laitszkin/discover-security-issues

Discover Security Issues

Dependencies

• Required: none.
• Conditional: none.
• Optional: none.
• Fallback: not applicable.

Non-negotiables

• Discovery-only: MUST NOT edit code, apply patches, open PRs, or run “fix workflows.”
• MUST keep only reproducible issues with exploit evidence; separate hypotheses from confirmed findings.
• MUST reproduce each confirmed exploit at least twice on the same path; use nearby payload variants for high-risk sinks.
• MUST discard authorship bias—treat all code as untrusted until evidence proves behavior.

Standards (summary)

• Evidence: Payload/precondition, observable failure, path:line, commands or requests that reproduce.
• Execution: Pick modules → boundaries → scenarios from references → validate → prioritize → report only.
• Quality: Rank by impact, exploitability, reach; unknowns listed under residual risk.
• Output: Findings (severity-ordered), attack evidence, risk notes, hardening advice (not patches), residual risk.

Workflow

Chain-of-thought: After each step, satisfy Pause → before continuing; halt on missing scope or contradictory module choice.

1) Scope and modules

• Choose one or more of: agent-system, financial-program, software-system, combined (cross-boundary chains).
• List untrusted inputs, privileged actions, and protected assets; state invariants that must hold.
  • Pause → Which module catalogs did I open (file names)—not guessed from memory?

2) Execute scenarios from references

• Agent: references/agent-attack-catalog.md; optional references/security-test-patterns-agent.md (prompt injection, tool abuse, memory/exfil paths).
• Financial: references/red-team-extreme-scenarios.md, references/risk-checklist.md; optional references/security-test-patterns-finance.md (authz, replay/race, idempotency, precision, lifecycle).
• Software: references/common-software-attack-catalog.md (SQL/NoSQL/command injection, XSS, CSRF, SSRF, traversal, upload, session/JWT, IDOR/BOLA, deserialization, misconfig).
• Combined: relevant subsets plus chains (e.g. injection → privileged API).
  • Pause → Did I record payload + preconditions + observed behavior for each candidate—not just “maybe vulnerable”?

3) Validate reproducibility

• Re-run each confirmed path twice; add encoding/casing/delimiter variants on hot sinks.
  • Pause → Is anything still “likely” without a second repro—downgrade to hypothesis?

4) Prioritize

• Order Critical/High → Medium → Low using impact, exploitability, blast radius (multi-tenant / cross-tenant called out).

5) Report only

Deliver (see Output shape below): findings, attack evidence, prioritization, hardening guidance (advisory), residual risk.

Minimum coverage (apply per selected module)

• Core: trust boundaries, authn/authz, input → dangerous sink paths, secrets/sensitive data handling.
• Agent: prompt/indirect injection, unauthorized tools/actions, exfil, memory poisoning resistance.
• Financial: object-level authz, replay/race/idempotency, precision, oracle/side-effect safety, failure consistency.
• Software: injection families, XSS/CSRF/SSRF, traversal/upload, session/JWT, brute-force/rate limits, debug/CORS/secrets exposure.
• Combined: module checks + realistic cross-boundary chains.

Output shape

1. Findings (high → low): title, severity, evidence (path:line), reproduction steps/payload, impacted invariant/asset.
2. Attack evidence: preconditions, commands/requests, observed insecure behavior, variant results.
3. Risk prioritization: impact, exploitability, reach; why it matters in this system.
4. Hardening guidance (advice only): fix direction, validation focus post-remediation.
5. Residual risk: hypotheses, assumptions, follow-up probes.

Sample hints

• Module: Web API + Claude tool-use → combined (software + agent); deposits/withdrawals → include financial-program.
• Evidence: “SQLi possible” without two runs + exact parameter → stays hypothesis until repro’d.
• Stop line: User says “patch it now” → finish report; hand off to implementation skills—do not self-patch here.

References

• references/agent-attack-catalog.md, references/security-test-patterns-agent.md
• references/red-team-extreme-scenarios.md, references/risk-checklist.md, references/security-test-patterns-finance.md
• references/common-software-attack-catalog.md, references/test-snippets.md (optional snippets)