helderberto/harden

Harden

Security as a constraint on every line that touches user data, auth, or external systems. This skill is proactive: applied during implementation, not after. For reactive scans, use safe-repo (sensitive data) or deps-audit (CVEs).

When to Use

• Building anything that accepts user input
• Implementing authentication or authorization
• Storing or transmitting sensitive data
• Integrating with external APIs or webhooks
• Adding file uploads, payments, or PII handling

Three-Tier Boundary System

Always do (no exceptions)

• Validate every external input at the system boundary (route handler, API entry)
• Parameterize all database queries (never concatenate user input into SQL)
• Encode output to prevent XSS — use framework auto-escaping, don't bypass it
• HTTPS for all external communication
• Hash passwords with bcrypt/scrypt/argon2 (salt rounds ≥ 12); never plaintext
• Set security headers: CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options
• Session cookies: httpOnly, secure, sameSite
• Use environment variables for secrets; reference, never inline

Ask first (human approval required)

• New authentication flow or auth logic changes
• Storing new categories of sensitive data (PII, payment)
• New external service integrations
• CORS configuration changes
• File upload handlers
• Rate-limit / throttling changes
• Granting elevated permissions or roles

Never do

• Commit secrets to version control
• Log sensitive data (passwords, tokens, full PAN)
• Trust client-side validation as a security boundary
• Disable security headers for convenience
• Use eval() or innerHTML with user-provided data
• Store sessions in client-accessible storage (e.g., localStorage for auth tokens)
• Expose stack traces or internal errors to users

OWASP Top 10 — Quick Reference

| Risk | Mitigation | |------|------------| | Injection (SQL/NoSQL/OS) | Parameterized queries; ORM with bound params; never concat user input | | Broken authentication | bcrypt/argon2 hashing; httpOnly+secure+sameSite cookies; rate-limit auth endpoints | | XSS | Framework auto-escape; sanitize with DOMPurify if HTML is unavoidable | | Broken access control | Check authorization on EVERY endpoint; verify ownership, not just authentication | | Misconfiguration | helmet for headers; CORS restricted to known origins via env var | | Sensitive data exposure | Strip sensitive fields before API response; env vars for secrets | | Insufficient logging | Log auth failures, access denials, input rejections | | SSRF | Allowlist outbound destinations; never fetch user-provided URLs without validation |

Input Validation at Boundaries

Always validate at the system boundary (route handler, message consumer), not in business logic:

• Schema validator (Zod, Joi, Yup, pydantic) defines the contract
• Reject with 422 + structured error before any business logic touches the data
• Trust internal code; validate only at the edges

File Upload Safety

• Allowlist MIME types; deny unknown
• Enforce max size before processing
• Check magic bytes if file type is security-critical (don't trust extension or mimetype)
• Store outside webroot or behind authenticated access

Triaging npm audit / CVE findings

Critical or High severity?
├── Vulnerable code reachable in your app?
│   ├── YES → Fix immediately
│   └── NO (dev-only, unused path) → Fix soon, not a blocker
└── Fix available?
    ├── YES → Update to patched version
    └── NO → Workaround / replace dep / allowlist with review date

Defer with documented reason and review date. Never silent allowlist.

Secrets Management

.env.example   → committed (template, placeholder values)
.env           → NOT committed (real secrets)
.env.local     → NOT committed (local overrides)
*.pem, *.key   → NOT committed

Pre-commit check: git diff --cached | grep -iE "password|secret|api_key|token". Better: safe-repo --diff as part of ship.

Rules

• Validate at boundaries; trust internal code
• Use framework defaults (helmet, parameterized ORMs, framework escaping)
• Read secrets from env vars; never inline
• Authorization checked on every protected endpoint
• Strip sensitive fields from API responses by default
• Never trust client-side validation as a security boundary

Red Flags

• User input flowing directly into SQL string, shell command, or HTML render
• Secrets in source code or commit history
• API endpoint without authentication or authorization check
• CORS wildcard (*) or no CORS config
• No rate limit on auth endpoints
• Stack traces returned to users
• Dependencies with known critical CVEs and no plan

Verification

After implementing security-relevant code, confirm:

• [ ] deps-audit shows no critical or high CVEs (or each is documented with review date)
• [ ] safe-repo --diff clean
• [ ] All user input validated at system boundaries
• [ ] Authorization checked on every protected endpoint (ownership, not just auth)
• [ ] Security headers present in response (check via DevTools or curl -I)
• [ ] Error responses don't expose internal details
• [ ] Rate limit active on auth endpoints

Common Rationalizations

| Rationalization | Reality | |-----------------|---------| | "Internal tool, security doesn't matter" | Internal tools get compromised; attackers target the weakest link | | "We'll add security later" | Retrofitting is 10x harder than building it in | | "No one would exploit this" | Automated scanners will; security-by-obscurity is not security | | "Framework handles security" | Frameworks provide tools, not guarantees | | "It's a prototype" | Prototypes become production; habits compound |