skills/team/python-security-review/SKILL.md
OWASP-based security review of Python applications (FastAPI, Django, Flask). Detects the framework and entry points, scans against the OWASP Top 10 (2025) mapped to Python patterns (injection, insecure deserialization, SSTI, secrets, auth), runs bandit and pip-audit for evidence, and produces a manager-friendly executive summary plus a graded technical findings table. Use to audit Python code for vulnerabilities. Triggers on "python security review", "audit python code", "check python vulnerabilities", "OWASP python", "bandit scan", "pip-audit", "fastapi security", "django security", "flask security". For federal / gov / DOE / NIST / FIPS / CUI context, run security-review-federal after this base review. Do NOT use to grade architecture/structure — use python-architecture-checklist.
npx skillsauth add michaelalber/ai-toolkit python-security-reviewInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
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"Security is not a product, but a process." — Bruce Schneier
Shared across the dotnet / python / php / rust security reviews — same values, language-specific threats.
| # | Value | What it means |
|---|-------|---------------|
| 1 | Validate at boundaries | Every external input validated and typed at the edge (Pydantic/serializers); never trust client data. |
| 2 | Parameterized queries only | No f-string / %-formatted SQL; bound parameters or the ORM everywhere. |
| 3 | Secrets out of code | No hardcoded secrets; env / secret-manager; never logged. |
| 4 | Authn/authz at every boundary | Authentication and authorization enforced server-side at each trust boundary; deny by default. |
| 5 | Least privilege & safe defaults | Minimal permissions; secure defaults; fail closed. |
| 6 | Protect data in transit & at rest | No sensitive data (passwords, tokens, PII) in logs; TLS; encryption at rest. |
| 7 | Dependencies pinned & audited | Versions pinned; pip-audit in CI; supply chain reviewed. |
| 8 | Evidence-based, graded findings | Every finding cites file:line + OWASP category + severity; report is graded and manager-readable. |
Shared skeleton: DETECT → SCAN → EXECUTIVE SUMMARY → GRADED FINDINGS.
DETECT Framework (FastAPI/Django/Flask + version), entry points (routes, views, tasks, CLIs),
and the data stores / external calls in scope.
SCAN Walk the Python Threat Checklist below, one OWASP category at a time. Gather evidence:
bandit -r <pkg> # static security analysis
pip-audit # known CVEs in dependencies
grep -rn "yaml.load(\|shell=True\|format(.*SELECT" <pkg>
Every issue becomes a finding with file:line, OWASP category, and severity.
EXEC SUMMARY Manager-friendly: risk grade, count by severity, top 3 risks in plain language.
FINDINGS Technical table: severity · location · OWASP · finding · remediation.
| OWASP (2025) | Python check | Severity signal |
|---|---|---|
| A01 Broken Access Control | Auth dependencies/decorators on every protected route; object-level checks (no IDOR); deny by default | Critical |
| A02 Cryptographic Failures | hashlib SHA-256+ (never MD5/SHA1 for security); secrets/os.urandom for tokens (not random); passlib/bcrypt for passwords | High |
| A03 Injection | ORM or bound params (no f-string/% SQL); no shell-command execution on input (subprocess(..., shell=True), shell helpers); no dynamic eval/exec on input | Critical |
| A04 Insecure Design | Server-Side Template Injection (Jinja2 rendering user input); open redirects | High |
| A05 Misconfiguration | DEBUG=False in prod; ALLOWED_HOSTS/CORS locked down; secure cookie flags; SECRET_KEY from env | High |
| A06 Vulnerable Components | pip-audit clean; versions pinned in pyproject.toml; no abandoned packages | High |
| A08 Integrity Failures | No insecure deserialization of untrusted input (native object deserialization, yaml.load without SafeLoader) | Critical |
| A09 Logging Failures | No passwords/tokens/PII in logs; auth and access failures logged | Medium |
| A10 SSRF | Outbound URLs from user input validated/allow-listed; no raw requests.get(user_url) | High |
Full per-category checklist: owasp python checklist.
<security-review-state>
language: python
mode: DETECT | SCAN | EXEC-SUMMARY | FINDINGS | COMPLETE
detected: [framework+version | entry points | data stores]
owasp_covered: [A01..A10 progress]
findings: [critical:N high:N medium:N low:N]
last_action: [what was just done]
next_action: [what should happen next]
</security-review-state>
Shared across all four security reviews. Executive summary template: executive summary.
## Security Review: [project] (Python)
**Framework**: [FastAPI/Django/Flask] | **Scope**: [paths] | **Risk grade**: [A–F]
### Executive Summary (manager-friendly)
[2–3 sentences: overall posture, the most serious risk in plain language, recommended next step.]
Findings: Critical [N] · High [N] · Medium [N] · Low [N]
### Technical Findings
| Severity | Location | OWASP | Finding | Remediation |
|----------|----------|-------|---------|-------------|
| CRITICAL | file:line | A03 | [pattern] | [fix] |
**Top 3 priorities**: 1. … 2. … 3. …
Risk grade: A no critical/high · B no critical, ≤2 high · C no critical, multiple high · D 1+ critical · F systemic (injection + secrets in code + broken access control).
file:line and the OWASP category. No speculative findings.python-architecture-checklist — note and route.security-review-federal after this base review.security-review-federal — Federal/gov overlay (NIST 800-53, FIPS, CUI, POA&M) applied on top of this base review.python-architecture-checklist — Companion for structure/maintainability; run first for context.supply-chain-audit — Deeper dependency/CVE and license analysis beyond pip-audit.dotnet / php / rust-security-review — Sibling skills sharing this exact Core Values + workflow + output.development
Federal / government security overlay applied ON TOP OF a base language security review (dotnet/python/php/rust/react). Language-agnostic: adds NIST SP 800-53 control mapping, FIPS 140-2/3 cryptographic compliance (with a per-language crypto table), CUI handling, EO 14028 supply-chain requirements, and DOE Order 205.1B, and emits POA&M-ready findings with FIPS 199 impact levels. Use for federal/DOE/DOD/national-laboratory systems. Triggers on "federal security review", "NIST compliance", "NIST 800-53", "FISMA", "CUI", "FIPS audit", "DOE security", "POA&M", "ATO review". Do NOT use alone — run the matching <lang>-security-review FIRST; this overlay maps and extends it.
tools
OWASP-based security review of React / TypeScript front-end applications. Detects the framework (Vite/CRA/Next), entry points, and data flows, scans against the OWASP Top 10 (2025) mapped to React client-side patterns (XSS via raw HTML, URL/protocol injection, secrets in the bundle, insecure token storage, dependency CVEs, missing CSP, open redirects), and produces a manager-friendly executive summary plus a graded technical findings table. Use to audit React code for vulnerabilities. Triggers on "react security review", "frontend security audit", "audit react for vulnerabilities", "owasp react", "react xss", "react security posture", "npm audit review". For federal / gov / DOE / NIST / FIPS / CUI context, run security-review-federal after this base review. Do NOT use to grade architecture/structure — use react-architecture-checklist.
tools
Analyzes legacy React codebases and produces actionable modernization plans. Primary migration paths include class components to function components + hooks, Create React App to Vite, React 16/17 to 18 to 19, JavaScript to TypeScript, Enzyme to React Testing Library, legacy Redux to Redux Toolkit / Zustand / Context, and deprecated lifecycle/API removal. Does NOT perform the migration — assesses, quantifies risk, and plans. Triggers on phrases like "modernize react", "class to hooks", "upgrade react", "migrate CRA to vite", "react legacy migration", "react 17 to 18", "react js to typescript", "react technical debt", "enzyme to RTL".
development
Scaffolds feature-based React / TypeScript architecture using feature folders, presentational + container components, custom hooks, a typed data layer, and structural CQRS (query hooks vs mutation hooks). React analog of dotnet-vertical-slice and python-feature-slice — no DI framework; uses props/context for dependency injection and a query cache for server state. Use when creating feature-based React projects, adding React features, organizing components by feature rather than by technical type, or scaffolding a feature's data layer. Triggers on phrases like "scaffold react feature", "create react slice", "react feature folder", "react vertical slice", "add react feature", "react feature architecture", "organize react by feature".