agents/skills/solana/instruction-introspection/SKILL.md
Trigger Pattern INSTRUCTION_INTROSPECTION flag detected (load_instruction_at/Sysvar1nstructions) - Inject Into Breadth agents, depth agents
npx skillsauth add plamentsv/plamen instruction-introspectionInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
3 of 9 scanners reported clean
Some scanners were skipped, did not run, or reported a non-clean status. Review each row below.
Trigger Pattern: INSTRUCTION_INTROSPECTION flag detected (load_instruction_at/Sysvar1nstructions) Inject Into: Breadth agents, depth agents Finding prefix:
[II-N]Rules referenced: S10, S8, R15
For every use of instruction introspection in the Solana program:
List all instruction introspection usage:
| # | Location | Function Used | Purpose | Instructions Sysvar Source |
|---|----------|--------------|---------|---------------------------|
| 1 | {file:line} | load_instruction_at_checked / load_instruction_at / get_instruction_relative | {what it checks} | {account source} |
For each Instructions sysvar account:
| Usage | Sysvar Source | Address Validated? | Validation Method | |-------|-------------|-------------------|-------------------| | {usage} | {account param name} | YES/NO | {hardcoded check / Anchor constraint / NONE} |
Attack pattern (sysvar address spoofing): If Instructions sysvar address is NOT validated, attacker passes a fake account containing crafted "instruction" data. The introspection reads attacker-controlled data instead of real transaction instructions.
Defense: require!(sysvar_account.key() == sysvar::instructions::ID) or use Anchor #[account(address = sysvar::instructions::ID)].
For each load_instruction_at* call:
| Call | Uses _checked Variant? | Risk if Unchecked |
|------|------------------------|-------------------|
| {call} | YES/NO | {if NO: deprecated function, potential ABI issues} |
Rule: Always use load_instruction_at_checked (validates the sysvar account) over the deprecated load_instruction_at (does not validate).
For flash loan and atomic operation patterns:
| Pattern | Borrow Instruction Checked? | Repay Instruction Checked? | Gap Between Checks? | |---------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------| | Flash loan repay check | YES/NO | YES/NO | {can attacker insert instructions between borrow and repay?} |
Attack (marginfi pattern): Protocol checks that a repay instruction exists in the transaction but doesn't verify that no state-modifying instructions execute BETWEEN the borrow and repay. Attacker inserts exploit instructions in the gap. Defense: Verify the COMPLETE instruction sequence, not just the presence of specific instructions.
For each introspection-based check:
| Check | State Changes Between Checked Instructions | All Changes Accounted? | Gap? | |-------|------------------------------------------|----------------------|------| | {check} | {list possible state changes} | YES/NO | {if NO: what's unaccounted} |
Pattern: Introspection checks often verify instruction A and instruction B exist, but ignore what happens in between. Any state changes between A and B can be exploited.
For each instruction inspected via introspection:
| Inspected Instruction | Program ID Checked? | Expected Program | Spoofable? | |----------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-----------| | {instruction} | YES/NO | {expected} | {if NO: attacker deploys mimicking program} |
Attack: Introspection check verifies an instruction with matching function signature exists, but doesn't verify it belongs to the expected program. Attacker deploys a program with the same instruction signature that does nothing.
**ID**: [II-N]
**Severity**: [sysvar spoofing = Critical, sequence gap = High, missing program check = Medium]
**Step Execution**: ✓1,2,3,4,5,6 | ✗(reasons) | ?(uncertain)
**Rules Applied**: [S10:✓, S8:✓/✗, R15:✓/✗]
**Location**: program/src/{file}.rs:LineN
**Title**: [Introspection issue] in [instruction] enables [attack]
**Description**: [Specific introspection vulnerability with sequence analysis]
**Impact**: [Flash loan bypass / fake instruction acceptance / state manipulation]
| Section | Required | Completed? | Notes | |---------|----------|------------|-------| | 1. Introspection Usage Inventory | YES | ✓/✗/? | For every introspection use | | 2. Sysvar Address Validation | YES | ✓/✗/? | CRITICAL - sysvar address spoofing | | 3. Checked Function Usage | YES | ✓/✗/? | _checked vs deprecated | | 4. Instruction Sequence Validation | IF flash loan / atomic pattern | ✓/✗(N/A)/? | Gap between checks | | 5. State Change Coverage | YES | ✓/✗/? | Between checked instructions | | 6. Program ID Verification | YES | ✓/✗/? | For every inspected instruction |
development
Prepare Solidity projects for a security audit — test coverage, test quality, NatSpec docs, code hygiene, dependency health, best-practice enforcement, deployment readiness, and project documentation checks. Generates a scored Audit Readiness Report and optionally runs static analysis. Trigger on: "prepare for audit", "audit readiness", "pre-audit check", "audit prep", "NatSpec check", or any request to review a Solidity codebase before a security review.
development
Launch the Plamen deterministic Web3 security audit pipeline
development
Run the Plamen smart-contract audit wizard in Codex
testing
Launch the Plamen deterministic L1 infrastructure audit pipeline