offensive-tools/windows/powerview/SKILL.md
Auth/lab ref: PowerView AD reconnaissance; users/groups/computers, ACL/delegation paths, policy checks, domain evidence workflow.
npx skillsauth add aeondave/malskill powerviewInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
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PowerShell Active Directory enumeration toolkit — maps domain structure, ACLs, groups, and privilege escalation paths.
# Load the script
. .\PowerView.ps1
# Enumerate domain users
Get-NetUser
# Find domain admins
Get-NetGroupMember -GroupName "Domain Admins"
# Enumerate computers
Get-NetComputer
# Find interesting shares
Invoke-ShareFinder -Verbose
# Map domain structure
Get-NetDomain
| Function | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Get-NetUser | List all domain users |
| Get-NetUser -AdminCount | Find users with admin status |
| Get-NetUser -SPN | Find users with Service Principal Names (Kerberoastable) |
| Get-NetUser -Properties pwdlastset | Last password change |
| Get-NetUser -Credential | Enumerate as different user |
| Function | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Get-NetGroup | List all domain groups |
| Get-NetGroupMember -GroupName "Domain Admins" | Members of a group |
| Get-NetGroup -MemberIdentity <user> | Groups a user belongs to |
| Get-NetLocalGroup -ComputerName <host> | Local groups on remote machine |
| Function | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Get-NetComputer | List all domain computers |
| Get-NetComputer -Unconstrained | Find unconstrained delegation machines |
| Get-NetComputer -TrustedToAuth | Constrained delegation targets |
| Get-NetComputer -OperatingSystem "*2016*" | Filter by OS |
| Get-NetComputer -Properties operatingsystem,lastlogontimestamp | Detail view |
| Function | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Get-ObjectAcl -Identity <user\|group> | ACLs on object |
| Get-ObjectAcl -ResolvGUIDs | Resolve GUID to readable names |
| Invoke-ACLScanner | Scan for weak ACLs (noisy!) |
| Function | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Get-NetDomain | Current domain info |
| Get-NetForest | Forest structure |
| Get-NetForestDomain | All domains in forest |
| Get-NetDomainTrust | Domain trusts (inter-domain paths) |
| Get-NetDomainController | Find domain controllers |
| Function | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Invoke-ShareFinder | Find accessible network shares |
| Invoke-FileFinder | Search for sensitive files on shares |
| Get-NetFileServer | Find file servers |
| Get-NetLoggedOnUser <host> | Users logged in to remote machine |
| Get-NetSession <host> | Active sessions on remote host |
| Function | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Find-LocalAdminAccess | Computers where current user is admin (slow!) |
| Find-DomainUserLocation | Find where specific users are logged in |
| Get-NetComputer -Unconstrained | Unconstrained delegation targets |
| Get-NetComputer -TrustedToAuth | Constrained delegation abuse targets |
. .\PowerView.ps1
# 1. Domain structure
Get-NetDomain
Get-NetForestDomain
Get-NetDomainTrust
# 2. User inventory
Get-NetUser | Select name, mail, pwdlastset
Get-NetUser -AdminCount | Select name
# 3. Kerberoastable accounts (crackable)
Get-NetUser -SPN | Select name, serviceprincipalname
# 4. Computers & delegation
Get-NetComputer -Properties name, operatingsystem
Get-NetComputer -Unconstrained | Select name
# 5. Share enumeration
Invoke-ShareFinder
# 6. Privilege paths to Domain Admin
Get-ObjectAcl -Identity "Domain Admins" -ResolveGUIDs
# 1. Get domain admins
$admins = Get-NetGroupMember -GroupName "Domain Admins" | Select -ExpandProperty membername
# 2. Find where they're logged in
foreach ($admin in $admins) {
Find-DomainUserLocation -UserIdentity $admin
}
# 3. Pivot to their machines
# Find unconstrained delegation machines
$unconstrained = Get-NetComputer -Unconstrained | Select name
# These machines can capture TGTs from users
# → Use Rubeus to monitor and capture → forge Golden Ticket
# Review who logs in to these machines
foreach ($comp in $unconstrained.name) {
Get-NetLoggedOnUser $comp
}
# Forest structure
Get-NetForest
# Inter-domain trusts
Get-NetDomainTrust -Domain corp.local
# Trust direction can enable lateral domain movement
Filter and export:
# Export users to CSV
Get-NetUser | Export-Csv users.csv
# Find specific attributes
Get-NetUser | Select name, mail, department, manager
# Count by property
Get-NetComputer | Group-Object -Property operatingsystem | Select name, count
| Tool | Use Case | |---|---| | BloodHound | PowerView enumerates raw data; SharpHound automates + imports to BloodHound GUI | | Rubeus | PowerView identifies targets (unconstrained, Kerberoastable); Rubeus exploits them | | Certify | PowerView finds CA info; Certify performs AD CS abuse | | CrackMapExec/NetExec | PowerView for detailed recon; NetExec for automated spray/execution |
Find-LocalAdminAccess → Very slow (queries every computer); use with cautionInvoke-ACLScanner → Noisy; may trigger alerts-Verbose for detailed output-PageSize 1000 to speed up large queries| File | When to load |
|---|---|
| references/ | Advanced ACL abuse, Kerberoasting targets, BloodHound query equivalents |
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