plamentsv/fork-ancestry

FORK_ANCESTRY Skill -- Aptos

Trigger Pattern: Always (run during recon TASK 0, not breadth) Inject Into: Recon agent only (meta_buffer.md enrichment) Purpose: Detect known parent codebases and inherit their historical vulnerability patterns.

1. Detect Fork Indicators

Grep the codebase for known parent signatures:

| Parent Project | Detection Patterns | Common Forks | |---------------|-------------------|--------------| | Thala | thala\|thalaswap\|move_staking\|thala_manager\|stability_pool\|mod_coin | Stableswap/staking forks | | Echelon | echelon\|lending_pool\|borrow_pool\|echelon_market\|lending_config | Lending protocol forks | | Aries | aries\|aries_market\|margin_trade\|aries_profile | Margin trading forks | | Aptos Framework Staking | delegation_pool\|stake_pool\|validator_set\|staking_config | Delegation/staking forks | | Liquidswap | liquidswap\|curves\|liquidity_pool\|coin_helper\|lp_coin | DEX forks (Pontem) | | Curve StableSwap | stable_swap\|stableswap\|get_d\|get_y\|ramp_a\|stop_ramp_a\|A_PRECISION\|RATE_MULTIPLIER\|calc_withdraw_one_coin\|remove_liquidity_imbalance\|get_virtual_price\|admin_fee\|pontem_stable | StableSwap AMM forks — set STABLESWAP_FORK flag if MEDIUM+ confidence | | Pancakeswap | pancake\|masterchef\|smart_router\|pancakeswap\|cake_token | Yield farming forks | | Amnis Finance | amnis\|amnis_staking\|amapt\|stapt\|amnis_router | Liquid staking forks | | Cellana Finance | cellana\|ve_token\|gauge\|voter\|bribe | ve(3,3) / gauge forks | | Merkle Trade | merkle\|trading\|pnl_manager\|fee_distributor\|merkle_trading | Perp DEX forks | | Aptos Names (ANS) | aptos_names\|domains\|ans_v2\|name_service | Name service forks | | Tortuga | tortuga\|staked_aptos\|tortuga_staking\|tAPT | Liquid staking forks | | Ditto | ditto\|ditto_staking\|staked_coin\|ditto_vault | Liquid staking/vault forks | | Aptos Token V2 / Digital Assets | token::TokenV2\|collection\|aptos_token\|digital_asset | NFT/token standard forks | | Aptos Fungible Asset Framework | fungible_asset\|FungibleStore\|FungibleAsset\|primary_fungible_store | FA standard consumers | | Pendleswap (Aptos) | pendle\|pendleswap\|sy_token\|pt_token\|yt_token\|market_factory | Yield tokenization forks |

Git-based detection (complements code-pattern matching — catches forks that renamed all identifiers). Skip if REPO_SHAPE: squashed_import in build_status.md — single-commit repos have no meaningful git metadata.

• Parse .gitmodules for submodule URLs pointing to known parent repos
• Check git remote -v for origin URLs matching known Aptos parent organizations (aptos-labs, econia-labs, pontem-network, thala-labs, pancakeswap)
• If a git-URL match is found but NO code-pattern match exists, flag as GIT_ONLY_FORK

Output: List of detected parents with confidence level (HIGH: 3+ patterns, MEDIUM: 2 patterns, LOW: 1 pattern, GIT_ONLY: git URL match but no code patterns).

2. Query Known Parent Issues

For each detected parent (confidence MEDIUM or HIGH):

2a. Solodit Search (two queries, run in parallel)

// Query 1: Known high-quality issues
search_solodit_live(
  protocol="{parent_name}",
  impact=["HIGH", "CRITICAL"],
  language="Move",
  quality_score=3,
  sort_by="Quality",
  max_results=15
)
// Query 2: Rare/unusual patterns specific to fork divergences
search_solodit_live(
  keywords="{parent_name} fork modified divergence aptos move",
  impact=["HIGH", "MEDIUM"],
  language="Move",
  sort_by="Rarity",
  max_results=10
)

2b. Tavily Search

tavily_search(query="{parent_name} aptos move smart contract vulnerability exploit audit finding 2024 2025 2026")

2c. Known Issue Catalog

Compile results into:

| Parent | Known Issue | Severity | Root Cause | Solodit Ref | Applicable to Fork? | |--------|-----------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------------| | {parent} | {issue title} | {severity} | {brief root cause} | {link/ID} | YES / NO / CHECK |

Applicability criteria:

• YES: Fork retains the vulnerable code path unchanged
• NO: Fork modified the vulnerable code path (document what changed)
• CHECK: Cannot determine without deeper analysis (flag for breadth agent)

2d. Hardcoded Known-Issue Floor (Web Search Fallback)

If Solodit AND Tavily BOTH fail, use this minimum catalog -- check EACH applicable parent type:

This floor is keyed on the parent's TYPE (generic mechanism), NOT on any specific protocol name — brand-keyed rows are prohibited (a floor row naming a specific protocol is the confirmed benchmark-contamination vector; see the HARD no-overfit rule). Classify the detected parent into a type below and check the generic hazard class; use at most one illustrative brand only in prose, never as the row key.

| Parent Type | Critical Known Issue | Root Cause | Search Keywords | |--------|---------------------|------------|-----------------| | Stableswap / stability pool (AMM) | Share manipulation on first deposit (e.g. Thala-class stability pools) | Empty-pool rounding in share calculation | aptos move stableswap stability pool first deposit share manipulation | | AMM / liquidity pool (constant-product, e.g. Liquidswap-class) | LP token inflation via small initial liquidity | Missing or insufficient MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY-equivalent floor | aptos move lp token inflation first liquidity minimum | | DEX yield farm (Aptos) | Reward rate manipulation via zero-amount deposit | Checkpoint timing + zero-amount triggers reward update | masterchef aptos deposit zero reward | | Liquid staking token (LST) | Exchange-rate staleness between LST and underlying; reward-distribution timing arbitrage | Discrete update timing allows entry at a stale rate, or reward-distribution timing creates an extractable arbitrage window | aptos liquid staking exchange rate staleness reward timing arbitrage | | Aptos Framework Staking | Delegation pool unlock timing + commission rate change | Validator can change commission before pending unlock completes | delegation pool commission unlock timing aptos | | Lending / money market | Oracle price staleness in liquidation path | Stale price allows unfair liquidation or avoids valid liquidation | aptos lending oracle staleness liquidation | | Vote-escrowed (ve) governance / gauge | Vote-escrowed token lock bypass via gauge interaction | ve token accounting inconsistency during gauge deposit/withdraw | aptos ve token lock gauge bypass | | Aptos Fungible Asset Framework | Ref capability leak via public friend function | MintRef/TransferRef/BurnRef exposed through insufficiently restricted public(friend) function | fungible asset ref capability leak public friend | | Aptos Token V2 | Object ownership transfer bypassing royalty enforcement | Token transfer via object::transfer bypasses marketplace royalty hooks | aptos token v2 royalty bypass transfer |

Note: This floor lists generic hazard CLASSES by parent type only — minimum coverage, not exhaustive, and not a substitute for live Solodit/Tavily research (2a/2b).

3. Divergence Analysis

For each detected parent:

3a. Identify What Changed

Compare fork vs parent in security-critical paths:

| Component | Parent Behavior | Fork Behavior | Security Impact | |-----------|----------------|---------------|-----------------| | {component} | {original} | {modified or SAME} | {new risk or NONE} |

Focus on:

• Modified access control (changed signer requirements, added/removed friend declarations)
• Changed mathematical formulas (fee calculations, exchange rates, reward distribution)
• Parameter semantic verification: When the parent has a mathematical specification, verify that each core parameter carries the same mathematical meaning in the fork — not just the same name and numeric range. Forks may store a raw value where the parent stores a derived form (e.g., raw coefficient vs. coefficient scaled by a function of pool dimensions). Compare the fork's formula usage against the parent's specification to confirm the encoding convention matches.
• Added external dependencies (new oracles, new CPI targets, new coin types)
• Removed safety checks (assertions removed, type constraints relaxed)
• Changed Ref storage patterns (different access control on stored MintRef/BurnRef/TransferRef)
• Module upgrade policy changes (parent immutable -> fork compatible, or vice versa)
• Generics changes (parent uses concrete types -> fork uses generics, or vice versa)

3b. New Attack Surface from Divergence

For each modification:

• Does the change introduce a NEW vulnerability not in the parent?
• Does the change REMOVE a parent fix/mitigation?
• Does the change create an INCONSISTENCY with parent's invariants?
• Does the change alter the Ref lifecycle (e.g., storing a Ref the parent consumed immediately)?

4. Output to meta_buffer.md

Append to {SCRATCHPAD}/meta_buffer.md:

## Fork Ancestry Analysis

### Detected Parents
| Parent | Confidence | Patterns Found |
|--------|-----------|---------------|

### Inherited Vulnerabilities to Verify
| # | Parent Issue | Severity | Location in Fork | Status |
|---|-------------|----------|------------------|--------|
| 1 | {issue} | {severity} | {fork location} | CHECK / VERIFIED_SAFE / VULNERABLE |

### Fork Divergences (Security-Critical)
| # | Component | Change | New Risk? |
|---|-----------|--------|-----------|

### Questions for Breadth Agents
1. {derived from inherited vulnerabilities}
2. {derived from divergence analysis}

---

Step Execution Checklist (MANDATORY)

| Section | Required | Completed? | Notes | |---------|----------|------------|-------| | 1. Detect Fork Indicators | YES | Y/N/? | | | 2. Query Known Parent Issues | IF parent detected | Y/N(no parent)/? | | | 3. Divergence Analysis | IF parent detected | Y/N(no parent)/? | | | 4. Output to meta_buffer.md | YES | Y/N/? | |