offensive-tools/linux/linpeas/SKILL.md
Auth/lab ref: LinPEAS Linux privilege review; weak permissions, services, env/config exposure, kernel hints, report triage.
npx skillsauth add aeondave/malskill linpeasInstall this skill globally with one command. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf.
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Linux Privilege Escalation Awesome Suite — comprehensive system audit for privilege escalation assessment.
# Download and run in one line
curl -L https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases/latest/download/linpeas.sh | bash
# Or local file
bash linpeas.sh
# Quiet mode (critical findings only)
bash linpeas.sh -q
# Export to file
bash linpeas.sh > enum_full.txt 2>&1
# Aggressive all-checks mode
bash linpeas.sh -a 2>&1 | tee linpeas_full.out
# Run as root (more thorough)
sudo bash linpeas.sh
| Category | What's Checked | Critical Findings | |---|---|---| | System Info | Kernel version, distro, architecture, hostname | Unpatched kernel (CVE), old distro | | Users & Groups | All users, sudoers, groups, sudo access | Overprivileged users, sudo without password | | Network | Network interfaces, open ports, connections | Listening privileged ports, root services | | Services & Daemons | Running services, startup scripts, service perms | World-writable service binaries, root scripts | | Cron Jobs | Crontab entries, cron.d scripts, anacron | Root crons with weak perms, writable scripts | | SUID/SGID Binaries | SUID/SGID files, permissions, known vulns | Exploitable binaries (nmap, cp, sudo) | | Capabilities | Linux capabilities on binaries | cap_setuid, cap_net_raw on user tools | | File Permissions | Writable directories, SGID abuse, world-writable | Writable /etc/, /root, /home paths | | Credentials | /etc/shadow readable, .bashrc creds, SSH keys | Readable shadow, hardcoded passwords | | SSH | SSH keys in home dirs, SSH configs, authorized_keys | Private keys, known_hosts data | | Containers | Docker group membership, container escape paths | Docker socket, privileged containers | | PAM & NSS | PAM config, LDAP/NIS bindings | Weak auth mechanisms, credential stores | | Kernel Exploits | CVEs matching kernel version | Exploitable kernel bugs (DirtyCOW, OverlayFS) | | Sudo Config | NOPASSWD entries, sudoers misconfigs | sudo without password, wildcards in sudoers | | Application Configs | Database configs, web app secrets, API keys | Plaintext DB creds, API keys in configs |
| Flag | Description |
|---|---|
| -q | Quiet mode (only critical findings) |
| -P <pass> | Try supplied password against sudo prompts where relevant |
| -s | Search for passwords in common files |
| -g | Search common paths for hidden files |
| -p | Password list for bruteforcing (optional) |
| -t <N> | Time limit (seconds) |
| -a | All checks (aggressive mode) |
bash linpeas.sh -q 2>/dev/null | grep -i "root\|sudo\|exploit"
# Quick summary of exploitable paths
bash linpeas.sh | tee /tmp/lp.txt
# Review output for:
# 1. SUID/SGID binaries with known exploits
# 2. Sudo entries without password
# 3. Writable system files / cron scripts
# 4. Kernel vulnerabilities
# 5. Unpatched services running as root
sudo bash linpeas.sh
# Identify ways to maintain access:
# - Backdoor cron jobs
# - SSH key insertion
# - Rootkit opportunities
# - Hidden user accounts
bash linpeas.sh -s
# Scans for plaintext passwords in common locations:
# - /home/*/.*profile / .bashrc / .zshrc
# - /etc/mysql/my.cnf
# - /etc/postgresql/postgresql.conf
# - Application configs
🔴 CRITICAL — Immediate escalation:
🟠 HIGH — Likely exploitable:
🟡 MEDIUM — Context-dependent:
LinPEAS color codes findings:
Also prioritize lines flagged like 99% PE or equivalent high-confidence markers before spending time on weaker leads.
Findings are grep excerpts, not proof — read the full file before acting. LinPEAS often prints only the matching line (e.g. just the auth ... pam_permit.so line of /etc/pam.d/common-auth, or a single sudoers/cron line), which can read like a misconfiguration or auth bypass the complete file does not actually support. Confirm the whole file first. Its version-based CVE hits (Kernel Exploit Registry, and service LPEs like PackageKit/pkexec/sudo) are stronger, verifiable leads — a held-back package version is often the intended path.
sudo -l, find SUID abuse)| Tool | Use Case | |---|---| | linux-exploit-suggester | Map kernel version to CVEs; compare with LinPEAS findings | | mimipenguin | Dump memory for credentials; use LinPEAS to find process PIDs | | pwncat | Catch shell + automatic privilege escalation attempt | | BeRoot | Lighter alternative; quick SUID/capabilities scan |
| File | When to load |
|---|---|
| references/ | Kernel exploit compilation, SUID abuse techniques, sudo exploitation |
development
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tools
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data-ai
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