apps/workbench/workbench-plugin/.claude-plugin/skills/observe-analyze/SKILL.md
Import and analyze agent activity logs to synthesize security policies
npx skillsauth add backbay-labs/clawdstrike apps/workbench/workbench-plugin/.claude-plugin/skills/observe-analyzeInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
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OBSERVE --> SYNTH --> TIGHTEN
| | |
v v v
Collect Generate Harden
events candidate iteratively
policy
Collect agent activity events in JSONL format. Each event should have:
{"action_type": "file_access", "target": "/workspace/src/app.ts"}
{"action_type": "network_egress", "target": "api.openai.com"}
{"action_type": "shell_command", "target": "npm install express"}
{"action_type": "mcp_tool_call", "target": "read_file"}
{"action_type": "file_write", "target": "/workspace/src/utils.ts", "content": "export function add(a, b) { return a + b; }"}
| action_type | target field | content field |
|-------------|-------------|---------------|
| file_access | File path | - |
| file_write | File path | File content |
| network_egress / network | Domain or URL | - |
| shell_command / shell | Command string | - |
| mcp_tool_call / mcp_tool | Tool name | - |
| patch_apply / patch | File path | Patch content |
| user_input | - | User text |
After collecting events, analyze patterns:
Call workbench_synth_policy with the JSONL events to generate a candidate policy. The synthesizer:
workbench_validate_policy on the synthesized policy.workbench_suggest_scenarios to generate test cases.workbench_run_all_scenarios to verify the policy works correctly.Review the synthesized policy and tighten it:
workbench_compliance_check and close gaps.Watch for these patterns that suggest the policy should be extra strict:
| Pattern | Risk | Action |
|---------|------|--------|
| Agent accesses .env or .ssh paths | Credential theft | Block with forbidden_path |
| Network calls to unknown/unusual domains | Data exfiltration | Restrict with egress_allowlist |
| Shell commands with pipes or redirections | Command injection | Enable shell_command guard |
| Many different MCP tools used | Over-privilege | Restrict with mcp_tool block |
| Large file writes | Data manipulation | Enable patch_integrity limits |
| User inputs with instruction keywords | Prompt injection | Enable prompt_injection guard |
After synthesizing, compare the result against the strict ruleset using workbench_diff_policies to identify areas where the synthesized policy is weaker.
workbench_validate_policyworkbench_diff_policies for before/after comparisontesting
A simple skill demonstrating clawdstrike security
tools
# Hello Skill A simple greeting skill that demonstrates secure agent operation. ## Description This skill allows the agent to greet users and perform basic file operations within the allowed workspace. ## Capabilities - Generate personalized greetings - Read files from the workspace - Write greeting logs to the output directory ## Usage Ask the agent: - "Say hello to Alice" - "Read the welcome message from data/welcome.txt" - "Log a greeting for Bob" ## Examples ### Basic Greeting **Us
testing
# bb-edr: Triage Skill Use this skill to turn clawdstrike audit logs into an incident report and a minimal response plan. ## Inputs - `.hush/audit.jsonl` (JSONL) — clawdstrike audit events (allowed/denied, guard, reason). - `policy.yaml` — the active security policy. ## Task 1. Read and summarize the last ~50 audit events. 2. Focus on **denied** events first: - Group by `guard` (e.g., `forbidden_path`, `egress`, `patch_integrity`) - Identify likely intent (misconfiguration vs. suspici
tools
Threat hunting and security event investigation