pinkpixel-dev/analyzing-cyber-kill-chain

Analyzing Cyber Kill Chain

When to Use

Use this skill when:

• Conducting post-incident analysis to determine how far an adversary progressed through an attack sequence
• Designing layered defensive controls with the goal of interrupting attacks at the earliest possible phase
• Producing threat intelligence reports that communicate attack progression to non-technical stakeholders

Do not use this skill as a standalone framework — combine with MITRE ATT&CK for technique-level granularity beyond what the 7-phase kill chain provides.

Prerequisites

• Complete incident timeline with forensic artifacts mapped to specific adversary actions
• MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise matrix for technique-level mapping within each kill chain phase
• Access to threat intelligence on the suspected adversary group's typical kill chain progression
• Post-incident report or IR timeline from responding team

Workflow

Step 1: Map Observed Actions to Kill Chain Phases

The Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain consists of seven phases. Map all observed adversary actions:

Phase 1 - Reconnaissance: Adversary gathers target information before attack.

• Indicators: DNS queries from adversary IP, LinkedIn scraping, job posting analysis, Shodan scans of organization infrastructure

Phase 2 - Weaponization: Adversary creates attack tool (malware + exploit).

• Indicators: Malware compilation timestamps, exploit document metadata, builder artifacts in malware samples

Phase 3 - Delivery: Adversary transmits weapon to target.

• Indicators: Phishing emails, malicious attachments, drive-by downloads, USB drops, supply chain compromise

Phase 4 - Exploitation: Adversary exploits vulnerability to execute code.

• Indicators: CVE exploitation events in application/OS logs, memory corruption artifacts, shellcode execution

Phase 5 - Installation: Adversary establishes persistence on target.

• Indicators: New scheduled tasks, registry run keys, service installation, web shells, bootkits

Phase 6 - Command & Control (C2): Adversary communicates with compromised system.

• Indicators: Beaconing traffic (regular intervals), DNS tunneling, HTTPS to uncommon domains, C2 framework signatures (Cobalt Strike, Sliver)

Phase 7 - Actions on Objectives: Adversary achieves goals.

• Indicators: Data staging/exfiltration, lateral movement, ransomware execution, destructive activity

Step 2: Identify Phase Completion and Detection Points

Create a phase matrix for the incident:

Phase 1: Recon        → Completed (undetected)
Phase 2: Weaponize    → Completed (undetected — pre-attack)
Phase 3: Delivery     → Completed; phishing email bypassed SEG
Phase 4: Exploit      → Completed; CVE-2023-23397 exploited
Phase 5: Install      → DETECTED: EDR flagged scheduled task creation (attack stalled here)
Phase 6: C2           → Not achieved (installation blocked)
Phase 7: Objectives   → Not achieved

For each phase completed without detection, document the defensive control gap.

Step 3: Map to MITRE ATT&CK for Technique Detail

Each kill chain phase maps to multiple ATT&CK tactics:

• Delivery → Initial Access (TA0001)
• Exploitation → Execution (TA0002)
• Installation → Persistence (TA0003), Privilege Escalation (TA0004)
• C2 → Command and Control (TA0011)
• Actions on Objectives → Exfiltration (TA0010), Impact (TA0040)

Within each phase, enumerate specific ATT&CK techniques observed and map to existing detections.

Step 4: Identify Courses of Action per Phase

For each phase, document applicable defensive courses of action (COAs):

• Detect COA: What detection would alert on adversary activity in this phase?
• Deny COA: What control would prevent the adversary from completing this phase?
• Disrupt COA: What control would interrupt the adversary mid-phase?
• Degrade COA: What control would reduce the adversary's effectiveness in this phase?
• Deceive COA: What deception (honeypots, canary tokens) would expose activity in this phase?
• Destroy COA: What active defense capability would neutralize adversary infrastructure?

Step 5: Produce Kill Chain Analysis Report

Structure findings as:

1. Attack narrative (timeline of phases)
2. Phase-by-phase analysis with evidence
3. Detection point analysis (what worked, what failed)
4. Defensive recommendation per phase prioritized by cost/effectiveness
5. Control improvement roadmap

Key Concepts

| Term | Definition | |------|-----------| | Kill Chain | Sequential model of adversary intrusion phases; breaking any link theoretically stops the attack | | Courses of Action (COA) | Defensive responses mapped to each kill chain phase: detect, deny, disrupt, degrade, deceive, destroy | | Beaconing | Regular, periodic C2 check-in pattern from compromised host to adversary server; detectable by frequency analysis | | Phase Completion | Adversary successfully finishes a kill chain phase and progresses to the next; defense-in-depth aims to prevent this | | Intelligence Gain/Loss | Analysis of whether detecting at Phase 5 (vs. Phase 3) reduced intelligence about adversary capabilities or intent |

Tools & Systems

• MITRE ATT&CK Navigator: Overlay kill chain phases with ATT&CK technique coverage for integrated analysis
• Elastic Security EQL: Event Query Language for querying multi-phase attack sequences in Elastic SIEM
• Splunk ES: Timeline visualization and correlation searches for kill chain phase sequencing
• MISP: Kill chain tagging via galaxy clusters for structured incident event documentation

Common Pitfalls

• Linear assumption: Adversaries don't always progress linearly — they may skip phases (weaponization already complete from previous campaign) or loop back (re-establish C2 after detection).
• Ignoring Phases 1 and 2: Reconnaissance and weaponization occur before the defender has visibility. Intelligence about these phases requires external sources (OSINT, threat intelligence).
• Missing insider threats: The kill chain was designed for external adversaries. Insider threats may skip directly to Phase 7 without traversing earlier phases.
• Confusing with ATT&CK tactics: The 7-phase kill chain and 14 ATT&CK tactics are complementary but not directly equivalent. Maintain distinction to prevent analytic confusion.