run linux.check_syscall, linux.lsmod, linux.hidden_modules, and linux.check_idt plugins to detect rootkit artifacts.
Compare module lists from /proc/modules, lsmod, and /sys/module to identify modules hidden from one view but present in another.
Run rkhunter and chkrootkit to detect known rootkit signatures, suspicious files, and modified system binaries.
JSON report containing detected syscall hooks, hidden kernel modules, modified IDT entries, suspicious /proc discrepancies, and rkhunter findings.
$ sudo python3 rootkit_analyzer.py --memory /evidence/linux-mem.lime --profile Ubuntu2204
Linux Kernel Rootkit Analysis Report
=====================================
Memory Image: /evidence/linux-mem.lime
Kernel Version: 5.15.0-91-generic (Ubuntu 22.04 LTS)
Analysis Time: 2024-01-18 09:15:32 UTC
[+] Scanning syscall table for hooks...
Syscall Table Base: 0xffffffff82200300
Total syscalls checked: 449
HOOKED SYSCALLS DETECTED:
┌─────────┬──────────────────┬──────────────────────┬──────────────────────┐
│ NR │ Syscall │ Expected Address │ Current Address │
├─────────┼──────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────┤
│ 0 │ sys_read │ 0xffffffff8139a0e0 │ 0xffffffffc0a12000 │
│ 2 │ sys_open │ 0xffffffff8139b340 │ 0xffffffffc0a12180 │
│ 78 │ sys_getdents64 │ 0xffffffff813f5210 │ 0xffffffffc0a12300 │
│ 62 │ sys_kill │ 0xffffffff8110c4a0 │ 0xffffffffc0a12480 │
└─────────┴──────────────────┴──────────────────────┴──────────────────────┘
WARNING: 4 syscall hooks detected - rootkit behavior confirmed
[+] Checking for hidden kernel modules...
Loaded modules (lsmod): 147
Modules in kobject list: 149
HIDDEN MODULES:
- "netfilter_helper" at 0xffffffffc0a10000 (size: 12288)
- "kworker_sched" at 0xffffffffc0a14000 (size: 8192)
[+] Scanning /proc for discrepancies...
Processes in task_struct list: 234
Processes visible in /proc: 231
HIDDEN PROCESSES:
- PID 31337 cmd: "[kworker/0:3]" (disguised as kernel thread)
- PID 31442 cmd: "rsyslogd" (fake, real rsyslogd is PID 892)
- PID 31500 cmd: "" (unnamed process)
[+] Checking IDT entries...
IDT entries scanned: 256
Modified entries: 0 (clean)
[+] Running rkhunter scan...
Checking for known rootkits: 68 variants checked
Diamorphine rootkit: WARNING - signatures match
System binary checks:
/usr/bin/ps: MODIFIED (SHA-256 mismatch)
/usr/bin/netstat: MODIFIED (SHA-256 mismatch)
/usr/bin/ls: MODIFIED (SHA-256 mismatch)
/usr/sbin/ss: OK
[+] Network analysis...
Hidden connections (not in /proc/net/tcp):
ESTABLISHED 0.0.0.0:0 -> 198.51.100.47:4443 (PID 31337)
ESTABLISHED 0.0.0.0:0 -> 198.51.100.47:8080 (PID 31442)
Summary:
Rootkit Type: Loadable Kernel Module (LKM)
Probable Family: Diamorphine variant
Syscall Hooks: 4 (read, open, getdents64, kill)
Hidden Modules: 2
Hidden Processes: 3
Hidden Connections: 2 (C2: 198.51.100.47)
Modified Binaries: 3 (/usr/bin/ps, netstat, ls)
Risk Level: CRITICAL
development
拋棄式 HTML mockup 比稿:產出 2 到 3 個設計立場不同的變體(密度 / 版式 / 強調軸,不是換色),各附取捨說明,最後給有立場的對比結論。適用:「畫個草圖」「比較 A 版 B 版」「先看方向再做」「給我看幾種做法」。要 production 元件或設計已定案時不適用。
tools
需求不明時的意圖萃取訪談:一次一題、每題附上自己的猜測、聽出「真正想要 vs 覺得應該要」,直到能預測使用者反應(約 95% 信心)才動工。適用:需求缺少對象 / 動機 / 成功標準 / 約束,或使用者點名「訪談我」「先確認一下」「我們確定嗎」。明確自足的指示、純資訊查詢、機械性操作不適用。
development
對非平凡決策啟動新鮮 context 對抗審查(找碴不背書),在修正還便宜的時候抓出錯誤方向。適用:高風險改動(production、資安敏感邏輯、不可逆操作)、不熟的程式碼、要宣稱「這樣是安全的 / 可行的」之前。機械性操作與一行修改不適用。
testing
Reference for writing and editing agent skills well — the vocabulary and principles that make a skill predictable. Consult when authoring, reviewing, or pruning a SKILL.md.