laurigates/custom-agent-definitions

Custom Agent Definitions

Expert knowledge for defining and configuring custom agents in Claude Code.

For full worked YAML examples (isolated research agent, read-only explorer, complete security auditor, plugin layout, common patterns), see REFERENCE.md.

When to Use This Skill

| Use this skill when... | Use agent-teams instead when... | |---|---| | Authoring a new .md agent definition file in .claude/agents/ | Spawning multiple already-defined agents that coordinate as a team | | Configuring a single agent's model, allowed-tools, or context: fork | Setting up a lead/teammate architecture with a shared task list | | Constraining tool access for a specialised read-only or write-restricted agent | Sequencing parallel work across worktrees (see parallel-agent-dispatch) | | Writing the system prompt that defines what one agent does | Auditing existing agent definitions for security (see meta-audit) |

Core Concepts

Custom agents let you define specialized agent types beyond the built-in ones (Explore, Plan, Bash, etc.). Each can have its own model, tools, and context configuration. They are defined in .claude/agents/ or via plugin agents/ directories, with YAML frontmatter + a markdown system prompt:

---
name: my-custom-agent
description: What this agent does
model: sonnet
allowed-tools: Bash, Read, Grep, Glob
---

# Agent System Prompt

Instructions and context for the agent...

Key Fields

Context Forking

| Value | Behavior | |-------|----------| | fork | Independent context copy — agent sees parent history but changes don't affect parent | | (default) | Agent shares context with parent and can see/modify conversation state |

Use fork for exploratory research, parallel investigations, and isolated experiments. See REFERENCE.md → Isolated research agent.

Tool Access (allowed vs disallowed)

| Field | Purpose | Behavior | |-------|---------|----------| | allowed-tools | Whitelist of permitted tools | Agent can ONLY use these tools | | disallowedTools | Blacklist of forbidden tools | Agent can use all tools EXCEPT these |

Use disallowedTools for read-only agents, restricting dangerous capabilities, and sandboxing. The two combine — an explicit whitelist plus a safety blacklist. See REFERENCE.md → Read-only explorer.

Agent Field for Delegation

The agent field specifies which agent type to use when delegating via the Agent tool, letting commands and skills name a preferred agent type:

agent: security-auditor

Agent Configuration Fields Reference

| Field | Type | Description | |-------|------|-------------| | name | string | Agent identifier | | description | string | What the agent does | | model | string | Model to use (sonnet, opus) | | context | string | Context mode: fork or default | | permissionMode | string | default, acceptEdits, dontAsk, bypassPermissions, or plan | | maxTurns | number | Maximum agentic turns before agent stops | | background | bool | Set true to always run as a background task | | memory | string | Persistent memory scope: user, project, or local | | skills | list | Skill names to preload into agent context at startup | | mcpServers | list | MCP server names available to this agent | | tools | list | Tools the agent can use (in agents/ dir; use allowed-tools in skills) | | disallowedTools | list | Tools the agent cannot use | | created / modified / reviewed | date | Lifecycle dates |

Best Practices

1. Principle of least privilege — grant only the tools the agent needs.

2. Use context: fork for isolation — exploratory work shouldn't pollute main context.

3. Combine allowed + disallowed — explicit whitelist with a safety blacklist.

4. Clear descriptions — describe what the agent does and its boundaries.

5. Model selection — sonnet for development workflows, opus for deep reasoning/analysis. (See .claude/rules/agent-and-tool-selection.md for the repo's Opus-for-subagents guidance.)

6. Report failures loudly — a dispatched agent that hits a wall must say so in its final message, never a one-word summary like Terminal. / Done. / Stopped. On a blocker it should commit and push its in-progress work, open a draft PR, and state exactly what stopped it and which tools were denied. A one-word surrender is indistinguishable from success to the orchestrator, so the work is silently cleaned up and lost (issue #1422). See parallel-agent-dispatch → "Loud-failure contract" for the dispatch-prompt form every brief should carry.

7. Prefer a Skill-less agentType for read-only fan-out — an agent that only reads files and emits structured output should NOT carry the Skill tool. Every Skill-bearing agent pays a ~25k-token skill_listing + deferred_tools_delta context tax before its first tool call, which can push read-heavy fan-out subagents over their context window. Use a lean read-only agent (e.g. agents-plugin:review) instead. See parallel-agent-dispatch → "Skill-less agentType for Read-Only Fan-Out" (issues #1549 / #1550).

Worked YAML for each practice is in REFERENCE.md → Best-practice snippets.

Agentic Optimizations

| Context | Configuration | |---------|---------------| | Exploratory research | context: fork, minimal read-only tools | | Security analysis | context: fork, disallowedTools: Bash, Write, Edit | | Quick lookups | minimal tools | | Complex implementation | model: sonnet, full tools |

Quick Reference

Context Modes

| Mode | Isolation | Use Case | |------|-----------|----------| | (default) | Shared | Normal workflows | | fork | Isolated | Research, experiments |

Tool Restriction Patterns

| Pattern | Fields | |---------|--------| | Whitelist only | allowed-tools: Tool1, Tool2 | | Blacklist only | disallowedTools: Tool1, Tool2 | | Combined | Both fields specified |

Related

• REFERENCE.md — full worked YAML examples and snippets
• agent-teams — multi-agent coordination via the implicit team
• parallel-agent-dispatch — worktree preflight, scope budgets, loud-failure contract
• meta-audit — auditing existing agent definitions for security/completeness
• .claude/rules/agent-development.md — agent lifecycle and field semantics