oimiragieo/memory-forensics

Memory Forensics

Security Notice

AUTHORIZED USE ONLY: These skills are for DEFENSIVE security analysis and authorized research:

• Incident response with proper authorization
• Forensic investigations in authorized contexts
• Malware analysis for defensive purposes
• CTF competitions and security research
• Educational purposes in controlled environments

NEVER use for:

• Unauthorized system access or surveillance
• Privacy violations
• Intellectual property theft
• Any illegal activities

Comprehensive techniques for acquiring, analyzing, and extracting artifacts from memory dumps for incident response and malware analysis.

Memory Acquisition

Live Acquisition Tools

Windows

# WinPmem (Recommended)
winpmem_mini_x64.exe memory.raw

# DumpIt
DumpIt.exe

# Belkasoft RAM Capturer
# GUI-based, outputs raw format

# Magnet RAM Capture
# GUI-based, outputs raw format

Linux

# LiME (Linux Memory Extractor)
sudo insmod lime.ko "path=/tmp/memory.lime format=lime"

# /dev/mem (limited, requires permissions)
sudo dd if=/dev/mem of=memory.raw bs=1M

# /proc/kcore (ELF format)
sudo cp /proc/kcore memory.elf

macOS

# osxpmem
sudo ./osxpmem -o memory.raw

# MacQuisition (commercial)

Virtual Machine Memory

# VMware: .vmem file is raw memory
cp vm.vmem memory.raw

# VirtualBox: Use debug console
vboxmanage debugvm "VMName" dumpvmcore --filename memory.elf

# QEMU
virsh dump <domain> memory.raw --memory-only

# Hyper-V
# Checkpoint contains memory state

Volatility 3 Framework

Installation and Setup

# Install Volatility 3
pip install volatility3

# Install symbol tables (Windows)
# Download from https://downloads.volatilityfoundation.org/volatility3/symbols/

# Basic usage
vol -f memory.raw <plugin>

# With symbol path
vol -f memory.raw -s /path/to/symbols windows.pslist

Essential Plugins

Process Analysis

# List processes
vol -f memory.raw windows.pslist

# Process tree (parent-child relationships)
vol -f memory.raw windows.pstree

# Hidden process detection
vol -f memory.raw windows.psscan

# Process memory dumps
vol -f memory.raw windows.memmap --pid <PID> --dump

# Process environment variables
vol -f memory.raw windows.envars --pid <PID>

# Command line arguments
vol -f memory.raw windows.cmdline

Network Analysis

# Network connections
vol -f memory.raw windows.netscan

# Network connection state
vol -f memory.raw windows.netstat

DLL and Module Analysis

# Loaded DLLs per process
vol -f memory.raw windows.dlllist --pid <PID>

# Find hidden/injected DLLs
vol -f memory.raw windows.ldrmodules

# Kernel modules
vol -f memory.raw windows.modules

# Module dumps
vol -f memory.raw windows.moddump --pid <PID>

Memory Injection Detection

# Detect code injection
vol -f memory.raw windows.malfind

# VAD (Virtual Address Descriptor) analysis
vol -f memory.raw windows.vadinfo --pid <PID>

# Dump suspicious memory regions
vol -f memory.raw windows.vadyarascan --yara-rules rules.yar

Registry Analysis

# List registry hives
vol -f memory.raw windows.registry.hivelist

# Print registry key
vol -f memory.raw windows.registry.printkey --key "Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"

# Dump registry hive
vol -f memory.raw windows.registry.hivescan --dump

File System Artifacts

# Scan for file objects
vol -f memory.raw windows.filescan

# Dump files from memory
vol -f memory.raw windows.dumpfiles --pid <PID>

# MFT analysis
vol -f memory.raw windows.mftscan

Linux Analysis

# Process listing
vol -f memory.raw linux.pslist

# Process tree
vol -f memory.raw linux.pstree

# Bash history
vol -f memory.raw linux.bash

# Network connections
vol -f memory.raw linux.sockstat

# Loaded kernel modules
vol -f memory.raw linux.lsmod

# Mount points
vol -f memory.raw linux.mount

# Environment variables
vol -f memory.raw linux.envars

macOS Analysis

# Process listing
vol -f memory.raw mac.pslist

# Process tree
vol -f memory.raw mac.pstree

# Network connections
vol -f memory.raw mac.netstat

# Kernel extensions
vol -f memory.raw mac.lsmod

Analysis Workflows

Malware Analysis Workflow

# 1. Initial process survey
vol -f memory.raw windows.pstree > processes.txt
vol -f memory.raw windows.pslist > pslist.txt

# 2. Network connections
vol -f memory.raw windows.netscan > network.txt

# 3. Detect injection
vol -f memory.raw windows.malfind > malfind.txt

# 4. Analyze suspicious processes
vol -f memory.raw windows.dlllist --pid <PID>
vol -f memory.raw windows.handles --pid <PID>

# 5. Dump suspicious executables
vol -f memory.raw windows.pslist --pid <PID> --dump

# 6. Extract strings from dumps
strings -a pid.<PID>.exe > strings.txt

# 7. YARA scanning
vol -f memory.raw windows.yarascan --yara-rules malware.yar

Incident Response Workflow

# 1. Timeline of events
vol -f memory.raw windows.timeliner > timeline.csv

# 2. User activity
vol -f memory.raw windows.cmdline
vol -f memory.raw windows.consoles

# 3. Persistence mechanisms
vol -f memory.raw windows.registry.printkey \
    --key "Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"

# 4. Services
vol -f memory.raw windows.svcscan

# 5. Scheduled tasks
vol -f memory.raw windows.scheduled_tasks

# 6. Recent files
vol -f memory.raw windows.filescan | grep -i "recent"

Data Structures

Windows Process Structures

// EPROCESS (Executive Process)
typedef struct _EPROCESS {
    KPROCESS Pcb;                    // Kernel process block
    EX_PUSH_LOCK ProcessLock;
    LARGE_INTEGER CreateTime;
    LARGE_INTEGER ExitTime;
    // ...
    LIST_ENTRY ActiveProcessLinks;   // Doubly-linked list
    ULONG_PTR UniqueProcessId;       // PID
    // ...
    PEB* Peb;                        // Process Environment Block
    // ...
} EPROCESS;

// PEB (Process Environment Block)
typedef struct _PEB {
    BOOLEAN InheritedAddressSpace;
    BOOLEAN ReadImageFileExecOptions;
    BOOLEAN BeingDebugged;           // Anti-debug check
    // ...
    PVOID ImageBaseAddress;          // Base address of executable
    PPEB_LDR_DATA Ldr;              // Loader data (DLL list)
    PRTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS ProcessParameters;
    // ...
} PEB;

VAD (Virtual Address Descriptor)

typedef struct _MMVAD {
    MMVAD_SHORT Core;
    union {
        ULONG LongFlags;
        MMVAD_FLAGS VadFlags;
    } u;
    // ...
    PVOID FirstPrototypePte;
    PVOID LastContiguousPte;
    // ...
    PFILE_OBJECT FileObject;
} MMVAD;

// Memory protection flags
#define PAGE_EXECUTE           0x10
#define PAGE_EXECUTE_READ      0x20
#define PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE 0x40
#define PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY 0x80

Detection Patterns

Process Injection Indicators

# Malfind indicators
# - PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE protection (suspicious)
# - MZ header in non-image VAD region
# - Shellcode patterns at allocation start

# Common injection techniques
# 1. Classic DLL Injection
#    - VirtualAllocEx + WriteProcessMemory + CreateRemoteThread

# 2. Process Hollowing
#    - CreateProcess (SUSPENDED) + NtUnmapViewOfSection + WriteProcessMemory

# 3. APC Injection
#    - QueueUserAPC targeting alertable threads

# 4. Thread Execution Hijacking
#    - SuspendThread + SetThreadContext + ResumeThread

Rootkit Detection

# Compare process lists
vol -f memory.raw windows.pslist > pslist.txt
vol -f memory.raw windows.psscan > psscan.txt
diff pslist.txt psscan.txt  # Hidden processes

# Check for DKOM (Direct Kernel Object Manipulation)
vol -f memory.raw windows.callbacks

# Detect hooked functions
vol -f memory.raw windows.ssdt  # System Service Descriptor Table

# Driver analysis
vol -f memory.raw windows.driverscan
vol -f memory.raw windows.driverirp

Credential Extraction

# Dump hashes (requires hivelist first)
vol -f memory.raw windows.hashdump

# LSA secrets
vol -f memory.raw windows.lsadump

# Cached domain credentials
vol -f memory.raw windows.cachedump

# Mimikatz-style extraction
# Requires specific plugins/tools

YARA Integration

Writing Memory YARA Rules

rule Suspicious_Injection
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects common injection shellcode"

    strings:
        // Common shellcode patterns
        $mz = { 4D 5A }
        $shellcode1 = { 55 8B EC 83 EC }  // Function prologue
        $api_hash = { 68 ?? ?? ?? ?? 68 ?? ?? ?? ?? E8 }  // Push hash, call

    condition:
        $mz at 0 or any of ($shellcode*)
}

rule Cobalt_Strike_Beacon
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects Cobalt Strike beacon in memory"

    strings:
        $config = { 00 01 00 01 00 02 }
        $sleep = "sleeptime"
        $beacon = "%s (admin)" wide

    condition:
        2 of them
}

Scanning Memory

# Scan all process memory
vol -f memory.raw windows.yarascan --yara-rules rules.yar

# Scan specific process
vol -f memory.raw windows.yarascan --yara-rules rules.yar --pid 1234

# Scan kernel memory
vol -f memory.raw windows.yarascan --yara-rules rules.yar --kernel

String Analysis

Extracting Strings

# Basic string extraction
strings -a memory.raw > all_strings.txt

# Unicode strings
strings -el memory.raw >> all_strings.txt

# Targeted extraction from process dump
vol -f memory.raw windows.memmap --pid 1234 --dump
strings -a pid.1234.dmp > process_strings.txt

# Pattern matching
grep -E "(https?://|[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3})" all_strings.txt

FLOSS for Obfuscated Strings

# FLOSS extracts obfuscated strings
floss malware.exe > floss_output.txt

# From memory dump
floss pid.1234.dmp

Best Practices

Acquisition Best Practices

1. Minimize footprint: Use lightweight acquisition tools
2. Document everything: Record time, tool, and hash of capture
3. Verify integrity: Hash memory dump immediately after capture
4. Chain of custody: Maintain proper forensic handling

Analysis Best Practices

1. Start broad: Get overview before deep diving
2. Cross-reference: Use multiple plugins for same data
3. Timeline correlation: Correlate memory findings with disk/network
4. Document findings: Keep detailed notes and screenshots
5. Validate results: Verify findings through multiple methods

Common Pitfalls

• Stale data: Memory is volatile, analyze promptly
• Incomplete dumps: Verify dump size matches expected RAM
• Symbol issues: Ensure correct symbol files for OS version
• Smear: Memory may change during acquisition
• Encryption: Some data may be encrypted in memory

Iron Laws

1. ALWAYS hash the memory dump immediately after acquisition — memory is volatile and can be challenged in court without a cryptographic integrity record proving the dump was not modified post-capture.
2. NEVER analyze from the live system that produced the dump — writing analysis tool artifacts to the suspect system contaminates volatile evidence and invalidates forensic chain of custody.
3. ALWAYS verify the OS profile before running plugins — wrong profile produces silently incorrect results; vol -f memory.raw windows.info must confirm OS version before any plugin output is trusted.
4. NEVER use a single plugin to confirm a finding — pslist misses DKOM-hidden processes; cross-validate with psscan and pstree before reporting any process as hidden.
5. ALWAYS work from a forensic copy, never the original dump — all analysis writes output files to the working directory; working on the original risks accidental modification of the evidence artifact.

Anti-Patterns

| Anti-Pattern | Why It Fails | Correct Approach | | ------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Skipping acquisition hash | Dump integrity cannot be proven in court or peer review; challenges invalidate all findings | Hash immediately: sha256sum memory.raw > memory.raw.sha256 before any analysis | | Wrong OS profile | Incorrect offsets produce garbage output with no error — findings appear valid but are fabricated | Run vol -f memory.raw windows.info first; confirm OS version and build before other plugins | | Analyzing on the live suspect system | Tool artifacts contaminate volatile evidence; file timestamps change; live-response tools modify RAM state | Acquire dump, transfer to isolated analysis workstation, analyze the copy only | | Trusting a single plugin | DKOM rootkits hide from pslist linked-list traversal but appear in psscan pool scan | Cross-validate process lists with at least pslist, psscan, and pstree before reporting | | Missing timeline correlation | Memory artifacts without disk/network context cannot establish causality or attacker timeline | Correlate memory findings with event logs and PCAP before writing the incident report |

Memory Protocol (MANDATORY)

Before starting: Read .claude/context/memory/learnings.md

After completing:

• New pattern -> .claude/context/memory/learnings.md
• Issue found -> .claude/context/memory/issues.md
• Decision made -> .claude/context/memory/decisions.md

ASSUME INTERRUPTION: If it's not in memory, it didn't happen.