plugins/codebase-audit-suite/skills/ln-621-security-boundary-auditor/SKILL.md
Checks application security boundaries: secrets, injection, XSS, input validation, and sensitive env defaults. Use when auditing exploitable code paths.
npx skillsauth add levnikolaevich/claude-code-skills ln-621-security-boundary-auditorInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
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Paths: File paths (
references/,../ln-*) are relative to this skill directory.
Type: L3 Worker
Specialized worker auditing exploitable application security boundaries.
HARDEN_SECURITY_BOUNDARY, REMOVE_SECRET, or REMOVE_SENSITIVE_DEFAULTMANDATORY READ: Load references/audit_worker_core_contract.md and references/mcp_tool_preferences.md.
Tool policy: You may run as an isolated subagent where host AGENTS.md is not in scope, so default to hex-line MCP first for file reads, search, and edits. Load references/mcp_integration_patterns.md only when MCP behavior is unclear.
Receives contextStore with: tech_stack, best_practices, principles, codebase_root, output_dir.
Use hex-graph first when dataflow or cross-file reference analysis materially improves confidence. Use hex-line first for local code reads when available. If MCP is unavailable, unsupported, or not indexed, continue with built-in Read/Grep/Glob/Bash and state the fallback in the report.
Detection policy: use two-layer detection (candidate scan, then context verification); load references/two_layer_detection.md only when the verification method is ambiguous.
innerHTML, | safe) -> confirmedreferences/templates/audit_worker_report_template.md, write to {output_dir}/ln-621--global.md in single Write callWhat: API keys, passwords, tokens, private keys in source code
Detection:
API_KEY = "...", password = "...", token = "...", SECRET = "...".ts, .js, .py, .go, .java, .cs.env.example, README.md, test files with mock dataSeverity:
Recommendation: Move to environment variables (.env), use secret management (Vault, AWS Secrets Manager)
Effort: S (replace hardcoded value with process.env.VAR_NAME)
What: String concatenation in SQL queries instead of parameterized queries
Detection:
query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id=" + userId, db.execute(f"SELECT * FROM {table}"), `SELECT * FROM ${table}`Severity:
Recommendation: Use parameterized queries (prepared statements), ORM query builders
Effort: M (refactor query to use placeholders)
What: Unsanitized user input rendered in HTML/templates
Detection:
innerHTML = userInput, dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{__html: data}}, echo $userInput;{{ var | safe }}, <%- var %>)Severity:
Recommendation: Use framework escaping (React auto-escapes, use textContent), sanitize with DOMPurify
Effort: S-M (replace innerHTML with textContent or sanitize)
What: Secret, token, key, credential, or privileged config values with unsafe code defaults
Detection:
SECRET, TOKEN, KEY, PASSWORD, PRIVATE, CREDENTIAL.env.example, tests, docs, and obvious placeholders (changeme, empty string, example)Severity:
Recommendation: Remove sensitive default, require explicit config, fail fast at startup
Effort: S-M
What: Missing validation at system boundaries (API endpoints, user forms, file uploads)
Detection:
Severity:
Recommendation: Add validation middleware (Joi, Yup, express-validator), implement input sanitization
Effort: M (add validation schema and middleware)
MANDATORY READ: Load references/audit_scoring.md.
MANDATORY READ: Load references/templates/audit_worker_report_template.md.
Write JSON summary per references/audit_summary_contract.md. In managed mode the caller passes both runId and summaryArtifactPath; in standalone mode the worker generates its own run-scoped artifact path per shared contract.
Write report to {output_dir}/ln-621--global.md with category: "Security Boundary" and checks: hardcoded_secrets, sql_injection, xss_vulnerabilities, sensitive_env_defaults, missing_input_validation.
Return summary per references/audit_summary_contract.md.
Standalone mode still writes the same JSON summary to a worker-owned run-scoped artifact path per shared contract.
Apply the already-loaded references/audit_worker_core_contract.md.
file:line for programmatic navigationHARDEN_SECURITY_BOUNDARY, REMOVE_SECRET, or REMOVE_SENSITIVE_DEFAULT.Apply the already-loaded references/audit_worker_core_contract.md.
{output_dir}/ln-621--global.md (atomic single Write call)references/audit_output_schema.mdVersion: 3.0.0 Last Updated: 2025-12-23
testing
Drafts and publishes fact-checked GitHub Discussions announcements. Use for releases, updates, or project news; not for release creation or issue responses.
testing
Prepares and publishes a tagged GitHub release from repository evidence. Use for an explicit release request; not for ordinary commits, packages, or community news.
testing
Validates, commits, pushes, and remotely verifies approved repository changes. Use when publication is requested; not for releases, package publishing, or announcements.
development
Reviews standalone skills and their configured distribution surfaces before publication. Use for skill release readiness; not for product code or implementation-plan review.