michaelalber/react-security-review

React Security Review

"Security is not a product, but a process." — Bruce Schneier

Core Security Values

Shared across the dotnet / python / php / rust / react security reviews — same values, language-specific threats.

Grounding note: the knowledge base has no React corpus. Use collection="internal" for OWASP, collection="javascript" for JS/TS specifics, and collection="ui_ux" for safe-by-default UI; cite react.dev and the OWASP cheat sheets as the React authority. Never invent a react collection.

| # | Value | What it means | |---|-------|---------------| | 1 | Validate at boundaries | Every external input (URL params, postMessage, API responses) validated/typed before use; never trust client-controlled data — even your own API's response shapes. | | 2 | No raw HTML from untrusted data | Output is escaped by default (JSX does this); the raw-HTML escape hatch is sanitized or never fed user data. | | 3 | Secrets out of the bundle | No API keys/tokens in client code; only intentionally-public VITE_/NEXT_PUBLIC_ values shipped; everything else stays server-side. | | 4 | Authn/authz is server-enforced | The client never decides authorization — it only reflects it. Route guards are UX, not security; the API enforces. | | 5 | Least privilege & safe defaults | Minimal scopes; safe link/target defaults; fail closed on missing data. | | 6 | Protect data in transit & at rest | TLS only; tokens in memory or httpOnly cookies, not localStorage; no PII/tokens in logs or analytics. | | 7 | Dependencies pinned & audited | Lockfile committed; npm audit / Snyk in CI; transitive CVEs reviewed (the npm tree is deep). | | 8 | Evidence-based, graded findings | Every finding cites file:line + OWASP category + severity; report is graded and manager-readable. |

Workflow

Shared skeleton: DETECT → SCAN → EXECUTIVE SUMMARY → GRADED FINDINGS.

DETECT     Framework (Vite/CRA/Next + React version), entry points (routes, forms, `postMessage`/
           `iframe`, external script tags), and the APIs / storage the app talks to.

SCAN       Walk the React Threat Checklist below, one OWASP category at a time. Gather evidence:
             npm audit --omit=dev                       # known CVEs in the dependency tree
             npx eslint . --plugin security             # eslint-plugin-security + jsx-a11y
             grep -rn "dangerously" src/                 # raw-HTML escape hatch usage
             grep -rn "localStorage\|sessionStorage" src/ # token storage
             grep -rn "VITE_\|NEXT_PUBLIC_\|process.env" src/ # secrets exposed to the bundle
           Every issue becomes a finding with file:line, OWASP category, and severity.

EXEC SUMMARY  Manager-friendly: risk grade, count by severity, top 3 risks in plain language.

FINDINGS      Technical table: severity · location · OWASP · finding · remediation.

React Threat Checklist (language-specific)

| OWASP (2025) | React / front-end check | Severity signal | |---|---|---| | A01 Broken Access Control | Authorization enforced by the API, not just hidden routes/buttons; no sensitive data fetched then client-side filtered; no IDOR via predictable IDs in client calls | Critical | | A02 Cryptographic Failures | Tokens not in localStorage (XSS-readable) — prefer httpOnly cookies or memory; no home-rolled crypto in the client; HTTPS-only links | High | | A03 Injection (XSS) | JSX auto-escaping intact; the raw-HTML escape hatch (dangerously…InnerHTML) only on sanitized HTML (DOMPurify); no href={userUrl}/src= allowing javascript:; no dynamic code evaluation (eval, the Function constructor, injected <script>) on input | Critical | | A04 Insecure Design | target="_blank" paired with rel="noopener noreferrer"; postMessage handlers check event.origin; no trust of window.name/referrer | High | | A05 Misconfiguration | Content-Security-Policy present; source maps not shipped to prod (or access-controlled); no * CORS reliance; React dev build not served in prod | High | | A06 Vulnerable Components | npm audit clean; lockfile committed; no abandoned/unmaintained UI deps; no latest ranges | High | | A07 Auth/Session Failures | Login flows rate-limited server-side; tokens cleared on logout; no long-lived tokens in storage; refresh handled securely | High | | A08 Integrity Failures | Third-party <script>/CDN tags use SRI (integrity); no untrusted dynamic import of attacker-controlled URLs | High | | A09 Logging Failures | No tokens/PII sent to client analytics/error trackers (scrub before Sentry/GA); no secrets in console.log | Medium | | A10 SSRF / Open Redirect | Redirect targets from query params allow-listed (no location.href = params.get('next')); image/iframe src from user input validated | High |

Full per-category checklist: owasp react checklist.

State Block

<security-review-state>
language: react
mode: DETECT | SCAN | EXEC-SUMMARY | FINDINGS | COMPLETE
detected: [framework+version | entry points | apis/storage]
owasp_covered: [A01..A10 progress]
findings: [critical:N high:N medium:N low:N]
last_action: [what was just done]
next_action: [what should happen next]
</security-review-state>

Output Template

Shared across all security reviews. Executive summary template: executive summary.

## Security Review: [project] (React)
**Framework**: [Vite/CRA/Next + React x] | **Scope**: [paths] | **Risk grade**: [A–F]

### Executive Summary (manager-friendly)
[2–3 sentences: overall posture, the most serious risk in plain language, recommended next step.]
Findings: Critical [N] · High [N] · Medium [N] · Low [N]

### Technical Findings
| Severity | Location | OWASP | Finding | Remediation |
|----------|----------|-------|---------|-------------|
| CRITICAL | file:line | A03 | [pattern] | [fix] |

**Top 3 priorities**: 1. … 2. … 3. …

Risk grade: A no critical/high · B no critical, ≤2 high · C no critical, multiple high · D 1+ critical · F systemic (unsanitized raw HTML + secrets in bundle + client-only authz).

AI Discipline Rules

• Evidence or it is not a finding. Run the tools; cite file:line and the OWASP category. No speculative findings.
• Detect the framework first. React escapes JSX by default and Next.js adds headers/CSP options — confirm the safe defaults are used, not bypassed, before flagging.
• Client guards are UX, not security. A hidden admin route is never a control; the finding is the missing server-side check, not the visible button.
• Severity reflects exploitability + impact, not how unusual the pattern looks. XSS that reads a localStorage token is Critical; a missing rel="noopener" is Low/Medium.
• Architecture, not here. Structural/maintainability issues belong to react-architecture-checklist — note and route.
• Federal/gov context → escalate. If NIST/FIPS/CUI/DOE applies, run security-review-federal after this base review.

Integration with Other Skills

• security-review-federal — Federal/gov overlay (NIST 800-53, FIPS, CUI, POA&M) applied on top of this base review.
• react-architecture-checklist — Companion for structure/maintainability; run first for context.
• supply-chain-audit — Deeper dependency/CVE and license analysis beyond npm audit (the npm tree is the largest attack surface here).
• dotnet / python / php / rust-security-review — Sibling skills sharing this exact Core Values + workflow + output.