plugins/secure/skills/workload-identity-federation-implementation/SKILL.md
Workload Identity Federation implementation guide. GKE setup, IAM bindings, ServiceAccount configuration, migration from service account keys, and troubleshooting patterns.
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from google.cloud import storage
# Credentials automatic
client = storage.Client(project='PROJECT_ID')
bucket = client.bucket('my-bucket')
blob = bucket.blob('data.txt')
blob.download_to_filename('data.txt')
from google.cloud import secretmanager
client = secretmanager.SecretManagerServiceClient()
secret_name = f"projects/PROJECT_ID/secrets/api-key/versions/latest"
response = client.access_secret_version(request={"name": secret_name})
api_key = response.payload.data.decode('UTF-8')
# SERVICE_ACCOUNT_A in PROJECT_A can impersonate SERVICE_ACCOUNT_B in PROJECT_B
gcloud iam service-accounts add-iam-policy-binding \
service-account-b@PROJECT_B.iam.gserviceaccount.com \
--role="roles/iam.serviceAccountUser" \
--member="serviceAccount:service-account-a@PROJECT_A.iam.gserviceaccount.com"
Containers need cloud access. But service account keys are static credentials that never rotate, frequently get stolen, and live forever.
Workload Identity Federation lets containers prove their identity to cloud providers without ever storing keys. The Kubernetes cluster itself becomes a trusted identity provider.
Production Hardening
Workload Identity eliminates the largest attack surface in containerized environments. This is foundational. Get it right.
Instead of storing a static key, your container presents a signed JWT token to prove it's running in your cluster.
| Approach | Token | Rotation | Revocation | Audit | | --------- | ------ | --------- | ----------- | ------- | | Service Account Keys | Static, never changes | Manual | Manual | Weak | | Workload Identity | Dynamic, short-lived | Automatic | Immediate | Full |
Service account keys are abandoned credentials. Workload Identity is ephemeral proof.
How It Works
- Pod requests token - Kubernetes API issues signed JWT
- Token presented to GCP - GCP validates signature
- GCP issues access token - Short-lived credential for GCP APIs
- Automatic rotation - Token refreshes before expiration
See examples.md for detailed code examples.
This guide is split into focused modules:
See examples.md for detailed code examples.
Verification
Test authentication from inside a pod:
kubectl run -it --image=google/cloud-sdk:slim test-wi \ --serviceaccount=app-sa \ -n production \ -- gcloud auth list
Common Mistakes
- Forgetting to annotate the Kubernetes ServiceAccount
- Using wrong format in IAM binding (
serviceAccount:PROJECT_ID.svc.id.goog[NAMESPACE/SA_NAME])- Not granting
roles/iam.workloadIdentityUserrole- Metadata server enabled on nodes (
workloadMetadataConfig.modemust beGKE_METADATA)
See examples.md for detailed code examples.
Problems:
# Kubernetes ServiceAccount with annotation
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: app-sa
annotations:
iam.gke.io/gcp-service-account: app-gcp@PROJECT_ID.iam.gserviceaccount.com
Benefits:
See Migration Guide for detailed migration steps.
from google.cloud import storage
# Credentials automatic
client = storage.Client(project='PROJECT_ID')
bucket = client.bucket('my-bucket')
blob = bucket.blob('data.txt')
blob.download_to_filename('data.txt')
from google.cloud import secretmanager
client = secretmanager.SecretManagerServiceClient()
secret_name = f"projects/PROJECT_ID/secrets/api-key/versions/latest"
response = client.access_secret_version(request={"name": secret_name})
api_key = response.payload.data.decode('UTF-8')
# SERVICE_ACCOUNT_A in PROJECT_A can impersonate SERVICE_ACCOUNT_B in PROJECT_B
gcloud iam service-accounts add-iam-policy-binding \
service-account-b@PROJECT_B.iam.gserviceaccount.com \
--role="roles/iam.serviceAccountUser" \
--member="serviceAccount:service-account-a@PROJECT_A.iam.gserviceaccount.com"
Workload Identity eliminates static keys. Tokens rotate automatically. Access revokes immediately. Audit trail complete. Zero-trust credential model in place.
Instead of storing a static key, your container presents a signed JWT token to prove it's running in your cluster.
| Approach | Token | Rotation | Revocation | Audit | | --------- | ------ | --------- | ----------- | ------- | | Service Account Keys | Static, never changes | Manual | Manual | Weak | | Workload Identity | Dynamic, short-lived | Automatic | Immediate | Full |
Service account keys are abandoned credentials. Workload Identity is ephemeral proof.
How It Works
- Pod requests token - Kubernetes API issues signed JWT
- Token presented to GCP - GCP validates signature
- GCP issues access token - Short-lived credential for GCP APIs
- Automatic rotation - Token refreshes before expiration
See examples.md for detailed code examples.
This guide is split into focused modules:
See examples.md for detailed code examples.
Verification
Test authentication from inside a pod:
kubectl run -it --image=google/cloud-sdk:slim test-wi \ --serviceaccount=app-sa \ -n production \ -- gcloud auth list
Common Mistakes
- Forgetting to annotate the Kubernetes ServiceAccount
- Using wrong format in IAM binding (
serviceAccount:PROJECT_ID.svc.id.goog[NAMESPACE/SA_NAME])- Not granting
roles/iam.workloadIdentityUserrole- Metadata server enabled on nodes (
workloadMetadataConfig.modemust beGKE_METADATA)
See examples.md for detailed code examples.
Problems:
# Kubernetes ServiceAccount with annotation
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: app-sa
annotations:
iam.gke.io/gcp-service-account: app-gcp@PROJECT_ID.iam.gserviceaccount.com
Benefits:
See Migration Guide for detailed migration steps.
from google.cloud import storage
# Credentials automatic
client = storage.Client(project='PROJECT_ID')
bucket = client.bucket('my-bucket')
blob = bucket.blob('data.txt')
blob.download_to_filename('data.txt')
from google.cloud import secretmanager
client = secretmanager.SecretManagerServiceClient()
secret_name = f"projects/PROJECT_ID/secrets/api-key/versions/latest"
response = client.access_secret_version(request={"name": secret_name})
api_key = response.payload.data.decode('UTF-8')
# SERVICE_ACCOUNT_A in PROJECT_A can impersonate SERVICE_ACCOUNT_B in PROJECT_B
gcloud iam service-accounts add-iam-policy-binding \
service-account-b@PROJECT_B.iam.gserviceaccount.com \
--role="roles/iam.serviceAccountUser" \
--member="serviceAccount:service-account-a@PROJECT_A.iam.gserviceaccount.com"
Workload Identity eliminates static keys. Tokens rotate automatically. Access revokes immediately. Audit trail complete. Zero-trust credential model in place.
See examples.md for code examples.
See reference.md for complete documentation.
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