offensive-tools/vuln-scanners/testssl/SKILL.md
Auth/lab ref: testssl.sh: broad TLS/SSL testing script checking protocol support, cipher suites, vulnerabilities (BEAST, POODLE, Heartbleed, ROBOT, DROWN, etc.), and certificate issues.
npx skillsauth add aeondave/malskill testsslInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
3 of 9 scanners reported clean
Some scanners were skipped, did not run, or reported a non-clean status. Review each row below.
TLS/SSL testing script — protocols, ciphers, vulnerabilities, certificates.
# Full scan (all checks)
testssl.sh https://target.com
# Specific port
testssl.sh target.com:8443
# STARTTLS (mail server)
testssl.sh --starttls smtp mail.target.com:25
| Flag | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| -p | Check protocols (SSLv2/3, TLS 1.0-1.3) |
| -s | List cipher suites (preferred + supported) |
| -f | Check forward secrecy |
| -h | Check HSTS / HPKP |
| -U | Test all vulnerabilities |
| -E | List cipher suites per protocol |
| -B | Heartbleed (OpenSSL vulnerability) |
| --beast | BEAST attack check |
| --breach | BREACH check |
| --crime | CRIME check |
| --lucky13 | Lucky13 timing attack |
| --poodle | POODLE (SSLv3) |
| --sweet32 | Birthday attacks on 64-bit block ciphers |
| --logjam | Logjam (DH key exchange weakness) |
| --drown | DROWN attack (SSLv2 overlap) |
| --ticketbleed | Ticketbleed (F5 vulnerability) |
| --robot | ROBOT attack |
| --tls-fallback | TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV check |
| -e | List all supported ciphers |
| --protocols | List supported protocols only |
| --server-defaults | Server defaults (cert, session, etc.) |
| --server-preference | Server cipher preference |
| --client-simulation | Simulate handshake with common clients |
| --starttls <proto> | STARTTLS: smtp / pop3 / imap / ftp / xmpp / ldap |
| --mx | Test all MX records of a domain (mail servers) |
| --file <file> | Batch mode — one target per line |
| --mode parallel | Run batch in parallel (use with --file) |
| --outprefix <str> | Prefix for all output files in batch mode |
| --append | Append to existing output file |
| --ip <ip> | Force specific IP for SNI hosts |
| --proxy <host:port> | SOCKS5/HTTP proxy |
| --sneaky | Sneaky mode (minimal headers) |
| --ids-friendly | Avoid IDS trigger patterns |
| -t <n> | Timeout per connection |
| --connect-timeout <n> | Connection timeout |
| --openssl <path> | Specify OpenSSL binary to use |
| -oJ <file> | JSON output |
| -oC <file> | CSV output |
| -oH <file> | HTML output |
| -oA <file> | All output formats (adds extensions) |
| --color <0-3> | Color output level |
| --quiet | Minimal output |
| --warnings batch | Batch mode (no interactive prompts) |
| --parallel | Parallel testing (faster, less reliable) |
| --nodns <min> | Skip DNS reverse lookups |
| Flag | Vulnerability | Impact |
|------|--------------|--------|
| --heartbleed | Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160) | Memory leak → private key |
| --ccs | CCS Injection (CVE-2014-0224) | MITM |
| --ticketbleed | Ticketbleed (CVE-2016-9244) | Memory leak |
| --robot | ROBOT (RSA PKCS#1 oracle) | RSA key recovery |
| --breach | BREACH | HTTP compression info leak |
| --crime | CRIME | TLS compression info leak |
| --beast | BEAST | CBC mode attack (TLS 1.0) |
| --poodle | POODLE | SSLv3 CBC attack |
| --sweet32 | Sweet32 | 3DES birthday attack |
| --logjam | Logjam | DH 512/1024-bit export weakness |
| --drown | DROWN | SSLv2 cross-protocol attack |
| --lucky13 | Lucky13 | CBC timing attack |
| --tls-fallback | Downgrade fallback | Missing SCSV |
| --freak | FREAK | Export RSA key exchange |
| --rc4 | RC4 biases | Statistical attacks |
# Individual vuln flags (short form):
# -H heartbleed -I CCS -T ticketbleed --BB ROBOT -R renegotiation
# -C CRIME -B BREACH -O POODLE -Z fallback -W SWEET32
# -F FREAK -D DROWN -J LOGJAM -A BEAST -L LUCKY13 -4 RC4
# Protocol support check
testssl.sh -p target.com
# Look for: SSLv2 (critical), SSLv3 (critical), TLS 1.0/1.1 (warn)
# Cipher suites
testssl.sh -s target.com
# Look for: NULL, EXPORT, DES, RC4, 3DES (all bad)
# Want: AESGCM, CHACHA20, ECDHE (good)
# Check for forward secrecy (PFS)
testssl.sh -f target.com
# ECDHE/DHE = PFS available; RSA key exchange = no PFS
# Full cipher enumeration
testssl.sh -E target.com
# Full assessment with all checks
testssl.sh -U -p -s -h -f --server-defaults target.com
# Quick vuln check only (fast)
testssl.sh -U --quiet target.com
# STARTTLS mail server
testssl.sh --starttls smtp mail.target.com:587
testssl.sh --starttls imap mail.target.com:143
# JSON output for reporting
testssl.sh --jsonfile report.json -U target.com
# HTML report
testssl.sh -oH report.html -U -p -s target.com
# All formats at once
testssl.sh -oA report -U -p -s -f target.com
# Creates: report.json, report.csv, report.html
# Client simulation (browser compatibility)
testssl.sh --client-simulation target.com
# Batch scan with built-in file mode (one target per line):
# targets.txt can contain: host:port, -t smtp host:587, etc.
testssl.sh --file targets.txt --warnings batch -U --quiet
# Parallel batch scan (built-in):
testssl.sh --file targets.txt --mode parallel --warnings batch \
-oA pentest-$(date +%Y%m%d) # creates .json .csv .html per target
# Test all mail servers (MX records) for domain:
testssl.sh --mx example.com
# Stealth / IDS-evasion mode:
testssl.sh --sneaky --ids-friendly --nodns min -U target.com
| Finding | Severity | Recommendation | |---------|----------|---------------| | SSLv2 enabled | Critical | Disable immediately | | SSLv3 enabled | Critical | Disable (POODLE) | | TLS 1.0 enabled | Medium/High | Disable if possible | | Heartbleed | Critical | Patch OpenSSL | | ROBOT | High | Disable RSA key exchange | | NULL ciphers | Critical | Remove | | EXPORT ciphers | Critical | Remove | | RC4 ciphers | High | Remove | | 3DES (Sweet32) | Medium | Remove | | DH < 2048-bit | Medium | Use 2048+ bit DH | | Self-signed cert | Medium | Replace with trusted CA | | Expired cert | High | Renew certificate | | No HSTS | Low/Medium | Add Strict-Transport-Security | | No PFS | Medium | Enable ECDHE ciphers | | SHA1 certificate | Medium | Replace with SHA256+ |
# Extract findings from JSON
cat report.json | jq '.[] | select(.severity != "OK" and .severity != "INFO") | {id: .id, severity: .severity, finding: .finding}'
# Count by severity
cat report.json | jq '[.[] | .severity] | group_by(.) | map({severity: .[0], count: length})'
# Extract certificate info
cat report.json | jq '.[] | select(.id | startswith("cert")) | {id: .id, finding: .finding}'
# Find critical/high findings only
cat report.json | jq '.[] | select(.severity == "CRITICAL" or .severity == "HIGH") | {id, finding}'
| File | When to load |
|------|--------------|
| references/tls-hardening.md | TLS configuration best practices, cipher suite recommendations, HSTS setup |
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