jwa91/env-inspector

ENV Inspector

Reads .env files and emits a redacted view: keys are always shown, values are shown only when they look unambiguously safe. Anything ambiguous is replaced with <redacted>.

Usage

bash .agents/skills/env-inspector/scripts/env-safe-read.sh /path/to/.env

Inspect every .env* in a project (excluding examples):

for f in $(find . -maxdepth 3 -name '.env*' -not -name '.env.example' -not -path '*/node_modules/*'); do
  echo "--- $f ---"
  bash .agents/skills/env-inspector/scripts/env-safe-read.sh "$f"
  echo ""
done

How redaction works

Four layers, all default-deny. A value is shown only if it survives all of them:

1. Sensitive-key block. Keys matching KEY|SECRET|TOKEN|PASSWORD|PASS|CREDENTIAL|AUTH|PRIVATE|SIGNING|HASH|SALT|ENCRYPTION|JWT|BEARER|COOKIE|CSRF|SESSION|DSN|WEBHOOK_URL are redacted regardless of value.
2. Token-pattern blocklist. Values matching known shapes (sk-…, pk_live_…, ghp_…, github_pat_…, eyJ… JWT, AKIA…, xox[abprs]-…, AIza…, glpat-…, npm_…, dckr_pat_…) are redacted.
3. Shannon entropy. Values ≥16 chars with entropy ≥3.5 bits/char are redacted (catches random tokens that don't match a known prefix).
4. Positive allowlist. What survives is shown only if it matches a known-safe shape: booleans, numbers, log levels, localhost/loopback, short non-random strings (≤20 chars), or HTTP(S) URLs without embedded @ credentials and without long random query strings.

What this skill is and isn't

• Is: a heuristic that makes leaks much less likely when summarizing env config.
• Isn't: a cryptographic guarantee. A short, human-chosen password under an innocent key (e.g. MY_PIN=hunter12) can still slip through.
• For high-stakes contexts (production secrets, audit logs), inspect manually instead.

Path-gate hook

The skill ships with a PreToolUse hook (hooks/path-gate.sh) that:

• Allows env-safe-read.sh to run only against paths inside $CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR.
• Rejects any target whose filename doesn't match a .env pattern.
• Rejects paths containing .. traversal.

The hook is a guardrail, not the primary defense — the redaction in the script is what protects you. The hook just ensures the script can't be aimed at, say, /etc/postgresql/.env by an over-eager agent.

If your harness doesn't honor skill-level hooks frontmatter, copy the matcher block into your project .claude/settings.json or run the script manually.

Compatibility

• Requires bash and awk (entropy calc). No Python or jq dependency.
• The hook uses sed for JSON parsing to avoid a jq dep — fragile but works for the standard Claude Code tool-call shape.