skills/octopus-security-audit/SKILL.md
OWASP compliance, vulnerability scanning, and adversarial red team testing — use for security reviews
npx skillsauth add nyldn/claude-octopus octopus-security-auditInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
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Host: Codex CLI — This skill was designed for Claude Code and adapted for Codex. Cross-reference commands use installed skill names in Codex rather than
/octo:*slash commands. Use the active Codex shell and subagent tools. Do not claim a provider, model, or host subagent is available until the current session exposes it. For host tool equivalents, seeskills/blocks/codex-host-adapter.md.
This generated Codex skill preserves an enforced workflow contract from the source skill.
PROHIBITED:
Your first output line MUST be: 🐙 **CLAUDE OCTOPUS ACTIVATED** - Security Audit
Invokes the security-auditor persona for thorough security analysis during the ink (deliver) phase. Supports both quick OWASP scanning and full adversarial red/blue team testing.
# Quick scan via security-auditor persona
${HOME}/.claude-octopus/plugin/scripts/orchestrate.sh spawn security-auditor "Scan for SQL injection vulnerabilities"
# Adversarial red team via squeeze workflow
${HOME}/.claude-octopus/plugin/scripts/orchestrate.sh squeeze "Security audit the authentication module"
# Via auto-routing (detects security intent)
${HOME}/.claude-octopus/plugin/scripts/orchestrate.sh auto "security audit the payment processing module"
| Mode | Auto-Trigger | Confidence Gate | Scope | |------|-------------|----------------|-------| | Quick (default) | Standard security scan, no sensitive files in diff | 8/10 — only high-confidence findings | Changed files only | | Deep (auto-escalated) | Diff touches auth/security/CI files, OR explicit request | 2/10 — flag anything suspicious | Entire codebase |
Auto-escalation to Deep mode: The skill automatically switches to Deep mode when ANY of these are true:
*auth*, *login*, *password*, *session*, *token*, *secret*, *crypt*, *oauth*, *saml*, *jwt*, *permission*, *rbac*, *acl*.github/workflows/*, Dockerfile*, docker-compose*, .gitlab-ci*package-lock.json, yarn.lock, Gemfile.lock, requirements.txt, go.sumNo user action needed — mode detection happens automatically from the git diff context.
Scan git history for leaked credentials that may have been "deleted" but remain in commits:
# Search git history for common secret patterns
git log --all -p --diff-filter=D -- '*.env' '*.key' '*.pem' 2>/dev/null | head -200
git log --all -p -S 'AKIA' --pickaxe-regex 2>/dev/null | head -100 # AWS keys
git log --all -p -S 'sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}' --pickaxe-regex 2>/dev/null | head -100 # API keys
git log --all -p -S 'ghp_|gho_|github_pat_' --pickaxe-regex 2>/dev/null | head -100 # GitHub tokens
git log --all -p -S 'password\s*[:=]' --pickaxe-regex 2>/dev/null | head -100 # Passwords
Report any findings with the commit SHA, file, and recommendation to rotate the credential.
Audit GitHub Actions and CI configuration for injection and privilege escalation:
# Find all workflow files
find .github/workflows -name '*.yml' -o -name '*.yaml' 2>/dev/null
# Check for dangerous patterns:
# 1. Untrusted input in run: blocks (command injection via PR titles/branch names)
# 2. pull_request_target with checkout of PR code (code execution from forks)
# 3. Overly broad permissions (write-all, contents: write)
# 4. Missing pinned action versions (uses: actions/checkout vs actions/checkout@v4)
# 5. Secrets exposed to pull_request events (accessible to forks)
Flag each finding with severity (CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW).
Verify integrity of installed Claude Code skills and plugins:
# List installed plugins
ls -la ~/.claude/plugins/ 2>/dev/null
# Check for skills that execute arbitrary bash
grep -r 'exec\|eval\|bash -c' ~/.claude/skills/*/SKILL.md 2>/dev/null | head -20
# Verify plugin sources (are they from known registries?)
cat ~/.claude/plugins/*/plugin.json 2>/dev/null | grep -E '"source"|"registry"'
For the target component, enumerate threats across all 6 STRIDE categories:
| Category | Question | |----------|----------| | Spoofing | Can an attacker impersonate a user or component? | | Tampering | Can data be modified in transit or at rest? | | Repudiation | Can actions be denied without audit trail? | | Information Disclosure | Can sensitive data leak through logs, errors, or side channels? | | Denial of Service | Can the service be overwhelmed or starved? | | Elevation of Privilege | Can a low-privilege user gain admin access? |
This skill wraps the security-auditor persona defined in:
agents/personas/security-auditor.mdcodex-reviewgpt-5.2-codexinkowasp, vulnerability-scanning, security-review"Scan for hardcoded credentials in the codebase"
"Check for CSRF vulnerabilities in form handlers"
"Review the API authentication implementation"
"Red team review the payment API"
For comprehensive security testing, use the squeeze workflow which runs a 4-phase adversarial cycle:
${HOME}/.claude-octopus/plugin/scripts/orchestrate.sh squeeze "[user's security request]"
# Focus on specific vulnerabilities
${HOME}/.claude-octopus/plugin/scripts/orchestrate.sh squeeze --principles security "Audit for auth bypass only"
# Loop until all vulnerabilities fixed
${HOME}/.claude-octopus/plugin/scripts/orchestrate.sh squeeze --loop --quality 100 "Zero tolerance audit"
| Aspect | Quick Scan (spawn) | Adversarial (squeeze) | |--------|-------------------|----------------------| | Speed | 1-2 min | 5-10 min | | Depth | Single perspective | Blue + Red team | | Output | Issue list | Exploit PoCs + fixes | | Best for | Pre-commit checks | Pre-deployment review |
Do use for: pre-commit security checks, development-phase testing, architecture security review, CI/CD security gates.
testing
Environment diagnostics — check providers, auth, config, hooks, scheduler, and more
testing
Run a configurable multi-LLM council with personas, budget caps, synthesis, veto gates, and optional implementation handoff.
data-ai
Evidence before claims — run verification commands before declaring work complete, fixed, or passing
testing
Evidence before claims — run verification commands before declaring work complete, fixed, or passing