modules/home/programs/cli-agents/shared/skills/learn-codebase/SKILL.md
Discover project conventions and surface security concerns. Use when starting work in a new or unfamiliar project, when asked to "learn the codebase", "check project rules", "what are the conventions", "onboard to this project", or "anything shady in this codebase". Scans agent config files (.claude/, .cursor/, CLAUDE.md, etc.) and runs a security/smell sweep for hardcoded secrets, insecure patterns, suspicious dependencies, and dangerous configurations.
npx skillsauth add not-matthias/dotfiles-nix learn-codebaseInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
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Scan the current project for agent instruction files from various tools, summarize the conventions, and optionally register discovered skills in .pi/settings.json.
Search the project root for these files and directories:
# Agent instruction files (root-level)
for f in CLAUDE.md AGENTS.md COPILOT.md .cursorrules .clinerules; do
[ -f "$f" ] && echo "FOUND: $f"
done
# Agent config directories
for d in .claude .cursor .github .pi; do
[ -d "$d" ] && echo "FOUND DIR: $d/"
done
# Deeper convention files
[ -f ".github/copilot-instructions.md" ] && echo "FOUND: .github/copilot-instructions.md"
# Claude Code rules, skills, and commands
[ -d ".claude/rules" ] && echo "FOUND: .claude/rules/"
[ -d ".claude/skills" ] && echo "FOUND: .claude/skills/"
[ -d ".claude/commands" ] && echo "FOUND: .claude/commands/"
# Cursor rules
[ -d ".cursor/rules" ] && echo "FOUND: .cursor/rules/"
# Pi project skills
[ -d ".pi/skills" ] && echo "FOUND: .pi/skills/"
For each discovered file, read its contents and extract key conventions:
CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, .cursorrules, etc.) — read fully, these are the primary project rules.claude/rules/, .cursor/rules/) — read each rule file.claude/commands/) — read each command file. These are reusable prompt workflows from Claude Code (e.g., PR creation, release scripts, review checklists). Summarize what each command does..claude/skills/, .cursor/skills/) — list available skills and read their descriptions.claude/settings.json) — note permissions and configurationPresent a structured summary to the user:
## Project Conventions Summary
### Build & Run
- Package manager: [npm/pnpm/yarn/bun]
- Dev command: [command]
- Test command: [command]
### Code Style
- [Key style rules]
### Architecture
- [Key patterns, structure]
### Agent-Specific Rules
- [Any rules targeted at AI agents]
### Available Commands (from .claude/commands/)
- [command-name] — [what it does]
### Available Skills (from other tools)
- [List skills found in .claude/skills, .cursor/skills]
Focus on actionable information. Skip boilerplate and obvious conventions.
If .claude/skills/ or other skill directories exist, suggest registering them in .pi/settings.json so pi can use them too:
{
"skills": ["../.claude/skills"]
}
Ask the user if they want to create or update .pi/settings.json with the discovered skill paths. Only do this if skills were actually found.
After summarizing, highlight the top 3-5 things to keep in mind while working in this project. These are the conventions most likely to be violated if forgotten — things like:
Scan the codebase for things that look shady, fishy, or dangerous. This isn't a full audit — it's a quick sweep to surface anything the user should be aware of. Flag real concerns, not hypotheticals.
Run these checks and report anything suspicious:
Hardcoded Secrets & Credentials
# Look for hardcoded secrets, API keys, tokens, passwords
rg -i --hidden -g '!{.git,node_modules,dist,build,.next,vendor,*.lock}' \
'(api[_-]?key|secret|token|password|credential|auth)\s*[:=]\s*["\x27][^"\x27]{8,}' \
--type-not binary -l 2>/dev/null | head -20
# .env files committed to repo (should be gitignored)
git ls-files --cached | grep -iE '\.env($|\.)' 2>/dev/null
Insecure Code Patterns
# eval(), exec(), dangerouslySetInnerHTML, innerHTML assignments, shell injection vectors
rg --hidden -g '!{.git,node_modules,dist,build,.next,vendor,*.lock}' \
-e '\beval\s*\(' -e '\bexec\s*\(' -e 'dangerouslySetInnerHTML' \
-e '\.innerHTML\s*=' -e 'child_process' -e '\$\(.*\$\{' \
--type-not binary -l 2>/dev/null | head -20
# Unparameterized SQL (string concatenation in queries)
rg --hidden -g '!{.git,node_modules,dist,build,.next,vendor,*.lock}' \
-e 'query\s*\(\s*[`"'"'"'].*\$\{' -e 'execute\s*\(\s*[`"'"'"'].*\+' \
--type-not binary -l 2>/dev/null | head -20
Suspicious Dependencies
# Check for install/postinstall scripts in dependencies (supply chain risk)
[ -f package.json ] && cat package.json | grep -E '"(pre|post)install"' 2>/dev/null
# Look for wildcard or git dependencies (unpinned)
[ -f package.json ] && rg '"[*]"|"git[+:]|"github:' package.json 2>/dev/null
# Very outdated lock file vs package.json mismatch
[ -f package-lock.json ] && [ package.json -nt package-lock.json ] && echo "WARN: package.json newer than lockfile"
[ -f pnpm-lock.yaml ] && [ package.json -nt pnpm-lock.yaml ] && echo "WARN: package.json newer than lockfile"
Overly Permissive Configurations
# CORS wildcards, disabled security headers, permissive CSP
rg --hidden -g '!{.git,node_modules,dist,build,.next,vendor,*.lock}' \
-e "origin:\s*['\"]?\*" -e 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin.*\*' \
-e "cors.*true" -e 'unsafe-inline' -e 'unsafe-eval' \
--type-not binary -l 2>/dev/null | head -10
# Disabled TLS verification, insecure flags
rg --hidden -g '!{.git,node_modules,dist,build,.next,vendor,*.lock}' \
-e 'NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED.*0' -e 'rejectUnauthorized.*false' \
-e 'verify.*false' -e 'insecure.*true' \
--type-not binary -l 2>/dev/null | head -10
File Permissions & Sensitive Files
# Private keys, certificates, or database files in repo
git ls-files --cached 2>/dev/null | grep -iE '\.(pem|key|p12|pfx|jks|keystore|sqlite|db)$' | head -10
# Check .gitignore exists and covers basics
if [ -f .gitignore ]; then
for pattern in '.env' 'node_modules' '.DS_Store'; do
grep -q "$pattern" .gitignore || echo "WARN: .gitignore missing $pattern"
done
else
echo "WARN: No .gitignore file found"
fi
Present findings in a dedicated section with severity tags. Be direct — no sugarcoating, but also no false alarms.
## Security & Code Smell Findings
### [P0] Hardcoded API key in src/config.ts
Line 42 has a Stripe secret key directly in source code.
This should be in an environment variable, not committed.
### [P1] .env file tracked by git
`.env.production` is committed and contains database credentials.
Add to `.gitignore` and rotate the exposed credentials.
### [P2] eval() usage in src/utils/parser.ts
Used to parse user-supplied expressions. Consider a safe parser
like `JSON.parse()` or a sandboxed evaluator instead.
### Nothing Concerning
[If sweep is clean, say so explicitly — don't manufacture findings.]
Severity guide:
Do NOT flag:
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