aeondave/reversing-technique

Reverse Engineering Technique

Extract actionable intelligence efficiently by adapting workflow to your objective.

When to activate

• Malware analysis: Understand behavior, C2, persistence, evasion.
• Software protection analysis: Identify license/protection logic, emulate validation checks, reconstruct key material where authorized.
• Patch diffing: Find security fixes, understand vendor patches.
• Firmware reversing: Extract filesystems, analyze embedded code.
• .NET reversing: Deobfuscate, understand managed code logic.
• Protocol reversing: Reconstruct proprietary protocols or file formats.
• Vulnerability hunting: Find bugs in closed-source components.
• Exploitability triage: Qualify a corruption primitive found during RE, then hand off to binary-exploitation-technique for chaining and proof.
• Secrets extraction: Recover keys, tokens, passwords.
• Custom VM / obfuscation: Binary has a bytecode VM, LLVM CFF dispatcher, or VMProtect/Themida packing.
• Anti-analysis bypass: Binary exits under debugger, detects VM, crashes analysis tools, or uses signal-handler tricks.
• Side-channel RE: Validation timing, instruction count, or signal behavior leaks per-character correctness.
• Language-specific RE: Go, Rust, Python bytecode, Unity IL2CPP, Nim, VBS/WSH, Node.js/V8 snapshots requires language-specific tooling (see references/languages.md, references/nim-rev.md, references/node-v8-snapshots.md).
• In-memory loading: Linux binary loads a second-stage ELF via memfd_create + dlopen (fileless; see references/in-memory-loading.md).

Initial triage

Before diving deep, classify the artifact and the operator objective so the workflow starts in the right lane.

• Starting state: is the target malware, protected software, firmware, a managed assembly, a protocol artifact, a crash primitive, or an unknown binary?
• First questions: what do you need to learn first, what architecture/runtime/packing signals are present, and is static or dynamic evidence the fastest way to reduce uncertainty?
• Immediate actions: perform fast format/entropy/import/string triage, assign the objective workflow, and only then choose the decompiler/debugger/tooling mix.
• Tool-family direction: start with CLI/static triage families (radare2, objdump, readelf, strings, capa, binwalk) and escalate to heavy decompilation/debugging (ghidra, binaryninja, gdb, x64dbg, windbg, dnspy, frida) once the goal is defined.
• Escalation rule: objective first, tool second; do not decompile everything before deciding what question you are answering.

Core methodology

1. Triage (5-10 min): Quick assessment before deep dive.
2. Define objective: What do you need to know?
3. Select tools: Based on binary type, objective, environment.
4. Static analysis: Structure understanding without execution.
5. Dynamic analysis: Validate assumptions via runtime behavior.
6. Synthesis: Pseudocode, documentation, or exploit.
7. Verification: Test findings; iterate if needed.

Triage (first 5-10 minutes)

Quick assessment to decide approach:

| Check | Tool reference | What to look for | |-------|-----------------|-------------| | File type | file, detect-it-easy | PE/ELF/Mach-O/.NET, arch, bits | | Packers/obfuscation | Detect It Easy, binwalk | UPX, ASPack, ConfuserEx, high entropy | | Strings | strings, radare2 (iz) | URLs, IPs, registry keys, crypto constants | | Imports/exports | radare2 (ii, ie), ghidra | Suspicious APIs, crypto, network, process | | Metadata | pefile, radare2 (iI) | Timestamps, version, compiler, PDB | | Hashes | sha256sum, rahash2 | Submit to VirusTotal, MalwareBazaar | | Capabilities | capa (offensive-tools/forensic/capa/) | TTP fingerprint, malware family, embedded shellcode |

Decision tree:

• High entropy + suspicious imports → Malware analysis workflow
• Protection messages (registration, trial, activation) → Software protection workflow
• Two versions of same binary → Patch diffing workflow
• Firmware header (uImage, vmlinux) → Firmware workflow
• .NET assembly → .NET reversing workflow
• Network capture + unknown protocol → Protocol RE workflow
• Large switch(opcode) + byte-buffer IP loop → Custom VM workflow (see references/custom-vm.md)
• fork() + ptrace(TRACEME) or SIGTRAP/SIGFPE signal loop → Nanomites (see references/custom-vm.md §2)
• Binary exits/behaves differently under debugger or in VM → Anti-analysis bypass (see references/anti-analysis.md)
• Validation response varies by character (timing/count) → Side-channel RE (see references/custom-vm.md §4)
• Go buildid / Rust __rust_panic / .pyc file → Language-specific RE (see references/languages.md)
• LLVM control flow flattening (dispatcher switch, state variable) → references/custom-vm.md §6
• VMProtect / Themida packing detected → dump after OEP (see references/anti-analysis.md §unpacking)
• NimMain / HEXnn mangled names / @[ slice constants → Nim RE (see references/nim-rev.md)
• pkg/prelude / NODE_SEA_FUSE / snapshot_blob in strings → Node.js/V8 snapshot (see references/node-v8-snapshots.md)
• memfd_create in strace / /proc/self/fd/ path to dlopen → In-memory loading (see references/in-memory-loading.md)
• ljmp 0x33: / push 0x33; retf in 32-bit ELF → Heaven's Gate Linux (see references/anti-analysis.md §Category 8)
• PCAP / protobuf / gRPC / grpc-web / WebSocket frames / length-prefixed binary RPC → Protocol reversing (see references/protocol-rev.md)
• .crx / .xpi / manifest.json / MV3 service worker / content_scripts / externally_connectable → Browser extension reversing (see references/browser-extension-rev.md)
• Two binary versions for patch analysis / a single Microsoft Patch-Tuesday MSU to reconstruct / stripped library with unknown symbols → Binary diffing / FLIRT (see references/binary-diffing.md)
• Confirmed overwrite primitive with partial control over RIP/EIP/PC, heap metadata, or function pointer → Exploitability triage (§7b), then hand off to offensive-techniques/binary-exploitation-technique
• Kernel driver/module, hidden artifacts, boot-chain tampering, or EFI/bootloader changes → Rootkit / bootkit RE workflow (see references/rootkit-and-bootkit-re.md)

CLI-first tool preference

Prefer CLI/scriptable tooling for triage, batch work, and repeatable evidence. Move to GUI decompilers/debuggers when semantics, types, or interaction speed justify it.

| Need | Prefer first | GUI/decompiler escalation | |---|---|---| | File metadata, imports, sections, strings | rabin2, radare2, objdump, readelf, strings | Ghidra/Binary Ninja project when structure matters | | Fast static triage | radare2 (aaa, afl, iz, ii, iS), capa | Ghidra for decompilation and type recovery | | Linux dynamic behavior | strace, ltrace, gdb | Ghidra debugger only if needed | | Windows crash/debug | windbg/cdb for dump triage | x64dbg for interactive patch/trace | | Firmware extraction | binwalk CLI first | Ghidra/radare2 per extracted binary | | .NET | de4dot/CLI metadata first | dnspy for decompile/debug/patch |

Formal tool skills: offensive-tools/rev/radare2/, offensive-tools/rev/gdb/, offensive-tools/rev/frida/, offensive-tools/rev/binwalk/, offensive-tools/rev/ghidra/, offensive-tools/rev/binaryninja/, offensive-tools/rev/dnspy/, offensive-tools/rev/windbg/, offensive-tools/rev/x64dbg/, plus offensive-tools/forensic/capa/ for capability triage.

Objective-driven workflows

1. Malware analysis

Goal: Understand behavior, extract IOCs, identify C2, assess threat.

Operator flow:

1. Triage: strings, imports, VirusTotal, Any.Run sandbox report.
2. Static: Load in `ghidra` or `radare2` → auto-analysis.
   - Check imports for: VirtualAlloc, CreateRemoteThread, WriteProcessMemory.
   - Cross-reference suspicious strings (URLs, IPs, registry paths).
   - Identify decryption routines (loops with XOR/RC4/AES).
3. Dynamic: Debug in `x64dbg` (Windows) or `gdb`+`pwndbg` (Linux).
   - Set breakpoints on crypto APIs, network APIs.
   - Dump decrypted strings/config from memory.
   - Monitor: Process Monitor, Wireshark, ProcMon.
   - Linux: use `strace -e trace=network,file` to log syscalls without a debugger; `ltrace` for library call interception.
4. Unpack if packed: Use `x64dbg` + Scylla, or `binwalk` for firmware.
5. Report: IOCs, TTPs, C2 config, YARA rules.

Key tricks:

• Decryption routines often precede string usage—trace backwards from strings.
• Config often in resources or appended to binary—check binwalk, radare2 (iS).
• Anti-debug: PEB.BeingDebugged, NtGlobalFlag, RDTSC—use ScyllaHide or patch.
• C2 often encrypted with simple XOR—search for XOR loops with constant key.

Key tools: capa (TTP triage), ghidra/radare2 (static), x64dbg/gdb+pwndbg (dynamic), frida (hooking), binwalk (unpacking), strace/ltrace (Linux syscall/lib tracing), windbg (crash dumps).

→ Full workflow: references/re-workflow.md. Anti-debug bypass: references/anti-analysis.md.

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2. Software protection bypass and licensing emulation

Goal: Understand license/protection checks, emulate validation, and produce authorized proof of bypass or key-generation logic.

Operator flow:

1. Triage: Identify protection (ASProtect, Themida, custom).
2. Static: Load in `ghidra` → find protection strings, error messages.
   - Search for: "Invalid key", "Trial expired", "Wrong password".
   - Cross-reference strings to validation functions.
3. Dynamic: Debug in `x64dbg` or `radare2` debugger.
   - Set breakpoint on validation function or message box.
   - Trace backwards to find comparison logic.
   - Patch: NOP conditional jump, or change return value.
4. Key reconstruction: Understand algorithm from decompiled code.
   - Reconstruct in Python/C based on pseudocode.
5. Verify: Patched binary accepts valid key.

Key tricks: Cross-ref error strings to validation functions; NOP/invert the final comparison; watch for CRC re-checks after patching.

Key tools: ghidra (decompile validation), x64dbg (patch jumps), frida (hook online activation), dnspy (.NET).

→ Unpacking details: references/anti-analysis.md §unpacking. Binary diffing: references/binary-diffing.md.

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3. Patch diffing

Goal: Find what changed between two binary versions (security patch, CVE reconstruction).

• Run radiff2 -g main old new or Ghidra Version Tracking to correlate functions.
• Focus on functions with added if / early-return → likely security fix.
• Verify the bug is reachable before claiming exploitability.

→ Full workflow with FLIRT, BinDiff, and symbol recovery: references/binary-diffing.md.

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4. Firmware reversing

Goal: Extract filesystem, analyze embedded binaries, find backdoors.

Operator flow:

1. Triage: Identify firmware type (router, IoT, BIOS, etc.).
   - Check magic bytes: uImage (0x27051956), vmlinux, squashfs, etc.
2. Extract: preserve/hash first, identify the outer format, then follow `references/firmware-rev.md` for isolated, bounded extraction.
3. Analyze filesystem:
   - `squashfs-root/`: config files, web interfaces, binaries.
   - Search for: hardcoded credentials, backdoor accounts, crypto keys.
4. Reverse embedded binaries:
   - Identify arch: MIPS, ARM, AVR (use `radare2` or `ghidra`).
   - Load in appropriate tool with correct base address.
5. Emulate (optional): QEMU user-mode for MIPS/ARM binaries.

Key tricks:

• Firmware often has: Telnet backdoors, hardcoded SNMP community strings, private keys.
• Web interfaces: check for command injection (ping, traceroute), path traversal.
• Embedded binaries may be stripped → use radare2 zignatures or ghidra function ID.
• Check /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, SSH keys, certificate files.

Tool citations:

• binwalk — signature scan, extraction, entropy analysis.
• ghidra — analyze MIPS/ARM binaries, recover structs.
• radare2 — headless analysis, scripting for batch processing.
• frida — dynamic analysis if firmware runs on emulated device.

Common pitfalls:

• Wrong architecture → decompilation nonsense.
• Wrong base address → function calls go to invalid addresses.
• Ignoring filesystem configs → missing high-value IOCs.

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5. .NET reversing (managed code)

Goal: Understand C#/VB.NET logic, bypass obfuscation, extract configs.

1. Detect obfuscator: de4dot --detect sample.exe
2. Deobfuscate: de4dot sample.exe -o clean.exe
3. Analyze in dnspy — start at Entry Point (Ctrl+Shift+K); set breakpoints on decryption/config load
4. Watch for multi-stage loaders: Assembly.Load() + GetManifestResourceStream call sites
5. Network isolation is mandatory before dynamic debugging stealers/RATs

Key tools: dnspy (decompiler/debugger/patcher), de4dot (deobfuscation), ghidra (fallback).

→ Full deobfuscation table, ConfuserEx/Reactor flags, config extraction: references/dotnet-rev.md.

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6. Protocol reversing

Goal: Reconstruct proprietary protocol, understand message format.

Operator flow:

1. Capture traffic: Wireshark, tcpdump, or `frida` SSL pinning bypass.
2. Triage: Identify protocol type (text, binary, encrypted).
   - Look for magic bytes, length fields, checksums.
3. Static: Analyze client/server binaries in `ghidra`.
   - Find send/recv functions → cross-reference to protocol handlers.
   - Reconstruct structs from serialization code.
4. Dynamic: Hook send/recv with `frida` → log raw packets.
   - Correlate with network capture.
5. Document: Message format, state machine, encryption (if any).

Key tricks:

• Text protocols: look for delimiters (\n, |, ;) and command keywords.
• Binary protocols: look for length fields, magic bytes, checksums (CRC32, Adler32).
• Encryption: check for TLS, or custom crypto (XOR, AES) in binary.
• Use frida to intercept before encryption/after decryption.

Tool citations:

• ghidra — analyze protocol handlers, recover structs.
• frida — hook send/recv, bypass SSL pinning.
• wireshark — (external) packet analysis.
• radare2 — headless protocol analysis scripting.

Common pitfalls:

• Assuming protocol is text → it's binary with magic bytes.
• Ignoring encryption → can't read payload without key.
• Not correlating static + dynamic → missing protocol state machine.

→ gRPC/protobuf/websocket/app-framing specifics and decoder bootstrap: references/protocol-rev.md.

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7. Vulnerability hunting

Goal: Find bugs (buffer overflow, use-after-free, etc.) in closed-source.

Operator flow:

1. Recon: Identify attack surface, input channels, and hardening context.
   - Parsers, network listeners, IPC, config importers, update handlers.
2. Static: Load in `ghidra` or `binaryninja`.
   - Trace attacker-controlled data into size, offset, pointer, and format operations.
3. Classify the candidate primitive.
   - Overflow, UAF/double-free, integer mis-sizing, format string, command construction.
4. Dynamic validation: Debug in `gdb`+`pwndbg` or `x64dbg`.
   - Confirm branch reachability, memory/register side effects, and repeatability.
5. Symbolic execution: use `angr` for path exploration when manual analysis of branching logic is too slow — especially useful for complex key validation or constrained input recovery.
6. Fuzzing or targeted harness: Use AFL++, LibFuzzer (see `offensive-tools/fuzzing/`) if format knowledge will improve coverage.
7. Exploitability model: rank by control quality, mitigations, and environmental preconditions before claiming impact.

Key tricks:

• Focus on input parsers: file format readers, network packet handlers.
• Look for: integer overflows (size calculations), off-by-one errors.
• Use checksec (in gdb+pwndbg) to see mitigations (NX, PIE, CANARY).
• Patch diffing helps: find recent CVE fixes → analyze vulnerability.
• Keep one controlled input per hypothesis so crash cause and side effects stay attributable.
• Write proof requirements early: what would count as a validated primitive vs a suspicious crash?

Tool citations:

• ghidra, binaryninja — static analysis, decompilation.
• gdb+pwndbg/gef — crash analysis, exploit debugging.
• frida — runtime analysis, hooking.
• angr — symbolic execution, path exploration, automated constraint solving for input recovery.
• AFL++, LibFuzzer — fuzzing (see offensive-tools/fuzzing/).

Common pitfalls:

• Fuzzing without understanding input format → low coverage.
• Ignoring mitigations → exploit harder than expected.
• Not verifying exploitability → crash ≠ vulnerability.
• Claiming impact without proving reachability from a realistic input path.
• Missing config-dependent branches → the vulnerable path may be disabled in the default run.

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7b. Exploitability triage and handoff

Goal: From a validated corruption primitive, qualify exploitability and hand a clean primitive to offensive-techniques/binary-exploitation-technique; do not build the chain here.

Qualify before handoff:

• Prove what is controlled (PC, stack pivot, arbitrary read/write, object/type confusion) and the bug family (overflow/UAF/type confusion/index/format string).
• Confirm deterministic, attacker-influenced reproduction under a fixed input path — a crash is not yet a primitive.
• Model the primitive's repeatability: read every branch of any state guard (is_set, initialized, done, idx == fav). The else/already-set branch frequently still performs the gated read/write/free, so an apparently one-shot primitive is a repeatable arbitrary read/write loop. Confirm which branch runs on the second invocation before declaring a path dead.
• Inventory mitigations (checksec, module headers): NX/DEP, ASLR/PIE, canary, RELRO, CFG/CET, allocator hardening — carry this into the handoff.

Tools: gdb+pwndbg/gef, x64dbg, windbg for control validation; angr for trigger-gating constraints; radare2/ghidra/binaryninja for gadget/function reachability.

→ Chain strategy, mitigation-aware planning, and reproducible proof: offensive-techniques/binary-exploitation-technique. Concrete recipes (ROP/heap/FSOP/format-string/one_gadget): offensive-ctf/pwn-ctf/references.

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8. Secrets extraction

Goal: Recover hardcoded keys, passwords, tokens, C2 addresses.

Operator flow:

1. Triage: Strings (`strings`, `radare2` `iz`), look for:
   - Crypto constants (AES S-box, RSA magic, base64 patterns).
   - URLs, IPs, email addresses.
   - High-entropy regions (likely encrypted/compressed).
2. Static: Find decryption routines in `ghidra`.
   - Look for: XOR loops, AES key schedules, RC4 init.
   - Cross-reference encrypted strings to decryption function.
3. Dynamic: Breakpoint on crypto APIs (`CryptEncrypt`, `BCryptEncrypt`).
   - Dump memory after decryption (`x64dbg` memory dump).
4. Decode: Base64, hex, or emulate decryption in Python.

Key tricks:

• Secrets often: XORed with single byte, or AES with embedded key.
• C2 config: may be JSON/XML in resources, or encrypted blob.
• API keys/tokens: search for common patterns (Bearer, api_key, secret).
• Use radare2 to search for crypto constants: /R opcode for ROP, but for crypto search bytes.

Tool citations:

• ghidra — identify crypto algorithms, recover keys.
• radare2 — search patterns, script analysis.
• x64dbg — runtime memory dump after decryption.
• frida — hook crypto APIs, log plaintext.

Common pitfalls:

• Assuming strings are plaintext → they're decrypted at runtime.
• Not checking resources → secrets hidden in embedded data.
• Ignoring TLS traffic → C2 communication encrypted.

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9. JavaScript / browser extension reversing

Goal: Understand web application logic, browser extensions, or obfuscated JS payloads.

Operator flow:

1. Triage: Is it a browser extension (zip/crx), single-page app bundle, or obfuscated script?
2. Extract:
   - Browser extension: rename .crx → .zip → extract.
   - SPA bundle: download the main JS bundle via DevTools → Sources.
3. Deobfuscate:
   - Run through JS beautifier (js-beautify, Prettier).
   - For eval-obfuscated/string-array obfuscation: use de-obfuscation pass (obfuscator.io reverse, webcrack, deobfuscate.io).
   - For packed bundles (webpack/rollup): look for chunk map → identify module boundaries.
4. Static analysis: Browser DevTools or VS Code → search for:
   - Sensitive strings: API keys, endpoints, tokens.
   - Crypto calls: subtle.crypto, CryptoJS, forge.
   - Eval / dynamic code execution.
5. Dynamic: DevTools debugger → breakpoint on XHR/fetch, DOM mutation, or suspicious function.
   - Intercept requests via proxy (mitmproxy).
   - Patch eval'd payloads with live overrides (DevTools override feature).
6. Manifest audit (extensions): check `permissions`, `content_scripts`, `background`, `externally_connectable`.

Key tricks:

• Webpack bundles expose __webpack_require__ — iterate module map to enumerate all modules.
• Chrome extension background workers: debug via chrome://extensions → inspect background page.
• Eval-hidden payloads: override eval at load time to log all executed strings.
• API key extraction: search for Authorization, api_key, Bearer, X-Api-Key.

Tool citations:

• Browser DevTools — primary debugger and network inspector.
• frida — inject into Electron/Node.js apps using the browser engine.
• mitmproxy (offensive-tools/network/mitmproxy/) — intercept and replay browser-initiated requests.
• radare2 / ghidra — if JS engine (V8) is compiled into a native binary.

→ MV2/MV3 entry points, permission-risk triage, messaging edges, and nativeMessaging / externally_connectable audit: references/browser-extension-rev.md.

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Anti-reverse engineering bypass

Common techniques and countermeasures

| Technique | What it does | Bypass method | Tool reference | |------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------| | PEB.BeingDebugged | Checks PEB flag | Patch byte at PEB+0x02 to 0 | x64dbg, ScyllaHide | | NtGlobalFlag | Sets heap flags for debugging | Clear flag at PEB+0x68 (32-bit) | x64dbg, ScyllaHide | | RDTSC timing | Measures CPU cycles for debugger | Patch or emulate | frida hook | | FindWindow/Process | Detects debugger windows | Hook with frida or NOP | x64dbg | | CRC/integrity | Checks code section hashes | Patch check or suspend thread | x64dbg breakpoint | | VM detection | Detects VirtualBox/VMware | Use real hardware or hide with VM detection bypass | ScyllaHide | | Anti-dump | Prevents memory dumping | Use Scylla for IAT fix | x64dbg + Scylla | | Obfuscation (.NET) | Renames, control flow, constants | Use de4dot, dnSpy decompile | dnspy |

Unpacking workflow

1. Detect packer: DIE, PEiD, or manual (section names, entry point).
2. Static: Find OEP (Original Entry Point) via:
   - Pushad/popad patterns (UPX).
   - Call to GetProcAddress/LoadLibrary (custom).
3. Dynamic: Set breakpoint on VirtualAlloc (for RWX memory).
   - When hit, check size arg → likely unpacked code destination.
   - Set hardware execute BP on returned address.
   - Run → break at OEP (unpacked code).
4. Dump: Use `Scylla` (x64dbg plugin) or `radare2` `om`.
5. Fix IAT: Reconstruct imports with `Scylla` or manual.

Operator checklist (per objective)

Each objective workflow in §1–9 plus §7b contains a full step-by-step flow. Quick gate:

• Triage complete before deep static analysis.
• Objective defined before tool selection.
• Isolated environment for dynamic analysis.
• Static findings validated dynamically; dynamic assumptions confirmed statically.
• Reproducible notes (hashes, tool versions, environment) captured for reporting.

Common pitfalls (all objectives)

• Analysis paralysis: Disassembling everything without objective.
• Trusting decoys: Strings may be encrypted, fake, or irrelevant.
• Skipping triage: Wasting time on packed/encrypted code.
• No isolation: Dynamic analysis on host → infection/compromise.
• Confirmation bias: Ignoring evidence contradicting hypothesis.
• Tool fixation: Using wrong tool for binary type (e.g., x64dbg for ELF).
• Ignoring anti-analysis: Debugger detected, malware exits silently.

Tool selection quick reference

| Objective | Primary tools (see offensive-tools/rev/) | Environment | |-----------|------------------------------------------|------------| | Malware (Windows) | ghidra, x64dbg, frida, capa | Windows VM | | Malware (Linux) | ghidra, gdb+pwndbg, radare2, capa | Linux VM/WSL | | Software protection (Windows) | ghidra, x64dbg, dnspy (.NET) | Windows | | Patch diffing | ghidra (Version Tracking), radare2 (radiff2) | Cross-platform | | Firmware | binwalk, ghidra, radare2 | Linux | | .NET reversing | dnspy, de4dot | Windows | | Protocol RE | ghidra, frida, mitmproxy | Depends | | Vulnerability hunting | ghidra/binaryninja, gdb, AFL++ | Linux/Windows | | Exploitability triage (→ binary-exploitation-technique) | gdb+pwndbg/gef, x64dbg, windbg, checksec | Linux/Windows | | JS/Browser extension | DevTools, frida, mitmproxy | Browser/Electron | | Kernel/crash dump | windbg | Windows |

Resources

Core sequence:

• references/triage.md — start here for the first 5–10 minutes: format detection, entropy, imports, language/runtime fingerprints, and next-step decisioning.
• references/re-workflow.md — core methodology after triage: static, dynamic, reconstruction, Ghidra workflow, crypto-pattern spotting, and reporting.

Format supplements:

• references/pe-rev.md — PE-only pivots: RVA/raw mapping, data directories, TLS/CRT pre-entry paths, IAT/EAT/delay imports, resources/overlay/Authenticode, unpacking, and mitigation handoff.
• references/elf-rev.md — ELF-only pivots: program headers, dynamic entries, PLT/GOT/relocations, RELRO/ASLR, symbol versioning, IFUNC/constructors, loader instrumentation, and packer/runtime surfaces.
• references/dotnet-rev.md — managed-assembly workflow: deobfuscation order, resource/config extraction, stage loading, and managed/native handoff.
• references/firmware-rev.md — firmware container workflow: format-first bounded extraction, filesystem/control-plane mapping, startup review, and emulation handoff.

Problem-specific deep dives:

• references/anti-analysis.md — Linux/Windows anti-debug, anti-VM, anti-DBI, code integrity, anti-disassembly, MBA, Heaven's Gate Linux, and bypass strategies.

• references/custom-vm.md — custom VM reversing, nanomites, self-modifying code, metamorphic decrypt loops, lattice/linear-algebra solving, side-channel attacks, and emulation frameworks.

• references/ransomware-re.md — ransomware crypto workflow: hybrid model, Windows CryptoAPI/CNG/OpenSSL identification, implementation flaw checklist, encrypted-file analysis, public-key extraction, and YARA skeleton.

• references/languages.md — language/runtime pivots for Go, Rust (crate fingerprinting), Python bytecode (PyInstaller/PyArmor), Nim, VBS/WSH, Unity IL2CPP, and HarmonyOS HAP.

• references/protocol-rev.md — capture-first custom protocol reversing: text vs binary framing, gRPC/protobuf decoding, WebSocket/app-frame separation, and minimal parser outputs.

• references/browser-extension-rev.md — Chrome/Edge/Firefox extension workflow: MV2/MV3 entry points, permission-risk triage, content-script isolation, messaging edges, storage, and nativeMessaging.

• references/binary-diffing.md — binary diff workflow (radiff2, Ghidra VT, BinDiff, ghidriff), FLIRT signature generation, Ghidra FID for stripped library symbol recovery, and Windows Update MSU/CAB acquisition + PA30 delta reconstruction for n-day patch diffing.

• Exploitability handoff: once a primitive is confirmed, offensive-techniques/binary-exploitation-technique owns the chaining methodology and offensive-ctf/pwn-ctf/references holds the concrete recipes.

• references/rootkit-and-bootkit-re.md — Windows/Linux kernel-mode RE, driver/module triage, bootkit workflow, hook/callback analysis, and boot-chain evidence.

• references/nim-rev.md — Nim binary recognition, symbol recovery, GC/memory layout, decompilation patterns, stripped binary workflow.

• references/node-v8-snapshots.md — Node.js pkg/SEA/nexe extraction, V8 startup snapshot recovery, JS deobfuscation.

• references/in-memory-loading.md — Linux fileless loading via memfd_create + dlopen: detection, runtime dump, layer separation.

• offensive-tools/forensic/capa/ — capability-based binary classification (TTP/family detection).